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ABSTRACT
BASHKIRS BETWEEN TWO WORLDS, 1552-1824
MEHMET TEPEYURT

This dissertation examines the transformation of the Bashkir society from a nomadic and
semi-nomadic society to a sedentary society under the Russian empire’s control from the
sixteenth to the early nineteenth centuries. In particular, it analyzes inter-ethnic relations and the
consequences of these relations for both Bashkirs and other peoples in Bashkiria.
The historical Bashkir lands formed Russia’s southeastern frontier for more than two
hundred years and the penetration of non-Bashkir groups into the region was a slow and arduous
process. On the one hand, the region was an extremely dangerous place: the nomadic groups
were quite hostile to the arrival of the agricultural groups who carved out farms from the
pasturelands, thereby harming Bashkir nomadic economy. On the other hand, the Muscovite
Russian governments were fairly averse to the migrations from the European parts of Russia
where a labor force was most needed.
The Muscovite governments followed inconsistent policies in Bashkiria. They attempted
to preserve Bashkir Votchina rights granted by Ivan IV, but on the other hand they were
compelled to protect and improve their interests in the region. This was possible only by
erecting fortifications and seizing territory within Bashkir lands. In the process, the Russians
undermined Bashkir pastoral economy and provoked Bashkir rebellions against Russian policies
in the region. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries witnessed six major Bashkir rebellions
against the Russian state. These rebellions and Russian responses transformed Bashkir society.
The Russian presence and policies had mixed results for both Russians and Bashkirs.
Beginning with the enlightened policies of Peter the Great, the Russian authorities began to

consider the natives as ‘others’ and increasingly took a condescending and often hostile attitude
toward the indigenous people. The Russian government attempted to assimilate Bashkirs and
other non-Russian peoples of the region, including measures to sedentarize nomadic Bashkirs
and attempts to proselytize Orthodox Christianity among then through the Office of the New
Converts after 1731.
In the long term, such efforts had mixed results. On the one hand, by the early nineteenth
century most Bashkirs had shifted from pastoralism to agriculture, and became loyal Russian
subjects, fighting in the Russian army against Napoleon. On the other hand, they became
increasingly Islamicized. Earlier, as a pastoral people, the Bashkirs were not suited to the
practice of Islam and their adoption of this monotheistic religion remained largely superficial.
The Russian policies of repression and sedentarization of Bashkirs inspired and enabled their full
embrace of Islam (because Islam is largely a religion for sedentary societies) as an ideological
means to preserve their distinct Bashkir identity.
By the 1820s Bashkir society was economically and ideologically a more coherent body.
Their pastoral economy had been shattered through the migrations to the region and the Russian
policy of fortified lines and their superficial Islam had given way to orthodox Islam. Their
rebelliousness had been broken but their resistance to Russian assimilation gained another
dimension as a national group. Consequently the imperial policies of the Russian authorities had
modernized a native group and connected them to the wider world.
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Introduction
One of the most salient themes of Russian history is its frontier and its struggle with
either nomadic or sedentary people. In part Russia’s history is the history of a relentless
expansion to the disadvantage of its eastern and southern nomadic neighbors which gained
momentum after the fall of Kazan in 1552. After this date, Russia increasingly added new lands
and peoples to its ever growing empire. Between 1600 and 1900 Russia added an average of
57,000 sq. km every year.1 The unrelenting movement to the east and south made Russia for
centuries an empire of almost endless frontiers. This territorial expansion brought many
different ethnic linguistic and economic groups under Russian control, from sedentary Muslim
Volga Tatars to hunting-gathering animist Siberian groups such as Mansis and Samoyeds.
Russians benefited from this territorial growth in various ways. But it also brought cataclysmic
changes to the indigenous peoples. While some of these peoples were unable to cope with the
new situations, others were able to transform themselves to coexist side by side with the newly
arriving Russians and non-Russian neighbors.
This dissertation examines the period from 1552 to 1824 during which the Bashkir lands
formed Russia’s eastern and southeastern frontier, barring further Russian expansion to the
southeast. The Bashkirs relentlessly resisted Russian intrusions. In this respect, they were much
more successful than many other non-Russian groups who fell victim to Russia’s encroachments.
There are three actors or groups of actors on this frontier- the Russian state, indigenous people,
and various settler groups. This thesis centers on an example of the second group: the Bashkirs
who lived along the Volga-Ural region.
My research initially focused around a nomadic group which inhabited the fringes of a
great empire and it seemed to me a great topic for frontier studies. However as my studies
1

J. P. Cole, Geography of the Soviet Union, (London: Butterworths, 1984), 9.
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evolved, I realized that the Russo-Bashkir case was more than a frontier study. This dissertation
has theoretical and historiographical roots in four areas: recent frontier studies, the history of
conversion to Islam, certain elements of nationalism, and the new imperial history.
Frontier studies
This dissertation is an attempt to bring a much neglected community to light with a
frontier perspective. As frontier people Bashkirs’ history deserves much attention and will
contribute to frontier studies.
The frontier thesis was first introduced by Frederick Jackson Turner in the 1890s. Since
then, a field of frontier studies has developed that has refuted Turner’s thesis to a great degree.
Turner regarded the frontier as a point where savagery and civilization met while virtually
ignoring land conflicts. In his view the frontier offered free land ready to be picked up by
civilized people. For Turner, Indians were faceless impersonal individuals. The focus was on
the white men. His thesis was fraught with defects and abandoned by the 1980s though the
concept has survived and developed into a model for other parts of the world which, enables
scholars to construct analogies and grasp new dimensions of local histories. In the 1980s, a new
approach in the frontier studies emerged which reinterpreted Turner’s thesis. One of them, The
Frontier in History: North America and Southern Africa Compared by Howard Lamar and
Leonard Thompson conceives of the frontier as a zone or territory, rather than a boundary or line,
in which an interpenetration of two previously distinct societies takes place. The frontier, for
them, opens with the arrival of the first representatives of the intrusive society and closes when
one of them (either intrusive or indigenous) emerges as the sole authority in the region. In
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between, the relations between the intruder and the indigenous develop in various ways. They
establish a symbiotic coexistence from which both parties benefit.2
For Lamar and Thompson a frontier can close in different ways: the total extermination
of the indigenous population, their banishment, or their incorporation into the intruders’ political
and economic system. In the Bashkir case this is an insufficient explanation or at least requires
further clarification. I argue that the frontier closes only in the case of total extermination of the
indigenous population or its complete assimilation into the intruder’s culture. Otherwise the
tensions may decline and seem to disappear temporarily, but there is always a dormant potential
that the frontier issue may surface again under the suitable conditions like the collapse of central
authority or a pervasive civil war. For most of the time the relations between the intruder and the
indigenous remain uneasy. Economic, cultural or religious clashes may keep occurring even
after the military defeat.
Aside from clashes I regard the frontier as a field of interaction by two or more distinct
groups. It is mostly a fertile ground for development of different ways of living and a field for
acculturation, as a result of which one group becomes more like the other by borrowing elements
missing from its own culture from a different culture. Richard White asserts that acculturation is
a process in which the dominant culture dictates the correct behavior to the subordinate one. 3 I
argue that in the Bashkir case there was such a process by which the Russians created suitable
conditions under which the Bashkirs accommodated themselves to the new situation.
Stating this, I regard the frontier as a zone of interaction from which the ubordinate group
also benefits and conflict is only a part of the interaction. The distinct groups live together with

2
Howard Lamar & Leonard Thompson, ed. The Frontier in History: North America and Southern Africa Compared
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 7.
3
Richard White, The Middle Ground; Indians, Empires and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991)
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certain tensions of course, they make business, form marriage alliances and at times they fight
shoulder to shoulder against a declared common enemy as in the case of the Pugachev Rebellion
in 1774-1776. This relationship between Bashkirs and Russians is in line with that of Indians
and Europeans on America’s frontier.
A new approach between the colonizer and the colonized in America was formulated by
Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr. in a short article and he argued that Indian history writing should take
new directions to understand the complex relationship between White men and Indians.
However, he added, the focus of this new history must be based on the history of Indians and a
new history of America must be written from the perspective of Indians.4 In the wake of this
article and some other works that stressed the same point point of view, new scholarly works
appeared in the subsequent years which gained momentum in 1980s and 1990s. New Indian
historians such as James Axtell, James H. Merrell, Daniel H. Usner and Richard White have
stressed exchanges between Europeans and Indians in commerce, diplomacy, and society as a
counterbalance to conflict.5
Conversion to Islam
Sedentary peoples such as Russians, Tatars, and Finnic groups influenced the formation
of the nomadic Bashkirs’ ethnic identity with strong religious elements. As stated by Allen J.
Frank, the Bashkirs’ Islamization took place soon after their overlords, the Golden Horde,

4

Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., “The Political Context of a New Indian History,” Pacific Historical Review, 40, No. 3
(Aug., 1971): 357-382.
5
For a limited collection of books published in the context of new Indian History see Richard White, The Middle
Ground; Indians, Empires and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991); Daniel H. Usner, Indians, Settlers & Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lower Mississipi
Valley before 1783 (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Caroline Press, 1992); James Axtell, Natives and
Newcomers: The Cultural Origins of North America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); James H. Merrell,
The Indians' New World: Catawbas and Their Neighbors from European Contact through the Era of Removal
(University of North Carolina Press, 2010)
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converted to Islam in the fourteenth century.6 But due largely to their nomadism, the Bashkirs
remained only nominal Muslims. Even then their nominal Islamism posed certain problems
since they had chosen the Hanafi School of Islam, the most urban and intellectually sophisticated
Islamic school and the least suitable school for a nomadic group. This gives us clues that their
early conversion to Islam was not a conscious choice, but rather an imposition by their Mongol
masters.
In the Turkic world there are certain models of conversion to Islam. One of them is
conversion through assimilation which could be seen among the slave armies of the Abbasids
whose elite troops were Turkish slave soldiers. The other one is the Imperial conversion as
evidenced by the Qarahanids who converted to Islam in the 930s when their king embraced
Islam. Tribal conversion offers another model as in the case of the Saljuks in the late 10th
century. The tribal chief’s acceptance of Islam led the lesser clans to adopt their chiefs’ belief.7
The Bashkirs’ conversion took the third form when tribal chiefs decided to convert to Islam
without fully embracing the major tenets of Islam.
Islam generally played a transforming role in the life of newly converted communities.
At the beginning of the process, a formal and often hierarchical religious authority structure
emerged. In time the religious authority received a degree of legal autonomy from the political
authorities. In the daily life the religious vocabulary found more room in vernacular language
for purposes of exegesis or religious instruction. Finally the religious authorities found a place

6

Allen J. Frank, Islamic Historiography and Bulghar Identity among the Tatars and Bashkirs of Russia (Leiden:
Brill, 1998), 8.
7
Devin A. DeWeese, Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde: Baba Tükles and Conversion to Islam
in Historical and Epic Tradition, (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 9.
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for themselves in the society as spokesmen for the religious community and as exemplars of
religious life.8
This schemes of conversion that Richard W. Bulliet created for sedentary societies to a
great degree conflicts with the history of the nomadic Bashkirs. In the Bashkir case there was no
formal and hierarchical religious authority but rather abyz tribal elders. 9 Because the Bashkirs
were a stateless society, the religious elite developed their own legal autonomy from the tribal
leaders by posing as masters of wisdom. The fusion of religious and vernacular language can be
detected from the Islamization of the names of individuals. Another indicator of Islamization is
the spread of the use of the term Mulla10 for religious personalities. The term Mulla replaced
Abyz as the Islamization of Bashkirs reached its maturity around the end of the eighteenth
century. Also religious authorities emerged as the spokesmen of the Bashkir society when the
tribal leaders were either exterminated during the wars against the Russians or were incorporated
in the 1600s and 1700s.
The Bashkirs’ conversion to Islam was largely incomplete or at least delayed for a very
long time. This delay is not surprising because it is a common pattern throughout the Turkic
Islamic world that conversion to Islam and elaboration of Islamic institutions took place at

8

Richard W. Bulliet, Conversion to Islam in the Medieval Period; An Essay in Quantitative History, (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1979), 34-35.
9
Abyz was a common title in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries for Volga-Ural ulama, and seems to have
indicated any learned person. Literally it means a person who learned Quran by heart. By the first half of the
nineteenth century the term appears to have been replaced by the title mulla.
10
Mulla, a much more inclusive term than abyz, denoted an individual possessing a degree of religious authority
and education among the Muslims of the Volga-Urals region; according to the official definition of the term in the
nineteenth century any Islamic scholar with a status lower than the mufti and higher than müezzins was a mulla.
Literally Mulla means a man who mastered several Islamic religious fields. In this sense Mulla is a more
sophisticated person than abyz. Presumably a mulla is expected to know Quran by heart. Etymologically it is
Mevla, a Arabic word, and means master, pathfinder, helper, educator. With this switch of words from abyz to
mulla, one can detect the rise of religious men to the leadership of the Islamic Bashkir community.
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different times as a result of a sedentarization process.11 As the sedentarization process took
longer, so too did the institutionalization of Islam and the penetration of Islam into the daily lives
of people.
The events that accelerated this conversion process took place after 1552 when Bashkiria
received a high number of devoutly Muslim Tatar refugees escaping from Russian repression.
As intruders, Russian policies in Bashkiria after the 1550s led to a series of indigenous rebellions
that shaped the Bashkirs’ national and religious character embodied by myths and legends.
Religious revival of the frontier Bashkirs was not surprising or unique. The frontier
historian William Cronon asserts that frontier areas offer the best ground for conservative social
movements which seek to withstand cultural change and the conveyors of this new culture, in our
case Russians. It is by no means surprising that religious revival as cultural revitalization
occurred frequently in the frontier areas. Most of the downtrodden indigenous groups yearned
for bygone times.12 Unlike their previous limited acceptance of Islam, the Bashkirs this time
found willing companions, the Volga Tatars, who helped them to revive and form their Islamic
consciousness.
Though Russians deliberately avoided using force to Christianize Bashkirs, their
destruction of the traditional Bashkir life was so sweeping that the Bashkirs had no other
alternative but to embrace Islam presented to them by the Volga Tatars who had also been
victimized by the Russians. The increasing Islamization of the Bashkirs became noticeable as
the leadership of the Bashkir community fell into the hands of religious figures who had led
Bashkir rebellions against the Russians on several occasions. So it can be asserted that
11

Richard W. Bulliet, Conversion to Islam in the Medieval Period; An Essay in Quantitative History, (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1979), 3.
12
William Cronon, George Miles and Jay Gitlin, “Becoming West: Toward a new Meaning for Western History” in
Under an Open Sky; Rethinking America's Western Past, ed. William Cronon (New York: W. W. Norton &
Company, 1992), 19.
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Islamization brought a shift in the social structure of the Bashkirs and a revival in their spiritual
life, as well as a greater determination to resist assimilation attempts by the Russians. Though
the Russians were more successful in other frontier regions, in Bashkiria, Islam increased the
chances of “backward” Bashkirs surviving as an ethnie.
Nationalism
The Bashkirs’ formation as an ethnic community, separate from Volga Tatars, was based
on their nomadic past, tribal traditions, land grants from the Russian tsar and events that were
triggered by this land grant including their wars against the Russians. By the end of the
eighteenth century an ambiguous Bashkir identity had emerged which lacked secular dimensions.
The formation of Bashkir nationality is related to a radical change in their life style from
nomadism to sedentarism. This shift produced anachronistic results in Bashkirs’ nationalization
due to the fact that Bashkirs’ development of a national identity lacked an urban intellectual
basis but rather, as an indicator of their isolation from the modern world i.e., Western Europe.
In the case of the Bashkirs, it was a retroactive development inspired by religious awakening
which lacked secular dimensions. The Tatars’ impact upon the Bashkirs was in this sense
remarkable, since they also belonged to a fading age of religious sensibilities surrounding
themselves with the long void of theological arguments that influenced their political behavior. I
will argue that the Bashkirs’ incipient nationalization process was a byproduct of their common
struggle against the Russians and other sedentary communities in defense of their nomadic life
rather than the result of a premeditated intellectual movement.
Benedict Anderson argues that nationality or “nation-ness” is a cultural artefact. 13 My
purpose is not to examine Anderson’s premise but rather to argue that the emergence of Bashkir
13

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities; Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism revised edition,
(Verso: London, 1991), 4.
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ethnic identity was a natural result of several historical developments including their
sedentarization and Islamization. I will define the reasons and conditions that paved the way for
the emergence of a distinct Bashkir ethnie. In this respect, I will use Anthony D. Smith’s
definition of ethnie which states that “Ethnie (ethnic Communities) may be defined as named
human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an association with
a specific territory and a sense of solidarity.”14
New Imperial History
My study of the Bashkirs seeks to contribute to a major new trend in historiography about
the Russian empire that began around the tie of the Soviet collapse in 1991. This new literature
challenges the earlier, “cold war” historiography that viewed the Russian Empire as a “prisonhouse” of nationalities held together only by force. The new writings, based on a much more
careful and more extensive use of sources, generally argue that the peripheral nationalities living
in Russia’s borderlands while often victimized, also often benefited from Russian rule. In most
cases, Russian authorities in return for loyal services and poddanstvo (literally citizenship)
distributed to the local elite service opportunities, privileges, gifts and a guarantee for the
continuation of their dominant position in their native societies. As a result of these mostly
tolerant imperial policies, indigenous groups remained relatively unchanged from a cultural
perspective, a situation which Thomas Barrett calls ‘underassimilation.’15
The new literature has shown that imperial rule was a much more complex mechanism
than simply a brutalizing omnipotent force which imprisoned nationalities. As was discussed by
Willard Sunderland in his analysis of Boris Mironov’s book, Sotsial’naia Istoriia Rossiia, ‘the

14
Anthony D. Smith, “Structure and Persistence of Ethnie in Montserrat Guibernau.” In The Ethnicity Reader:
Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Migration, 2. edition, ed. John Rex, (Polity Press: Cambridge, 2010), 27.
15
Thomas M. Barrett, At the Edge of Empire: The Terek Cossacks and the North Caucasus Frontier, 1700-1860
(Boulder –Colorado: West View Press, 1999), 190.
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relative gifts of the Pax Russica have been generally underappreciated.’16 The key study that
opened this new approach was Andreas Kappeler’s book Russland als Vielvolkerreich:
Entstehung, Geschichte, Zerfall, which was translated into English in 2001 as The Russian
Empire: A Multiethnic History after the collapse of the USSR. Generally scholars of the field
agree that Kappeler’s book opened new venues in this field and its influence was so great that
according to Austin Jersild Kappeler simply created a sub-field within the study of imperial
Russian history.17 Kappeler sought to write a study of the empire that focused on the nonRussian nationalities. Even though the study was somewhat flawed because it did not examine
the Russians as an ethnic group, still it continues to influence the ongoing Anglo-American
history writing regarding Russian imperial history. Kappeler’s book inspired numerous
additional studies of the Russian empire and imperial borderlands in the 1990s and 2000s. This
period can be called the era of “imperial boom.” 18 The number of studies dealing with various
nationalities of the Russian Empire increased by leaps and bounds in 2000s. 19

16

Willard Sunderland, “Empire in Boris Mironov’s Sotsial’naia Istoriia Rossii,” Slavic Review 60, (Autumn 2001):
573.
17
Austin Jersild, “Russia, from the Vistula to the Terek to the Amur,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 1, (Summer, 2000): 533 (Review)
18
For a limited collection of essays and books published in 1990s, see Daniel R. Brower and Edward J. Lazzerini,
eds., Russia’s Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700–1917 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1997); Jane Burbank and David L. Ransel, Imperial Russia: New Histories for the Empire (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1998), especially Thomas M. Barrett and Willard Sunderland’s essays pertaining to interactions
between Russian settlers and native aliens are revealing; Michael Khodarkovsky, Where Two Worlds Met: The
Russian State and the Kalmyk Nomads, 1600-1771 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1992)
19
Just some of them are as follows: Christian Noack, Muslimischer Nationalismus im Russischen Reich:
Nationsbildung und Nationalbewegung bei Tataren und Baschkiren, 1861–1917 [Muslim Nationalism in the
Russian Empire: Nation-Building and National Movements among the Tatars and Bashkirs, 1861–1917]. (Stuttgart:
Franz Steiner Verlag, 2000); Jane Burbank, Mark Von Hagen, and Anatoly Remnev, eds., Russian Empire: Space,
People, Power, 1700–1930 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007); Robert P. Geraci and Michael
Khodarkovsky, eds., Of Religion and Empire: Missions, Conversion, and Tolerance in Tsarist Russia (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2001); Robert D. Crews, For Prophet and Tsar; Islam and Empire in Russia and Central
Asia (Cambridge Mass. Harvard University Press, 2006); Willard Sunderland, Taming the Wild Field: Colonization
and Empire on the Russian Steppe (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004) Sunderland’s work is a valuable
contribution to the borderland studies but his focus is more on the steppe region and Russian settler colonialism
rather than some particular non-Russian nationalities of the steppe region.
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These decades also witnessed the emergence of two new periodicals which have
particularly focused particular attention on the imperial Russian history. These journals provided
venues for new imperial historian who received their doctoral degrees in 1990s in the wake of
growing imperial studies with new focus on the peoples of the borderlands. The first one,
Kritika, appeared in winter 2000 based in the University of Maryland. Its subtitle, Explorations
in Russian and Eurasian History, redefines the field in light of the fact that the last Russian
Empire, the USSR, divided into 15 republics, most of which themselves contain semiautonomous national regions. Before 1991 the huge Eurasian mass was dominated by the USSR
which was a continuation of the Russian empire. But now in the same mass there are national
states and Russia is just one of them. These newly independent states have their own history
which has now to be studied with little Russian focus. So the use of the term Eurasia signals a
shift from the St. Petersburg or Moscow centered perspectives in writing history of the vast
spaces and multitudes of nationalities.
The other new periodical, Ab Imperio, is published in Kazan but attracts both Russian and
Western scholars as contributors though it is largely a Russian language periodical. It made its
first appearance in 2000 with a subtitle “Studies of New Imperial History and Nationalism in the
Post-Soviet Space.” The starting point of this new focus on Eurasianism, as Mark von Hagen
pointed out, is to constitute an anti-paradigm against two former paradigms (Russia/Orient and
Soviet Union/Modernization) that dominated the field until recently.20
Despite this new trend in the literature, the history of Islam and Muslim communities in
Russian Empire remains relatively little investigated. 21 This area is extremely important both
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21
Robert D, Crews’ book is a good attempt to update a comprehensive history of Islam in Russia. Robert D. Crews.
For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,

11

because of the role of Muslim groups in Russian history and because of their growing
significance in the region today. In this context, my study examines a Muslim Turkic group of
people, Bashkirs, who populated Russia’s southeastern frontier more than two hundred years and
how they benefited in the long run from the Russian rule despite the fact that they were largely
victimized by the Russian rule. I seek to contribute to this field specifically on the history of
Islam and Muslim groups in the Empire, because the field despite its spectacular growth still
lacks certain themes.
We still need to have a good history of the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly in
English language. There are a few articles mainly by Danil D. Azamatov but they do not fill the
gap. At least his book in Russian called Orenburgskoe Magomentanskoe Dukhovnoe Sobranie v
Kontse 18-19 vv. could be translated into English. Smaller national groups are also neglected
under more pervasive fields like Caucasus or Central Asia. In this context, when it comes to
Bashkirs a certain Volga-Ural regional history dominates the scholarly studies while Bashkir
history succumbs to that of much more popular Volga Tatars.
One of my starting points in writing a history of Russo-Bashkir relations was that despite
Bashkirs’ success in preserving their national identity against great odds; they were largely
understudied in the West. Neither in the field of Imperial studies nor in the frontier studies was
much written about them. There are only two scholars in the west who have specifically studied
Bashkiria. Alton Donnelly’s works belong to an earlier era. He mainly analyzed Russian
policies and practices in Bashkiria but devotes little or no attention to the Bashkirs’ point of
view. Its real value derives from the point that it was the first western scholarly work genuinely
dealing with Bashkirs during the imperial period. The works of Charles Steinwedel devote more
2006) However the field still lacks a detailed study of the complex relationships between Russian authorities and
local Islamic elite that will explain controversial policies of the center whether they were opportunistic or pragmatic.
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attention to Bashkirs than Donnelly and his PhD. thesis focuses on the state formation and the
integration of Bashkiria into the Russian system. He analyzes the transformation of the Bashkir
society in the nineteenth century and examines the patterns of Bashkirs’ integration into the
Russian imperial system and he occasionally brings Bashkir point of view to the fore and
explains how Bashkirs benefited from imperial integration. As distinct from Steinwedel I
analyze earlier period of Russo-Bashkir relations from 1550 s to 1820s and argue that the
development of a distinct Bashkir identity became possible only with the incorporation of the
region into the Russian Empire. Both, Donnelly and Steinwedel, devote inadequate attention to
Bashkirs because a pure Bashkir history is nearly impossible due to the long presence of the
Russians in the region. 22 Recognizing this facet of the Bashkir history relying on the available
published sources I have focused on the history of Bashkirs to the extent published primary
sources allowed.
There is a need to write the history of the Volga-Ural region and its peoples with a
regionalist approach focusing on the individual nationalities, their respective histories and their
relations to the Russians. In this way the multinational character of the empire could be better
revealed. This regionalist approach still needs to be defined with a certain methodology as well.
An all-encompassing (comprehensive) history of the Volga-Ural region runs the risk of ignoring
smaller nationalities in favor of more populous/dominant groups as happened in the past.
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Scholars have to consider the risk of focusing too much on single nationalities which may cause
ethnicization, “concentrating too much on one ethnic group while marginalizing the rest.”23
In the west, the existing scholarship about Volga Ural region pertaining to Imperial
period is developing. For example one of the most important sources of the Bashkir culture from
1300s called Kissa’i Yusuf (The story of Joseph) was finally translated into English.24 Earlier
Allen J. Frank’s works on the Volga-Ural region gave a new impetus to Volga-Ural history. He
contributed to the field with a number of works and commentaries that pointed to the availability
of local manuscripts written by Muslim scholars which still remain untranslated.25 Their
translation into English will enable the scholars to study the history of the people of the region
from indigenous point of view and will free them from the Russian scholarly approach to these
indigenous people.
My second point in writing such an essay is that despite their traumatic history Bashkirs
nevertheless managed to survive as a distinct group not exterminated by Russians and not
assimilated by a much more sophisticated Volga Tatar culture. Bashkirs at the beginning of the
Russian rule in 1550s were, culturally and economically, the least advanced group and the
Bashkir identity unlike a number of other people with a considerable population in the region,
like Bobyls and Teptiars, who submerged into either Tatar or Bashkir national groups, survived
to this day. In this study I analyze the factors that enabled Bashkir survival and their complex
relations with Russians and other non-Russian groups who moved into the region, thereby
gradually changing the Bashkirs’ traditional way of life.
23

Aleksei I. Miller, “Between Local and Inter-Imperial Russian Imperial History in Search of Scope and Paradigm”
Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, 5, (2004), 12.
24
Fred Beake, Ravil’ Bukharaev, trans. The Story of Joseph / Kissa’i Yusuf (Folkestone, UK : Global Oriental, 2010)
25
Allen J. Frank, Islamic Historiography and "Bulghar" Identity among the Tatars and Bashkirs of Russia (Boston:
Brill, 1998); Allen J. Frank. Muslim Religious Institutions in Imperial Russia: the Islamic World of Novouzensk
District and the Kazakh Inner Horde, 1780-1910, (Boston: Brill, 2001); Allen J. Frank, Tatar Islamic Texts
(Hyattsville, MD: Dunwoody Press, 2008)

14

In writing this essay I encountered a number of difficulties, as all doctoral students did.
Because of visa problems and obligatory military service in Turkey I was unable to leave the
USA to conduct archival research in Russia. As a result most of the sources are secondary
sources from the Imperial, Soviet or Federal Russia period but I endeavored to reinterpret the
existing literature with a new outlook. On the other hand I widely used published primary
sources in Russian under the title Materialy po Istorii Bashkirskoi Istorii, a six volume serial,
which enabled me to get most of the materials in writing this essay. Another published primary
source was Ravil Kuzeev’s Bashkirskie Shezhere (Bashkir Genealogy) that provided valuable
information about the early Russo-Bashkir relations for the sixteenth century Volga-Ural region.
Imperial Russian publications like Trudy Orenburgskoi Uchenoi Arkhivnoi Kommissii also
provided much needed archival materials. I also directly quoted from the archival materials from
the Russian scholars’ works and reinterpreted them with a new outlook.

15

Chapter 1
The Beginning of the Russo-Bashkir Relations
Russians conquered their age-old enemy the Kazan Khanate in 1552. It was at this point,
they came in contact with the Bashkirs, who were former vassals of the Kazan Tatars. Unlike
other groups, the Bashkirs became militarily the most troublesome subjects of Russians for more
than two hundred years from 1552 to 1775. During this period they effectively prevented
Russian advance toward Central Asia. Despite this situation, Russians never developed any
specific hatred against them as they did against the Kazan Tatars. It is no wonder that Kazan
was deliberately destroyed and Kazan Tatars were persecuted by the Russians as revenge for 200
years of the Mongol yoke. The Bashkirs, however, never established any independent state and
they never raided Russian territory by themselves. Accordingly the Russian attitude toward
Bashkirs was one of cold indifference for the most part of the history of their interactions. .

The Russians’ First Extension of Sovereignty over Bashkiria, 15th-17th Centuries
My purpose in this section is to present some aspects of the Bashkir way of life that most
radically that most radically differed from the Russians’ way of life and that did not meet the
requirements of the new conditions. The two opposing cultures, Bashkirs and Russians, first
established political relations after the fall of Kazan in 1552. The Russians as a sedentary group
found it difficult to develop a well-set political program pertaining to the Bashkirs’ nomadic
culture. The Bashkirs, on the other hand, lacked the necessary mindset to appreciate the true
nature of the quite different civilization represented by Russians. Russians demanded a number
of obligations from the Bashkirs, including recognition of Russian suzerainty, and paying yearly
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tribute in the form of Iasak.1 For the Bashkirs this was not something new as they used to pay
Iasak to their previous masters, Nogai, Kazan and Sibir Khanates. The potential trouble was not
the expectations of these obligations from the Bashkirs, but the Russians’ lack of deliberate goals
in Bashkiria. They had no master plan for dealing with these these nomadic people. It was for
this reason that Russians had so many troubles with the Bashkirs as they attempted to bring them
into their fold and incorporate Bashkir lands into Russia.
Russians appeared in Bashkir lands as early as the 1460s as hunters. At the beginning of
the sixteenth century there were a few Bashkir groups in the Muscovite Russian Empire, mostly
because of westward migration of some Bashkir clans.2 The Russians’ appearance in the area as
a political and military force took another century, only after the annihilation of the Kazan
Khanate which constituted a major barrier to Russian expansion to the east in 1552. The Russian
victory over the Kazan Khanate was one of several Russian attempts to break their isolation.
This policy intensified in the process that transformed Russia from a derelict Muscovite
principality into post-Petrine Imperial Russia.
Soviet historians have had heated debates about the nature of the first Russo-Bashkir
relations after the fall of Kazan. It is almost universally accepted that Bashkirs were
incorporated into the Russian empire in 1557 as a result of peaceful negotiations between
Russian authorities and Bashkir elders and that this incorporation had progressive results for

1
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2
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Bashkirskie Vosstaniia 17 i Pervoi Poloviny 18 vv.” in Materialy po Istorii Bashkirskoi Istorii, part 1: Bashkirskie
Vosstaniia v 17 i Pervoi Polovine 18 vv. (Moskva&Leningrad: Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1936), 22. The
author maintains that 1468 was the year when Russians first reached Bashkiria but they did not leave any imprint in
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Bashkirs.3 There are a variety of objections to this assertion, raised generally by Tatar historians
who claimed that Russians’ arrival in the region had devastating effects for the Bashkir groups.
These historians argue that there was a problem in the so-called “Bashkirs’ voluntary
incorporation” into the Russian empire since there were only three Bashkir elders who bowed
before Ivan the Terrible.
Also Bashkir lands were so vast4 that in 1557 Russians could only show their presence in
the western parts of Bashkiria while eastern Bashkiria remained under the Siberian Khanate until
its destruction by Russians at the end of the century.5 Quite naturally, only the westernmost
Bashkir groups yielded to this new power while the rest of the Bashkir tribes to the east and
southeast did not hurry to recognize the new masters. Bashkir historian R. N. Zinurov, in a
controversial work, maintained that there was a bitter five year-long war between Russians and
Bashkir tribes which forced the ‘white padishah’(Tsar) to send them a deputation.6 The same
revisionist historian in another work maintains that the value of the charter granted by the
Russian tsar was insignificant because the Tsar in no way felt himself compelled to promise
anything to eastern ‘savages’ since they were judicially unequal.7 Zinurov is definitely not alone

3
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in his assertions about the bloody nature of Bashkir incorporation to the Russian Empire. D. Zh.
Valeev argues that Bashkirs did not recognize Russian authority instantly and peacefully, and
asks that if Bashkirs had accepted Russian authority willingly how could one explain a twohundred year-long Russo-Bashkir war? 8 The first massive Bashkir rebellion, however, started in
1662, a century after the incorporation, when the Russian policies in the region created
conditions that harmed the traditional nomadic economy and nomadic social structure, a fact
which Tatar historians tend to overlook.
In the 1990s and early 2000s there emerged alternative interpretations that stressed
another version of the nature of Bashkir incorporation into the Russian Empire. N. A. Mazhitov
and A. Sultanov define this process as "compulsory-voluntary." In their opinion the Tsar’s
treatment of Bashkir envoys indicated the coercive nature of the Russian assimilation of
Bashkiria. The process could also be interpreted as an ultimatum because the severe winter
conditions claimed lives of many Bashkirs and their livestock which made them vulnerable.9 D.
A. Safonov, like Madzhitov and Sultanov, argued that Bashkirs surely did not rush to the arms of
Russia but had to do this due to the apparent threat of Russian aggression. This so-called
voluntariness not only saved the lives of Bashkirs but also brought a series of concessions to
them.10
One last interpretation from the extensive Russian literature on the initial Russian contact
with the Bashkirs is quite interesting from the semantic point of view. Zufar Enikeev argues
8
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against the Russian word prisoedinenie (annexation), claiming that this term is a tendentious and
Eurocentric word which implies a one-sided act, an acquisition by the Russian government. In
fact the Russian presence in the Bashkir lands became possible only after the Bashkirs received
client status. So the correct term for this occurrence is the Russian entry. However, he
maintains that, in the final analysis whether there was an entry or annexation by the Russians, it
was a conquest in appearance.11

Russians as patrons of Bashkirs
Ivan IV, the Tsar at the time of the first contact with the Bashkirs, first of all guaranteed
Bashkirs a normal, quiet life, and protection against the claims of their former masters, and from
intrusions of other nomadic groups. Second, the government gave a serious concession to the
Bashkirs on the land question. Bashkirs not only had the right to keep the lands that they already
occupied, but also received votchina rights on their lands. These land rights combined elements
of private property and entail. 12 Votchina lands could be redeemed by any member of the clan
or tribe for up to 40 years after it was alienation and thereby prevented the land’s
commoditization.13 Thirdly, the Russian government promised not to attempt to proselytize
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Muslim Bashkirs, a promise which sharply contrasted with how Russians treated the conquered
Kazan Tatars. Such a promise, on the other hand, can be interpreted as Russians’ lack of a
definite proselytization policy among Muslims. Fourthly, the government avowed to not
interfere in the internal life of the Bashkir population. The local authority was left in the hands
of Bashkir nobles.14
These were generous terms from the Bashkirs’ standpoint. There could be two possible
practical reasons for this Russian generosity. In the frontier areas the hold of a central
government, either Russian or any other government, was most of the time tenuous. Since
centrifugal tendencies are always strong among indigenous populations, weak government
authority made it relatively easy for these peoples to switch sides and look for alternative
patrons. Accordingly rulers were only rarely willing to take risks to impose their will on the
peoples of the frontier.15 The majority of the Bashkirs when Russians took over the Kazan
khanate in 1552 were living under Nogai khanate, another rival of Russia. Russian authorities
calculated that if they imposed too harsh terms on the Bashkirs of the former Kazan khanate, this
could lead to an exodus of Bashkirs away from Russian control. These Bashkirs would go south
and southeast to join with the other Bashkirs to form a group resisting against Russia’s further
advance into the region. Russian imposition of harsh terms could also discourage those Bashkirs
who were at the time beyond their territory from accepting Russian suzerainty. It was a grave
necessity for the Russians to attract other groups of Bashkirs to their side. Their cautious policy
in an unstable frontier soon bore fruit as a large envoy of Min, one of the most populous Bashkir
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tribes, arrived in Moscow in 1554 to apply for Russian suzerainty. They expected the same
privileges granted to other Bashkir tribes earlier and then they abandoned their Nogai masters.16
As for votchina rights, traditionally the Russian Tsar considered land as his patrimony
that he inherited from his ancestors. Even after the recovery of old Kievan lands and new
military conquests in the areas that had never been a part of old Kiev, Russian tsars continued to
consider all these lands as their own property. Richard Pipes described this pattern as a Russian
patrimonial system: “Once an area had been annexed to Moscow, whether or not it had ever
formed part of Kiev, and whatever the ethnic and religious affiliation of its indigenous
population, it immediately joined the 'patrimony' of the ruling house, and all succeeding
monarchs treated it as a sacred trust which was not under any circumstances to be given up.”17
Unlike Pipes’ negative stance about Russian patrimonialism, such a system was not uniquely
Russian. Other western European colonial empires widely relied on such a system as well. The
patrimonial system was an effective administrative method for the European colonial empires
which lacked enough personnel and left the local politics to the indigenous collaborative agents
and thereby effectively continued their rule with minimal use of force.18
Such a land system was protective of the existing social structure and preventive of
radical changes and social upheaval since changes take place in the long run and very slowly.
Direct rule on the other hand required a high number of competent officials who would be able
to impose the will of the central authority and construct a centralized administration which would
16
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require the dismantling of the existing indigenous institutions. Such a system was both
transformative and intensive.19 It would endanger the indigenous social system and cause the
destruction of a whole community. Unlike Richard Pipes’ derogatory remarks, the votchina
system was a quite favorable system for the Bashkir groups which were not in a position to deal
with the risks of radical and abrupt transformations.
The history of Bashkirs under Russians, until mid-1700s when Russians firmly brought
Bashkir lands under their control, revolved around the question of who really owned the land in
Bashkiria. It was the main reason for all the Bashkir rebellions that haunted the region until
Pugachev rebellion. A number of imperial Russian historians argued that the Russian
government had assigned the Bashkirs votchina rights but never made its point clear precisely
about the ultimate land ownership.20 There are however hints about the ultimate landownership.
V. N. Vitevskii comments that Bashkirs lost their rights to sell the land to other persons; they
could only give the land as “quitrent no more than two years to other Bashkirs but to rent or sell
the land to other inorodets (other faiths) or Russians was strictly prohibited."21
The Muscovite Law Code (Ulozhenie) of 1649 states that “ Boyars, and okol'nichie, and
counselors, and stol'niki, and striapchie, and Moscow dvoriane, and provincial dvoriane and deti
boiarskie, and Russians of all ranks shall not buy or exchange service [lands] or any [other]
lands, and sha1l not take [land] on mortgage, and [as] grants, and on hire for many years [in any
transactions] in the provincial towns with princes, and with mirzas, and with Tatars, and with
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Mordovians, and with Chuvashes, and with Cherernises, and with Votiaks, and with Bashkirs.”22
The Code of 1649 is a genuine example of patrimonial codification which substantially regulated
every estate and the relations among them and their relations with the state. In the final analysis
the articles of this vast codification relating to the Bashkir lands that forbade their sale was an
attempt by the central authority to protect Bashkir lands from the rapacious speculators. This
kind of patrimonial codification often promotes the security of all social elements.23
Even if Russian Tsars saw themselves as the ultimate owners of the Bashkir lands,
Bashkirs did not share this view. Both sides had their own legitimate reasons to push their
claims forward. It should be borne in mind that a patron and a client are not on equal status. In
their relationship there is a certain disparity with respect to their wealth, power and status. A
patron has the capabilities and responsibilities in times of need to supply goods and services to
the client who needs them for his own survival and well-being.24 But this delivery of supplies
does not make the patron all-powerful over the client. Although he could issue commands, the
patron also has some reciprocal responsibilities.
This relationship is not a formal and impersonal one where the boundaries of the
relationship are clearly defined.25 Such a patron-client relationship corresponds closely to the
relationship between Bashkirs and Russian authorities at the very beginning of the formation of
this patron-client relationship. The fact that Russian rulers lacked means to impose direct rule in
the distant Bashkir lands led them to recognize Bashkirs’ autonomy, but the existing social
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dynamics of the Muscovite Russia had the potential to endanger tranquility in Bashkiria. The
most sensitive issue for Bashkirs was the protection of their lands from being seized by those
who escaped from the Russian state’s repressive measures. The Muscovite authorities had a
bifurcated dilemma in Bashkiria. They were interested in the steady flow of Iasak payments and
the tranquility of the region but on the other hand they were short of competent administrators
and were unable to stop the migration of other national groups to the region and their seizure of
Bashkir lands. The more Russian authorities failed to prevent the mass migration of people from
the central areas of Russia and from the middle Volga region, the more tensions increased in
Bashkiria. Under such conditions the Muscovite rulers had no other alternative but to decree that
Bashkir lands were close to colonization and in this context they almost always confirmed
Bashkirs’ votchina rights.26
The outstanding Russian historian of the region in the nineteenth century, N. V. Firsov,
contended that the ultimate owner of the all the lands not only in Bashkiria but throughout Russia
was the tsar. He further noted that the sovereign considered himself complete owner of the lands
of Kazan, Astrakhan, the Nogai lands, Perm and Siberia. And the sovereign gave this land to
whomever he wanted and under whatever conditions he redeemed necessary. While doing this,
he never asked for the consent of the original owners of the land.27 This ambiguous situation
was the most troublesome problem for both parties. Muscovite rulers did not feel themselves in
a strong position in its relation to Bashkirs and never made clear their intentions of encroachment
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in Bashkiria in order better to exploit the riches of the region and take greater advantage of its
strategic location. Still, the local conditions made their officials adopt a gradual land seizure
policy without inciting Bashkir restlessness until the reign of Peter the Great.
In 1557, Bashkiria was a too great morsel for the Russians to swallow at one time as their
lands extended from Middle Volga in the west to Tobol River in the east, some 33 million
desiatinas.28 While the westernmost Bashkirs recognized Russian suzerainty in 1550s, those
groups to the east only gradually entered into the sphere of Russian influence when the so-called
unification of Bashkirs under Russians was complete. In the 1620s the easternmost Bashkir
groups - Kara and Baryn Tabyn, Synrian- accepted Russian suzerainty after the fall of the
Siberian Khanate.29

Initial Russian Administrative policies
The best possible way for the Russians to absorb Bashkir lands or to have a façade of
Russian administration in the region was to delineate Bashkir territory in terms of the tribal
composition of those lands and proximity of them to the center. Not surprisingly one of the very
first acts of the Russian authorities in the region was to preserve four dorogas, administrative-
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territorial divisions which had been created earlier by the Golden Horde. 30 The preservation of
these by the Russians could be understood as the Russian attempt not to overthrow the previous
system and to provide an orderly flow of Iasak payments to the Russian treasury. The dorogi
became a central theme in the Russian administration of the region. The four dorogi - Kazan,
Osin, Sibir and Nogai - were further divided into volosts, a total of 75 in Bashkiria by the
1730s.31 Even though this administrative division in the form of dorogas helped the Russians to
better grasp the features of the region, the Bashkir groups did not have any sense of these
divisions. As nomads, they had no use of these divisions and crisscrossed those imagined lines
whenever they needed to.32
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Bashkir Dorogas (Oblasts): 1. Kazan. 2. Osin. 3. Sibir. 4. Nogai.33

Ivan the Terrible’s grant of clientage to the Bashkirs was a remarkable event and the
Bashkirs were the only group within Russia to receive such a status. It is therefore not surprising
that the Bashkirs’ patrimonial rights were legally formalized first by Ivan the Terrible.34 In the
following decades, this grant was reaffirmed several times as evidenced by the Imperial mandate
The map is available at http://www.bashedu.ru/encikl/ddd/dorogi.htm .
N. V. Firsov makes a comparison between Bashkirs and those Tatars of former Kazan khanate and maintains that
no other indigenous had more privileges than Bashkirs with so few obligations like paying a meager Iasak than paid
by the other subject peoples. N. A. Firsov, Inorodcheskoe Naselenie Prezhnego Kazanskogo Tsarstva v Novoi Rossii
do 1762 Goda i Kolonizatsiia Zakamskikh Zemel’ v Eto Vremia.Vol.6, (Kazan: 1871), 21.
33
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from the voevod in Ufa in 1664, and government decrees of 1632, 1654, 1694, 1734, 1739, 1755,
1790 and later years.35 The decrees that guaranteed the Bashkirs’ votchina rights and the
authorities’ policies to centralize administration may seem contradictory. What the government
did was to ensure that Bashkir lands were kept as tribal votchina but as time passed on the
number of migrants increased and the amount of Bashkir lands diminished. Still, those
remaining parts of Bashkir lands were, against all odds, conceived as Bashkir votchina lands.
Bashkiria was at the fringe of the Muscovite Russia, a genuine border area. An analogy
can be established in this respect between Russia’s Bashkir frontier and the Roman Empire’s
frontiers. “Because they (frontier areas) are ethnically and culturally different from the interior
provinces, the frontier zones offered peculiar challenges to imperial ingenuity.”36 Thus, this
grant was not without reasons. Ernest Gellner argues that “a state may have partial control of
outlying geographical areas and find it uneconomic to assert itself in them. It may then hand
over power in them to individuals who … possess a local power base and who mediate between
central requirement and local interests.”37 In light of this statement it can be argued that this
Russian resilience in the face of newly added territories and subjects, however nominally
controlled, reflected an intention to avoid alienating the indigenous population. Imposing a new
system could elicit an unexpected reaction by the local population and endanger Russians’
unsubstantial presence in the region. To draw a low profile for the time being seemed the best
alternative.
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Bashkir society in the late 16th-early 17th Centuries
The Bashkirs, unlike their former masters, the Kazan Khanate, did not have a single
center and a single leadership. On the contrary their lands at the time of Russians’ appearance in
the region had been under a number of Khanates: the Sibir Khanate in the eastern part of Bashkir
territory, the Nogay Khanate in the southeast and the Astrakhan Khanate in the south and
southwest. On the other hand Bashkirs were organized into at least thirty tribes, each led by a
number of notables, divided into many more clans with many local leaders such as beis38 and
murzas.39 The relations between these tribes were far from friendly because of the competition
and frictions over pasturelands.40 Under such conditions in the region the best way for the
Russians to save face was to grant client status to the Bashkirs and let them handle their own
affairs themselves. To interfere with local institutions and practices could only harm Russia’s
prestige among the peoples of the region, which they had gained after the conquest of Kazan.
The dilemma of the intruder was that the military means were good enough to defeat armed
resistance, but they were a dismal failure in consolidating Russian rule effectively. Russia
lacked the means necessary to execute central government objectives beyond collecting Iasak.
A minority of the Bashkir groups, especially those who lived in areas near former Kazan
khanate, were sedentary or semi-nomadic. The rest of the Bashkir groups migrated between
pasturelands. This nomadic aspect of Bashkir life created serious problems for the Bashkirs
since they encountered a sedentary culture after the 1550s, Russia, whose demands for fields
clashed with Bashkir demands for meadows.41
38
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One other radical difference between nomadic and sedentary societies was that nomadic
Bashkirs did not have a system of private property in land.42 Carving out lands, declaring them
privately owned, and prohibition of the free passage of nomads through these lands seemed the
strangest practices to the Bashkirs. Bashkirs owned the land communally but operated on these
lands individually. Each member of the Bashkir community had the right to use land but cattle
were owned individually. Such practices were the most useful for a nomadic or semi-nomadic
society and the Bashkirs resisted Russian attempts in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to
turn pastures into privately owned fields.43 Though Russians had promised to preserve the
Bashkirs’ socio-economic structure, their civilization operated at a different level and they were
in the long run unwilling to preserve this system because a property system would be better
many reasons. Since these two cultures were intolerably alien, whatever the Russians did would
seem like appropriation to the Bashkirs.
The traditional form of life of Bashkirs changed very slowly, and the development of a
sedentary life among these nomads was a difficult process. In this context, Imperial and Soviet
period historians, with some exceptions, always preferred to view Russian conquest of the region
as a progressive move. They claimed that Bashkirs were living in a nomadic hunter-gatherer
historical stage while the Russians were at a much more advanced form of life because they were
sedentary and agrarian and brought true forms of sedentary life to Bashkir lands and thereby
transformed them.
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This argument must be taken with some skepticism because Bashkir society had shown
the first obvious signs of the development of a sedentary society under their Tatar-Mongol
suzerains by the late 1400s. There was an increasing tendency among the Bashkirs to embrace
some aspects of sedentary life especially in the wooded and mountainous areas ill-suited to
nomadism. Other developments tending toward sedentarism included the growing preference of
the cattle-raising as opposed to camel herds of the steppe region, emergence of beekeeping and
metal workmanship, privately owned livestock, and the growing feudalization of Bashkir society
who had been granted patrimonial rights by their suzerains.44 Bashkirs in the northwest region of
Bashkiria, vassals of the former Kazan Khanate, had already passed to the stage of agriculture.45
A Russian official from the Kungur district, Osin doroga, in northern Bashkiria wrote that
“Bashkirs of the region (Osin doroga) mostly grow grain, never leave their region for steppe
region for their herds. In fact they live like Russian peasants. Their herd is not large but they cut
a lot of hay for spring to feed their animals.”46 It could be assumed that even without Russian
interference, which ultimately cost the Bashkirs two hundred years of warfare and material and
human loss, Bashkirs would have developed a sedentary agricultural life anyway. 47
The Bashkirs and the Russians were so radically different that a compromise was reached
only at the cost of granting them autonomy by the Russian tsar. The Russian authorities’ first
consternation was caused by Bashkirs’ lack of any plausible political organization, which
prevented Russians from establishing a reasonable vassal-lord relation in the area. Conversely,
44
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Russians had to deal with so many different Bashkir groups and demands that the only solution
for them momentarily was to leave Bashkirs alone until the time they could figure out a workable
solution to the issue. Nomadic, nominally Muslim, tribal Bashkirs were to create within a
century great troubles for the sedentary, centralized, Christian Russian state. The radical
differences in the mindsets of both groups caused countless misunderstandings that created a
fruitful backdrop for armed clashes. The Bashkir case was an extremely important encounter of
Muscovite Russians with a fully nomadic society whose centrifugal tendencies had to be
restrained in one way or another. The Russians had no idea about how to achieve this and they
showed considerable confusion.
The first evidence of this confusion that took place was the grant of votchinnoe pravo by
the Russian tsar to some of the Bashkir tribal leaders soon after the nominal Russian
incorporation of the Bashkir lands. When Russians granted autonomy and a land charter to
Bashkirs, they thought it was a favor to Bashkirs and its status would be permanent. From the
Bashkir point of view, these grants were only temporary and they believed Russians were no
different than their previous masters, Kazan or Sibir khans or Nogais. This meant to them that
Bashkirs were the unquestionable masters of their own lands as long as they paid their yearly
tribute (Iasak). Despite counterarguments by some of the historians that the Bashkirs were
militarily crushed by Russians and forced to recognize Russians as new lords48, it seems clear
that the Bashkirs accepted the Russians as their new lords without too much fuss, considering the
military might of Russians which destroyed their former masters without a major difficulty.
48
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Another motive for the Bashkir recognition of Russian protection was the tumult in the Bashkir
lands under their former lords, Kazan, Sibir and Nogai khanates, and the nearly endless wars
between them that almost destroyed Bashkirs’ means of livelihood. The Russians seemed strong
enough to put an end to those times of troubles, granting votchina to various Bashkir tribes
stating “Let no one run, let each remain in his own faith in compliance with his customs.”49
This declaration is evidence that not only were the Russians not exclusively brutal exploiters, but
the subject peoples had an interest in accepting some degree of Russian domination for their own
goals.
The Russian authorities left the local affairs of the Bashkir tribes to the authority of the
Bashkir elders (starshina). These starshinas had to perform a number of functions including the
administration of their districts (volosts); leading national congresses, (Iighin) and popular
gatherings50; organization of the collection of tribute; military service in the capacity of the
protection of Russia’s southeastern frontiers; preservation of order and safety in the region and
negotiation with the nearby ethnic groups like Kalmyks to stop mutual attacks into each other’s
territory.51 Unlike their earlier policy of converting local nobles to orthodoxy as was the case in
the Kazan region, Russian authorities did not force Bashkir elites to embrace Christianity in
order not to perturb the already unnerved Bashkir life in distant regions where the Russian
authority was shaky.
49
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Russians did successfully incorporate a number of Bashkir elite into the Russian service.
Those leaders played later on an ominous role in the crushing of Bashkir rebellions in the 1600s
and 1700s. On the other hand there was another side to this gathering. By relying on these
Bashkir elite, Russian authorities were also strengthening Bashkir nobles’ position in the Bashkir
society and creating some sort of solid leadership among this mercurial people. Such an elite, if
their material needs were not fulfilled or they were humiliated by the center, could lead their
forces with the Bashkir masses, increasingly overburdened by the Iasak payments as the
seventeenth century progressed, in rising against increasing Russian interference, either by the
state or by individuals like colonizers, in local Bashkir affairs.
Firouzeh Mostashari argues in her book about the Northern Caucasus that as part of their
colonial policy Russians endeavored to co-opt Muslim elites by distributing benefits. Thanks to
such actions, the local elite were discredited in the eyes of the local population and lost their
traditional social standing.52 This was partially true for the Bashkir case. When Bashkir nobles
switched sides from the Russian government to the disgruntled Bashkir masses they were always
more than welcome, especially because the fate of the tribe often depended on the rich elite who
had the means to finance a war effort against the government. Not surprisingly the greatest
Bashkir rebellions were led by wealthy Bashkir nobles.
Despite all these elements of self-government that the Russian tsars granted the Bashkirs,
the conditions of Bashkirs worsened over time. Their right to the lands came up against a
number of obstacles. Bashkir tribes and clans were required to have written evidence that stated
their right to those lands granted by the state. Otherwise Russian authorities would declare their
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land occupation illegal.53 On the other hand the free seasonal migrations of the Bashkirs were
prevented because of a series of fortifications in the Bashkir lands. The Russians repeatedly
confiscated Bashkir lands for the construction of fortresses as well as villages, settlements and
factories. Unlike previous lords of the Bashkirs like the Kazan Tatars and Nogais, Russians
attempted to control these new lands, at least in part. The first of a series of garrison towns was
Ufa, whose foundation in 1574 admittedly upon the request by Bashkirs to facilitate the
collection of Iasak, because Kazan where the Iasak payments were made was far away, and to
improve Bashkir defenses against the raids of Kazakhs and Kalmyks,54 opened a new phase in
the history of the region. 55 Ufa gained town status in 1586 and it became the first true city in the
region until the foundation of Birsk in 1663, housing a number of Tsarist officials, streltsy
(musketeers) and merchants.

Russian Deviations from Bashkir Votchina Rights
The expansion of Russian authority in the region was closely tied primarily to the
construction of towns in the middle of the Bashkir territories. The first of these towns, Ufa,
quickly became a center of the Russians’ far-reaching operations on internal and international
levels. It became the place where Russians supervised the collection of tribute not only from
Bashkirs but also from the surrounding regions like Perm and western Siberia. Ufa also served
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as diplomatic center through which Russian authorities conducted diplomatic relations with
Kazakhs and Central Asians as well.56 The chief administrator, the voevoda or military
governor, resided in Ufa, conducting governmental duties relating to the region. These military
governors were the chief instruments of the central government and their primary duty was to
ensure the steady flow of Iasak payments and to monitor Bashkirs and other peoples. They were
unable to back Bashkirs against the attacks of other people, i.e. Kazakhs, who lived beyond
Russian border. The Russians were supposed to give support to Bashkirs as part of their
obligations mentioned in the vassalage documents but the Russian authorities never seriously
considered fulfilling this promise. Russians took the vassalage agreement into consideration in a
one-sided way: Bashkirs were supposed to protect Russia’s southeastern borders not vice versa.
The first people who arrived in Ufa were, quite naturally for a frontier town, officials,
Service Tatars, novokreshcheny or New Converts, tolmachy or translators, and the most
numerous group, streltsy or musketeers. Ufa began with 150 people whose food was sent from
the central provinces, a practice that seemed most impractical considering the distance, lack of
roads, climatic conditions and ecology. There was a thin line between civilization (in this case
agricultural production) and wilderness. The immediate needs of the garrison of Ufa broke this
line and in central Bashkiria agriculture was started by these officials, soldiers and others after
the government distributed to them seeds of rye, oat and barley.57 At the beginning the land
seizures by the Russians took place in the vicinities of the town but with the arrival of new
settlers at the beginning of the sixteenth century land seizures increased. Even though those
Bashkirs in the western parts of the region were not alien to sedentary life and agriculture, the
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ones who lived in central, eastern and southern parts were more nomadic than sedentary. Under
Russian direction agricultural life was about to begin in those areas. So storm clouds were
slowly appearing on the horizon.
In the 1500s, considering the fragility of their situation in the region, the Russian attitude
was based on gaining the acquiescence of the Bashkir groups by keeping a low profile.
Although the construction of Ufa was undertaken only after the consent of the indigenous people
which proved to be a very remarkable event, it quickly became an inseparable part of Russia. Its
location gave a strategic advantage to the Russians since it was founded right in the middle of the
region at the confluence of the Belaia and Ufa Rivers.
The Russian government needed this town for a number of reasons. First of all it would
enable Russians to improve their lot in a region where tribal aristocratic system of Bashkirs were
highly volatile and Russians felt compelled to make a strong showing to guarantee regular flow
of Iasak payments to the central treasure. Russians soon after the incorporation realized that only
those Bashkirs who lived around towns, Ufa and Birsk58, both founded in 1574, Osa, founded in
1591, and called Novo-Nikolskaya Sloboda, at the time paid Iasak on a regular bases, so the
taxation of all Bashkirs was a primary requirement.59 These were followed by Menzelinsk in
1645 and as part of Trans-Kama line strongholds, Belyi Iar, Eryklinsk, Tiinsk, Biliarsk,
Novosheshminsk, Kichuevsk and Zainsk, were founded.60 When Russians felt themselves
threatened by the Kalmyks they had hastily erected a number of fortresses and combined them in
the Trans-Kama line stretching 450 km to Menzelinsk on the Ik river.61 Though this line had
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been erected against Kalmyks it could quite adequately be used against Bashkir autonomy to
strengthen Russian presence in the region. Russian authorities could argue that this line was
specifically built for the security of Bashkirs against Kalmyk onslaught.
Russians’ construction of these fortress towns along Trans-Kama defensive line
increasingly alienated Bashkirs but it was inconceivable for a power as centralized as Russia not
to establish strongholds in its own territory to ensure the payment of Iasak, which was a
considerable amount. Russian authorities did not tolerate the loss of these payments because the
military expenses especially during the second half of the seventeenth century accumulated at an
enormous pace. How this goal could be achieved without antagonizing Bashkirs remained
enigmatic for the Russians until the mid-1700s. Still, Russian authorities delayed the
colonization of those lands where Bashkirs paid their taxes in order not to interrupt Iasak
payments.
The Siberian Khanate’s leader Kuchum Khan’s energetic policies to the east of Russia’s
newly added territories also perturbed Russian authorities. It was clear that without destroying
the Siberian Khanate Russian security in the region would never be fully achieved. In this
context Ufa, not far away from Siberian Khanate, would be a strong point for the Russian
designs and future conquest of Siberian khanate. As a newly rising colonial power, Russia had
every reason to fear a coalition of nomads. The incentive to go east could be explained not
solely for Russian hunger for furs but also for security.
Russian security concerns increased with the influx of disgruntled, anti-Russian groups
into the region including Tatars, Maris, Chuvash, and Cheremis. These groups initially
strengthened the anti-Russian potential among Bashkirs but in the long run they played a
prominent role in the transformation of Bashkir society into a more sedentary and more Islamic
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one. Though at the time Russian authorities were solely interested in their rebellious potential
they were not aware of their positive contributions to the economy of the region by opening more
and more lands to agriculture and bringing Bashkirs to a more reasonable level of sedentary
culture. The strategic importance of these people together with the Russian population was
visible in their agricultural activities and production of food that supported the town population
and garrisons in the distant areas.

Conclusion
The Russian advance into the Bashkir lands created radical changes both for Bashkirs and
the Russians. Russians encountered a fully nomadic culture and during the initial periods of its
rule in the region they had neither the desire nor the power to alter the basic ways of life in
Bashkiria. Yet quite naturally their economic and military power made them a strong party in
the steppe politics and Bashkirs most of the time during this period sought Russian intervention
to solve their problems with the other Bashkirs and non-Bashkir groups. Partly because of these
factors trade and exchanges with the sedentary societies were vital for the smooth functioning for
the nomadic societies and the Russians’ leverage increased significantly among the Bashkirs. 62
So without any premeditated state policy Russian influence extended deep into the nomadic life
and affected seriously the traditional form of life. In this context it can be argued that even if a
colonial state did not wish to transform the indigenous populations their influence and might had
transforming effects for the natives.
On the other hand the Russians’ goals in the region, like security or orderly flow of Iasak
payments, conflicted the requirements of nomadism. The cultural gap also added fuel to this
62
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conflict and by the end of the first period in the Russo-Bashkir relations the clouds of clashes
appeared in the horizon.
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Chapter 2
Bashkirs and Russian wars of the Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth
Century
This chapter discusses the formative period of the Russian empire and its policies in
Bashkiria that led to a number of violent armed clashes between the intruder and the natives.
The Russian state’s policy during this period was largely confined to the security of the region
and the orderly collection of Iasak. The security of the region required the construction of a
number of fortifications which hampered the traditional Bashkir nomadic economy. These
fortifications also led to the migrations from the middle Volga region and the European parts of
Russia which further aggravated the local economic conditions. The land seizures during this
period appeared the single most important reason for the outbreak of Bashkir rebellions against
Muscovite Russia.
By nature the empires are more flexible and they provide greater opportunities for the
ruling and the ruled than the more rigid nation states. The flexibility of empires enables them to
maneuver without much restraint. Though an unequal relationship exists between the imperial
center and the peripheral communities, it is undeniable that for the most part it is a win-win
relationship since imperial administrative structure can provide bases for indirect rule and the
periphery takes the advantage of a mighty patron.1
Initially Bashkir groups that recognized Russian suzerainty benefited from this
relationship by obtaining at least formal protection and strengthening their position against the
rival nomadic groups like Kazakhs who from time to time raided Bashkir territory. One of the
Kazakh raids in 1573 penetrated Bashkir territory as deep as the Chusovoi River, modern day
Yekaterinburg, 228 miles northeast of Ufa. Russian construction of fortifications started in
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earnest in southern Siberia. These fortifications also benefitted the Bashkirs by protecting their
herds and pasturelands.2 Ironically, this increasing security of the region led to the deterioration
of the pastoral economy and Bashkir nomads found no alternative but to resist further
encroachments of the imperial authority in their native lands.

Russo-Bashkir Relations in the Period of Early Russian Modernization, 17th –Early
18th Centuries
By and large historians from Russian and Bashkir backgrounds agree on the view that
Russian policy in the Bashkir region by the beginning of the modernization of Russia under the
heavy thumb of Peter the Great was based on the policy of non-interference. This view was also
shared by French historian Roger Portal who stated that Russian policy towards Bashkiria was
very cautious. Otherwise, he argued, Bashkirs could have migrated to the southern steppes and
recognized the suzerainty of the Kazakh khans, and the Russian treasury would have lost a pool
of tax payers who provided much coveted furs to the Russian treasury.3 Portal fails to grasp the
realities of the steppe politics in the late 1500s. For one thing, the Kazakh Khan’s incursions
into the Jungar territory and plunder of Jungar property skyrocketed hostilities between Kazakhs
and Jungars and resulted in Kazakhs’ search for relief from Moscow. They sent an embassy in
1594 to Moscow and requested Russian patronage against Jungars. 4 For the other, Bashkirs and
Kazakhs, ethnic, linguistic, religious affinities notwithstanding, were rivals over grazing lands.
Bashkirs, in contrast to Portal’s view, sought protection against Kazakhs.
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The arguments about the policy of non-interference contrast with some of the historical
facts. The Russian historian D. A. Safonov minimizes the size of the Russian population and
their settlements in the region. He argues that Russian presence in Bashkortostan for a
sufficiently long period, embodied in the establishment of several settlements, including Ufa and
a small number of fortresses and a number of unauthorized immigrants, did not violate the
traditional lifestyle of local people. So, in his mind, Moscow almost never interfered in the
internal affairs of the Bashkirs.5 It could also be asked whether Russians did not or could not
interfere in Bashkir relations vigorously because of the many years of crisis which lasted nearly
from the death of Ivan the Terrible in 1584 to the end of the Time of Troubles in 1613, and even
after than that when Russians needed a period of recuperation from their former crises.
On the other hand, Safonov’s underestimation can easily be challenged by examining the
data on Russian land acquisition and considering the rise of rebellious tendencies among the
Bashkir population as of the 1640s. The land distribution among Russian officials serving in the
region had started seriously by the 1590s. The landlords and streltsy were distributed generous
amounts of land in the area surrounding Ufa. 6 In fact the foundation of the town began Russian
colonization in the region.7 As each new fort was established again the officials serving in these
forts were given new lands and this accumulated in enormous amounts at the cost of Bashkir
pasturelands. By the year 1700, in Bashkiria there were about 162 dvoriane, of whom 79 owned
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land amounting from 250 to 480 chetverts and 83 owned from 500 to 1000 chetverts.8 These
lands distributed among the Russian officials clustered around the towns or fortresses where it
was easier to defend them from attacks.9
Besides these fortifications, the construction of monasteries in the region was well
underway by the end of the same century. The first stone monastery in the region, Smolenskii
Bozhei Materi, was constructed in 1579, soon after Ufa was founded in 1574. Additional
monasteries including Preobrazhenskii, Spaso-Preobrazhenskii, Bogoroditskii, Uspenskii,
Khristorozhdestvenskii, Voznesenskii, and Dolmatovskii had already been erected in the region
by the beginning of the seventeenth century. All these monasteries had the right to the land and
the Imperial government granted them Bashkirs’ votchina lands.10 They carved out lands for
their livelihood that became the targets of Bashkir hostility, and many of them were destroyed by
Bashkirs during the rebellions of the same century.
In fact Bashkir attacks on these units were frequent even when there was not a Bashkir
rebellion. For example, the monks of the Voznesensk monastery were supposed to produce salt
from a nearby river but they never managed to perform this task because of Bashkir raids.11
Some authors argued that these monasteries were founded by the Russian government because
there were sufficient numbers of Orthodox believers in the region by the 1570s who needed
church services.12 Earlier construction of monasteries after the conquest of Kazan and
Astrakhan in the 1500s suggests, however, that the interests of the government and the Orthodox
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Church were intertwined in managing the peripheral regions and that a large Christian population
was not necessary to justify the establishment of a monastery in the frontier. So the Orthodox
Church became a key player in the colonial politics of the Muscovite Russia and the foundation
of Smolenskii Bozhei Materi around Ufa was not coincidental. It was hoped that it would supply
much needed goods to the urban center.13
Bashkirs repeatedly sent petitions to Moscow to complain about the burdensome taxes
and the corruption of Russian officials in the region. In particular, the corruption of tax
collectors reached such a level of apogee that in many of their petitions Bashkirs demanded their
removal or replacement with more honest ones. The legendary corruption of Russian officials
was based on fact. Generally only the worst and most rapacious ones accepted such a distasteful
job as tax collector in the remote and backward regions. They had every opportunity to enrich
themselves by exploiting the local population since they knew that their excesses would go
unheeded because the tsarist central government lacked competent personnel and was in no
position to find alternative officials. On the other hand the coffers of Muscovite treasury had
never been rich enough to pay its officials a regular salary, lack of which in turn gave them no
alternative but to rely on the money extracted from the local population. A tax collector used to
receive his pay from surpluses collected above the amount due for taxes which took the form of
veiled robbery in the name of government and did everything possible to squeeze Bashkir iasak
payers. This near robbery by Russian officials was not without good reason because at that time
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an average family of four in European Russia who tilled 40 acres of land earned only a ruble a
year, while the price of a sable pelt was several rubles.14
Aside from Iasak, Bashkirs were also made to pay customs dues and taxes on horses,
tobacco, and other items. Customs were collected not only from goods actually sold, but from
any cattle and other things which Bashkirs gave to each other, like gifts in the form of bride
money and dowry. Where there were no customs centers, the equestrian tax officials visited
volosts and auls (small Bashkir or Tatar settlements) and collected taxes without controls or
regulations, causing serious abuses.15
The arguments about Russian non-interference in Bashkiria considering these sources are
accordingly unjustified. Bashkirs constantly felt betrayed by the Russian tsars’ so-called grant of
“Bashkir autonomy” since Russians already violated the most basic terms of their charter about
Bashkirs’ rights to the land. As a result of these land claims by agriculturalists, Bashkir mobility
was seriously restricted, which unavoidably created hostilities. The discontents over land and
taxes grew over the seventeenth century and ultimately culminated in a number of rebellions in
the 1660s and 1680s.

Russian Administration of the Bashkirs in the 17th Century
The Russian conquest of the Kazan, Astrakhan, Nogai, and Sibir khanates brought
Bashkirs under a single government, so this Russian takeover of these regions also meant
unification of Bashkir lands. Yet not all Bashkirs were treated equally under Russians. Those
groups who lived under the Siberian khanate offered some resistance to Russian eastward
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movement so they were not given vassalage status and their taxes were heavier. The Russian
military and administrative presence in the Osinskoi uezd was much stronger than in the southern
Urals even though the latter was closer to Moscow and was just a step away from the Middle
Volga region where there was a considerable Russian military presence and peasant colonization.
The next step for Russian colonization was seemingly western and southern Bashkiria. 16 Russia’s
Siberian administration, unlike the Ufa administration, did not consider any difference between
Bashkirs of the region and the other natives.
How can we explain this contradictory treatment of different Bashkir groups? The
Russian government sensed that trans-Ural Bashkirs would pose less of a problem than the
Bashkirs of former Kazan and Nogai dorogas on demographic grounds. The population of
Bashkirs in the Ufimskii Uezd at the end of the seventeenth century was around 100,00017 while
around the same time the Bashkir population of Tiumenskii uezd in western Bashkiria was
considerably smaller.18 Still, the eastern Bashkirs considered it a right to have vassalage as long
as their western brethren enjoyed such privileges.
The Russian government during the second half of the seventeenth century granted these
same rights to them as well. This was a harbinger of the future Russian efforts to integrate
Bashkirs to the Russian imperial system due to the fact that the Russian imperial system desired
to create a system of uniformity for the same ethnic groups within the Russian empire to
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facilitate their firm integration into the system. To deprive some groups within the same ethnic
communities could lead to jealousy and accordingly intergroup fighting and fighting against the
central authority.
The most direct example of Russian authority in Bashkiria was the collection of tribute,
either in kind or in cash. The amount of tribute has been a matter of vivid debate among the
imperial Russian and Soviet historians. For example, Bashkir historian I. G. Akmanov argued
that the major reason for the rebellions of Bashkirs was the exorbitantly high Iasak payments
which drove Bashkirs to helplessness. On the other hand, the eighteenth century Russian
historian, P. I. Rychkov, a native of Orenburg, argued that Bashkirs paid considerably less to
their Russian overlords than to their former masters, Nogais.19 A great many of the regional
historians claim that the Iasak collection was irregular, not collected in a timely manner and its
amount was negligible.20 B. A. Kulbakhtin argues that Iasak collection in Bashkiria lacked
regularity and uniformity to the extent that between 1600 and 1740 for various reasons Iasak was
not collected from Bashkirs of Ufa uezd for some fifty years. Other than that, Iasak demands
from Bashkirs were very light and the amount remained same between 1631 and 1702.21 The
amount of the tribute paid by Bashkir nomads is not always possible to determine with precision,
because most inventories about the Iasak payments have been lost. In addition, most of the
nomadic Bashkirs deliberately escaped Iasak payment which prevented the Muscovite
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government throughout the seventeenth century from forming lists that revealed the names of
Iasak-payers.22
There are reasons for this governmental leniency. The preeminent goal of the
government in the region was the security of the southeastern frontier for which Bashkirs could
be the best Russian agents. They served this goal primarily because Bashkirs were more hostile
to the Nogais as their age old rivals for pasturelands than to the Russians, a new-coming group
whose real intentions Bashkirs did not know yet. There was also a practical side of the issue in
collecting Iasak. According to Ustiugov the amount of Iasak paid by Bashkirs from the 1630s to
the 1730s was around 25 kopecks per household annually. This amount was much less than
what was paid by Russian peasants in the neighboring uezds. However Bashkirs were also
expected to join Russian military campaigns on their own account without getting any
compensation from the government. Considering the weakness of productive forces in Bashkiria
and military service this amount of tax could be onerous.23
The Soviet and post-Soviet historians maintain this view while national historians like
Vakhit Imamov, a Tatar nationalist and anti-Russian writer who tends to view Bashkirs as part of
a greater Tatar nation, argues that Russian Iasak collection was robbery based on the whims and
ambitions of the tax collectors.24 But from the few archival sources available it seems that Iasak
collection was irregular with no fixed rate, completely dependent on the necessities of the
Russian central government and the rapaciousness of the local administrators. Iasak payment
was a logical result of Bashkirs’ recognition of the Russian tsar as the ultimate protector of
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Bashkirs against other nomadic groups. Even though the local Russian authorities were quite
exorbitant in their demands, the central government followed a policy of tolerance towards the
natives since they needed Bashkirs as patrols along Russia’s southeastern borders.
The long run result of this reliance on Bashkirs as the main military agents of the
government in the southeastern frontier was that Russian military presence was weak for nearly a
century after the incorporation of the region into the Russian empire in the 1550s. The size of
the major fortress in Bashkiria is revealing in this respect. Ufa was the smallest of all Russian
frontier towns with the length of its walls around 440 meters.25
Yet the Russians were inconsistent in their rule over the Bashkirs. Definitely there are
cases that indicated that Russians saw themselves as the masters of Bashkir lands. On the other
hand the government officials at certain stages during the seventeenth century asked for the
opinion of Bashkirs about some issues. In one case, a certain Nogai mirza Saltan in 1643
requested from the Ufa administration to receive Russian clientage and pasturelands for his ulus
(in total 1300 people) in Ufa uezd. The reply reached him only after Voevoda of Ufa informed
Bashkirs and asked their opinion about the issue. When the Bashkir response turned out to be
negative, the request of Nogai mirza was declined.26 This apparent Russian cooperation with the
Bashkirs and their respect of the Bashkir votchina rights changed character with the arrival of a
significant force of Kalmyks in the region. Russians started favoring Kalmyks to the detriment
of Bashkir interest in the region and they granted chunks of Bashkir lands to Kalmyks which was
one cause of the first genuine Bashkir rebellion in 1645 against these Russian arrangements. The
Bashkir rebellion was led mainly by trans-Zama Bashkirs in direct reaction to the construction of
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Menzelinsk fortress by the government without the consent of the Bashkirs living in the area.
Accordingly, it had a local character and failed in its objectives.27

Bashkir Rebellions of the Mid-16th - Early 17th centuries
The Bashkirs’ rebellions against Russian policies in the region started soon after they felt
upset about the Russians’ volatility and evident corruption. The first violent clash broke out as
early as 1572. It was followed by others in 1583, 1587, 1603, 1608 and 1616.28 These were not
full-scale uprisings but extremely localized incidents and did not cause any radical shift in the
Russians’ posture in the region. On the other hand, in these incidents Bashkirs were not the
driving force but were just one of many participants. All non-Russian nationalities of Bashkiria
actively resisted Russians. Although they were, unlike Bashkirs, not nomads, they had their own
reasons to resist Russian policies in the region. The most immediate reason for their
rebelliousness was their expulsion from the Middle Volga region and proselytizing attempts of
the Russian missionaries.
Still the Bashkir attack against the newly founded Menzelinsk fortress in 1645 was the
harbinger of future and more massive Bashkir resistance. For one thing, it was much more brutal
than earlier incidents. Russians had to mobilize their forces in the region to quell this rebellion.
Bashkirs also for the first time dared to attack a major Russian fortress which was a symbol of
Russian authority in Bashkiria. The reason for the outbreak of the rebellion was the construction
of the fortress of Menzele against the objections of the Bashkirs. This was in fact a major
violation of Bashkirs’ votchina rights and the rebels’ goal was to get rid of the Russians from the
27
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region.29 This rebellion was initiated by Bashkirs but it remained a highly localized one, aimed
specifically against the Menzelinsk fortress and easily crushed by Russians. Russian’s
vulnerable position in the region had made them side with the stronger nomadic group, the
Kalmyks, at the cost of compromising their promises to Bashkirs who were supposedly under
Russian protection, according to the terms of the famous charter of Ivan the Terrible.
By 1660 Bashkirs had long-standing grievances that would recur later: the seizure of
Bashkir lands for the construction of fortresses by the Russian government and / or their
distribution to the Russian nobles; and the completion of the Trans-Kama defensive line by the
mid-1650s that threatened traditional forms of Bashkir life by restricting their free movement
within Bashkiria. Russia’s increasing imperial claims in the west, the Polish war of 1654-1667,
and Russia’s clashes with Sweden over Livonia caused a remarkable rise in the taxes. To escape
these increased tax demands, many Bashkirs fled to nearby nomadic groups beyond Russian
control or to distant areas within the Russian empire where governmental control was
considerably weaker. In 1660, the Russian envoy to the Kalmyks, Ivan Savvich Gorokhov, met
with 30 Bashkir families in the Kalmyk camp. When he questioned their reason for residing
among Kalmyks, they responded that they were from Ufa and overburdened by the taxes
imposed by the Russian voevoda (military governor) of Ufa.30 So the tyranny and the inflated
demands of the central government was another factor for the rise of hostilities.
One last reason for the rise of tensions between the Russians and the Bashkirs was that
the Russians provided protection to Kalmyks in the 1650s. The Kalmyks were a nomadic people
of Mongol stock, and were traditional enemies of the Bashkirs, who clashed with them over
pasture lands in southern and southwestern Bashkiria. Russians’ favorable treatment of Kalmyks
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to the disadvantage of Bashkirs, by authorizing the transfer of some Bashkir lands to the
Kalmyks’ usage, even if only on paper, antagonized Bashkirs. This Russian grant of Bashkir
lands to Kalmyks was evidence that Russians saw themselves as the owners of Bashkir lands.31
In the meantime it must be noted that Russia’s patronage over Kalmyks hints at the
volatility of their authority in the region because of the fact that although the government forbade
Bashkirs from raiding Kalmyks, this was ineffectual and Kalmyks kept complaining about
Bashkir raids. In some cases they refused to join Russia’s military expeditions on the grounds
that their lands were under Bashkir attack. Russians were in fact in a troubled position. Their
intention was not to leave Bashkirs to the mercy of Kalmyks but to exploit Kalmyk belligerence
in their Polish wars and to direct Kalmyks’ cavalry regiments against Crimea, an ally of the
Poles at the time.32
To gain Kalmyk loyalty, Russian officials spent efforts to pacify the Bashkirs, who were
raiding Kalmyks. As one Russian envoy to the Kalmyk camp stated, upon the request by the
Kalmyk Taishi, a certain Russian official named Somov was sent to Ufa with the instructions to
search among Bashkirs for Kalmyk goods and return them to the Kalmyks. The worst Bashkir
thieves were put to death, and the others were fined. This caused a reaction among Bashkirs, and
at least two dozen Bashkirs left Bashkiria to join very surprisingly the band of one of the sons of
Kalmyk Taishi33, a move that utterly frustrated Russian authorities. They immediately
dispatched their envoys to search the case and the reasons for the Kalmyk hospitality to these
Bashkir raiders of Kalmyk property.
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The relations on the frontier between Russians and nomads and among nomads
themselves were more complicated than they appeared. The loyalties could shift at lightning
speed. Russians had troubles adjusting themselves to this volatile nature of steppe diplomacy34
and they were at a crossroad to choose the side of Bashkirs against Kalmyks or to buy the
services of Kalmyks at the cost of antagonizing Bashkirs. If Bashkirs were to be in a position to
serve Russians in their campaigns in the west and south, as a more or less unified group like the
Kalmyks with a commonly recognized, even if nominally, Bashkir leader, then the clashes
between Kalmyks and Bashkirs would have to be resolved in favor of the latter. Given the
circumstances, authorities were compelled to ignore Bashkir interest which irked Bashkirs
deeply and led to their rebellion. The causes were clear. Bashkirs felt betrayed because they had
been favored by Russians until 1661 against Kalmyks and upon Russian orders, Bashkirs were
deprived of a source of revenue which they achieved through their raids of the Kalmyk camps. 35
As Russians felt themselves strong enough they increasingly violated the terms of the
Land Charter they had granted to Bashkirs at the local level, though the central government
vainly prohibited the sale, requisition, long-term lease or seizure of Bashkir lands in a number of
laws. The most famous law was the Code of 1649 according to which the sale and the lease of
the Bashkir lands were strongly prohibited and the violators were threatened with severe
punishments.36 The terms of the Code of 1649 regarding Bashkirs were later confirmed in a
number of decrees in 1664, 1694 and in 1734.37 The Soviet and post-Soviet Bashkir historians
claim that the government wished to continue the policy of preservation of lands in Bashkir
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hands as a reflection of the Russian government’s benevolence.38 This approach, however, is
quite problematic. As was discussed earlier, the Russians were the complete masters of Bashkir
territory because they claimed for themselves the right to prohibit the sale of Bashkir lands to
newcomers to Bashkiria as if they were the owners of Bashkir lands.
The Russian attitude towards the Bashkir lands was on the one hand possessive but on the
other unpredictable. It was not clear in the Russian mind which parts of the Bashkir lands would
be confiscated and how long and under what conditions, and this unpredictability of the next
Russian move caused confusion and frustration among the Bashkirs. If the government was the
owner of the Bashkir lands, why had the Tsar granted Bashkirs votchina rights, and time and
again confirmed Bashkirs’ votchina status as conditions necessitated? If Bashkir rights to the
land had been guaranteed by the Tsar, then how could land seizures be explained? The Russian
authorities were quite reluctant to discuss the future status of Bashkir lands with the Bashkirs. In
fact, the Russian policy in the region was not predetermined but shaped by the developing events
in the surrounding areas and this unpredictability of the authorities made Bashkirs seriously
worry about their future under the Russians.
It seems that from the very beginning the Russian authorities had no respect for Bashkir
autonomy, and practically they had the right to do so because they had no Bashkir counterpart in
the form of a universally recognized Bashkir khan who could represent his own people. 39 A. Z.
Asfandiiarov maintains that during the first hundred years of Russian suzerainty in Bashkiria,
they almost never interfered in the internal affairs of Bashkirs and Bashkirs never sought another
overlord. There were only minimal changes like introducing another doroga, Osinskii, at the
38
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turn of the century. This author, however, overlooks the controversial construction of
Menzelinsk fortress at the heart of the Bashkir lands against the will of the Bashkirs that led to a
small scale uprising in 1645. On the other hand Bashkirs also joined other rebellions earlier led
by Tatars, and by a number of Finnic groups. A major problem in history writing in Russia is
that the historians neglect the small-scale, isolated discontents and present the Russian presence
in the region as widely accepted by the indigenous people.
Throughout the history of Bashkir-Russian armed conflicts, one of the major handicaps
of the rebellious Bashkirs was that they were always short of time and they had to win, at least
initially, some military successes against the Russians to gain the support of the bulk of the
Bashkir population. Under the existing circumstances this seemed impossible due to the
shortage of military means to defeat a well-organized, well-armed, well-led, well-trained modern
army with their primitive nomadic weapons, tactics and logistics. In many instances rebels were
caught by surprise and were numerically overwhelmed by the enemy. The existing social
structure of the Bashkir society was inadequate to provide a common front against the enemy.
The Bashkirs remained too divided in the face of a superior military power. Many of the
Bashkirs were too willing to support Russians in the expectations of material gains.
Bashkirs, as it became clear to the Russian authorities in St. Petersburg, were a constant
source of distress. The military governor of Kazan, Apraksin, wrote in 1712 that they had almost
no troubles with the pagans but the Bashkirs were a constant domestic enemy. They received
nothing positive from their actions towards Bashkirs and they were in a state of constant fear of
attacks from them. As Soloviev writes; “They had accepted and given shelter to fugitives Russian and of other faiths - refusing to hand them over, notwithstanding repeated demands
which they turned down with great insolence; and that they had paid no attention to officials sent
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to them for the purpose of registering and recovering these fugitives, or worse, subjected them to
physical abuse and deprived them of their liberty.”40
The Russo-Bashkir Wars in the 17th century and Steppe Politics
The Bashkir wars against the Russian government began in the 1660s. Although Western
scholarship has neglected these events, they were very important because they delayed Russia’s
southeastern expansion until the early 1800s, and these wars played an important role in
formation of Bashkir politics and society in the long run.
The century of Russo-Bashkir wars lasted until 1775. In Russian historiography these
wars are called rebellions (vosstanii), and there is a vast literature about these wars in Imperial,
Soviet and post-Soviet history writing.41 They have quite legitimate reasons for this approach.
First of all the Russian authorities considered themselves the masters of these lands and what
they were doing in Bashkiria was the use of their property in ways they saw fit. On the other
hand the central government proposed concessions in return for ending rebellion. In the same
capacity Russian authorities quite often pardoned rebellious leaders as though they were gracious
masters of their subjects.42
40

Sergei M. Soloviev, History of Russia: Peter the Great, the Great Reforms Begin. v. 29, (Academic International
Press, 1981), 187. (Translated by K. A. Papmehl)
41
For a limited collection of essays and books; I. G. Akmanov, “Vosstanie 1662-1664 gg.: Pervoe Massovoe
Dvizhenie v Bashkirii” in Krest'ianstvo i Krest’ianskoe Dvizhenie v Bashkirii v 17 - Nachale 20 vv. ed., Kh. F.
Usmanov, (Ufa: 1981), 45-67; I. G. Akmanov, “Bashkirskoe Vosstanie 1704-1711 gg.” in Sbornik Nauchnykh Rabot
Aspirantov Istoricheskogo Fakul'teta MGU (1963), 124-153; V. I. Lebedev, “Bashkirskie Vosstanie 1705-1711 gg.”
Istoricheskie Zapiski, 1, (1937), 81-102; V. D. Puzanov, “Bashkirskie Vosstania 17-18 Vekov v IsetskoPritobolskom Regiona (Iuzhnie Zaurale)” Shadrinskaia Starina, 7, (1999), 133-144; N. V. Ustiugov, “Bashkirskoe
Vosstanie 1662-1664 gg.” Istoricheskie Zapiski, 24 (1947), 30-110; Z. I. Siraev, “O Kharaktere Bashkirskikh
Vosstanii 17-Pervoi Poloviny 18 vv. (1662-1664 gg.; 1681-1683 gg.; 1704-1711 gg.; 1735-1740 gg.)” in Iz Istorii
Bashkirii, Part 2 ed. R. G. Kuzeev, Ufa:1963), 5-23; I. G. Akmanov, Bashkirskie Vosstaniia (Ufa: Kitap, 1993); I. G.
Akmanov, Bashkirskie Vosstaniia 17-Pervoi Treti 18 v. (Ufa: 1978); R. N. Zinurov, Bashkirskie Vosstaniia i
Indeiskie Voiny: Fenomen v Mirovoi Istorii (Ufa: Gilem, 2001)
42
In the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries the Russian central government issued amnesty many times for the
rebellious Bashkirs and it even granted them certain privileges, gifts and positions in the administration of the
Bashkir society as will be seen in various pages of this essay. For example, Aznagul Uruskalov, one of the leaders of
the 1662-64 rebellion was pardoned despite his active role in the rebellion and in the negotiations with the
descendants of the Kuchum Khan, the last ruler of the Sibir khanate. See I. G. Akmanov and Aznagul Uruskulov,
ed., Bashkirskaia Entsiklopediia, v. 1, (Ufa: Nauchnoe Izdatel’stvo, 2005), 75.

58

These rebellions generally followed the same pattern and ended in similar ways. Many
of the Bashkir leaders renounced their vassalage to the Russian Tsar and sought another patron
protector, including their age-old enemies Kalmyks, Kazakhs, descendants of Kuchum Khan in
Siberia and even the Crimean Khan at different times and episodes in their wars against
Russians. They were caused mainly by the land seizures by the pripushchenniki, new-comers to
the region after 1552. Tatars and Finnic groups could be counted within this group as well but
the real reaction was directed against the Russian settlers even though their numbers were not as
big as Tatars and Finnic groups.
It appears that the reason why Russian settlements were especially attacked is that
Russian settlers were identified with the Russian state and abusive Russian officials in the
region. Until the reign of Peter the Great, the political leaders in Russia had considered Bashkiria
a fur-rich region. During the Muscovite period, fur trade still provided a large share of Russian
revenues so there was no urgent need to open the region to extensive agriculture. Russian
military might was still not strong enough to impose its will on the highly mobile Bashkirs for
which reason Bashkir wars during this period ended in a stalemate. However there were faint
signs that growing numbers of Bashkirs were increasingly adopting a sedentary life under the
influence of their new neighbors who flocked into the region. Even though there is no reliable
data about the intermarriages it can be assumed that Bashkirs and especially Tatar migrants were
concluding such marriages. Since these two groups shared the same religion and language, it
was not an extraordinary thing to witness such marriages.
Because Bashkirs had ethnic, linguistic, and religious affinities with Tatars and Mishars it
was much more difficult to oust these people from Bashkiria from a moral and Islamic point of
view. These peoples were also victims of Russian policies in the middle Volga region. On the
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other hand despite Bashkir leadership and initiative in these wars, these formerly Middle Volga
residents, especially Tatars and Mansi (Voguls), also supported Bashkir efforts against the
Russians.
The Bashkir Rebellion of 1662-1664
The most immediate reason for the outbreak of rebellion in 1662 appears to have been
Russia’s siding with Kalmyks to the disadvantage of Bashkirs. This rebellion was not the result
of a minor border conflict in fact. The Bashkir lands were part of the greater Russian system and
the crisis in the Russian center seriously affected Bashkirs as well. It is clear that despite all
counter arguments by Soviet historiography that the Russian influence and presence in the region
by the reign of Peter the Great was only minimal, Russians, in fact, were deeply ensconced in
Bashkiria and their policies in the center seriously affected the periphery, including Bashkirs.
This rebellion began in 1662 in Ufa uezd and quickly spread to Siberian Bashkiria and
the Middle Volga. By the spring of 1663 Bashkirs were attacking defensive positions of the
trans-Kama line constructed in the 1650s by the government against new nomadic threat from
Mongolian origin; Kalmyks. This line was also used by the authorities to contain Bashkirs
within the Russian empire and to increase governmental control of Bashkir lands. As a result,
Bashkirs developed a specific hatred for this line because this line cut across Bashkirs’ lands in
the 1650s and restricted Bashkir movements in the area. So it appears that this line was in fact
designed for this purpose rather than preventing infiltration of Kalmyks into the Russian
territory.
Upon hearing the news of a massive rebellion in 1662, the Russian authorities quickly
transferred Russian troops from nearby regions and from Moscow to the center of the rebellion.43
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What was most alarming to the Russian authorities during this rebellion was that the rebel forces
quickly overwhelmed a number of Russian fortified positions and burned some Russian
settlements, destroying a number of monasteries.44 In the face of the growing threat posed by
Bashkir rebels led by some influential Bashkir nobles, including Sary Mergen, Aznagul
Uruskulov, Bekzian Toktamyshev, Gaur Akbulatov, Arslanbek Bakkin, 45 Russian authorities
managed to gain the loyalties of the rest of the Bashkir elite. So the organization of the Russian
administration was far from being alone in repressing the rebellions. Many of the Bashkir
leaders supported the Russian efforts to crush the leaders of the rebellion. In the autumn of 1662
in southeast Bashkiria of Nogai Doroga, some minor Bashkir rebel leaders were captured by
loyal Bashkirs and delivered to Volkonski, the voevoda of Ufa, for the summary execution.46 By
modern standards this act on the part of loyal Bashkir leaders may seem treasonous but
considering the circumstances of the time it was based on much more practical reasons and
completely consistent with other imperial experiences. Upon capturing the rebel leaders, the
loyal party could have killed them but they preferred to send them to Ufa to prove their loyaltie,
ingratiate themselves with the authorities, and possibly receive some reward.
The size of the rebellion was frightening for the Russians who had always been
suspicious of even the most minor disturbances and the rebellion was certainly not confined
within the borders of Russia. During this war some Bashkirs approached the Kalmyks’ khan and
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the descendants of Kuchum Khan in Siberia. For example, Sary Mergen sent his deputies to the
Kalmyk khan for military support.47 This was alarming for the Russians because the Kalmyks
were the Bashkirs’ traditional foes and their services were valuable for the Russians. Nothing
came out of it. Another Bashkir leader, Arslanbek Bakkin, sent his representative to Kuchuk
Khan, the grandson of the last Sibir khan, Kuchum, and asked for help against the Russian
government and in return Bashkirs would submit to his authority. This mission also failed.48
Bashkir leaders also conducted a number of negotiations with the Crimean Tatar khan who was
also aware of the developments in the region thanks to the news brought by Bashkir envoys, but
with no success. These were the attempts by the Bashkir rebel leaders to get rid of Russian
poddanstvo (citizenship) and search for another protector. But by this time the Russians were
too strong to be intimidated by any usurper.
Bashkirs during this early period of Russian contact were perfectly suitable for the
acephalous community in which there was no specific leadership and political organization.
Order and peace was provided by able-bodied men who enforced the communal order through
the justified use of force. Since there was no central authority the groups defended their rights
and privileges through feuds. Raiding was a part of daily life but these raids were not arbitrary
but to defend the rightful claims like pasturelands or herds.49 Bashkirs on this basis raided not
only Kalmyks or Kazakhs, their immediate steppe neighbors, but also settled peoples and other
Bashkirs as well. Under the circumstances the order-loving Russian authorities found it
impossible to tolerate such anarchistic mode of behavior.
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This war became also a model for future Bashkir wars in many respects. First and
foremost Bashkirs lacked central leadership. They suffered from the lack of a common front
against the Russians, and even worse some of them, especially those who felt the military might
of the Russians to be stronger, remained loyal to the government. As part of their tribal nature,
there were too many distracting elements. The southern and western Bashkirs were primarily
interested in improving their defenses against Kalmyks and they did everything to attract other
Bashkir groups to their cause while the northern and eastern Bashkir groups wanted to fight
against Russians.
The reasons for the collapse of the rebellion anticipated future rebellions and their
failures as well. The Bashkir society by that time was divided into two camps. The “loyal”
Bashkirs benefited from the Russian presence in Bashkiria and were rewarded generously by the
Russians for their services to the Russian state. On the other side were those Bashkirs who lost
from the Russian presence in the region. They were mostly from the eastern and southern parts
of Bashkiria and they suffered most from the Russian presence in the region and the
overwhelming Russian fortification system which effectively barred them from the seasonal
migration.
Quite naturally Russians would be victorious in the long run and there was no practical
use to draw the wrath of the authorities upon themselves by joining or supporting, even if
surreptitiously, the rebellious groups. Another point is that predominantly nomadic Bashkirs had
not developed any national identity by that time but remained dependent upon the tribal loyalties.
It paid more to be loyal than to resist and the crushing of rebellious Bashkir tribes offered to the
loyal Bashkirs more pasturelands and more material benefits. Not surprisingly Russian
authorities exploited these frictions well by promising to distribute the properties of the
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rebellious Bashkirs to loyal ones. It must be underlined that the Russian control of the region
was not exclusively destructive for all Bashkirs since at least some Bashkirs gained land from
Russians. It was not simply that the Russians only seized land.
In these conflicts, not all of the Kalmyks threatened Bashkirs. Some Kalmyk leaders,
mainly Daishi, a contender for power among Kalmyks, against the newly elected and devoutly
loyal Puntsuk Khan, supported the Bashkirs’ endeavor. They even attacked Russian positions
with Bashkirs and provided haven for the fleeing Bashkir groups before the Russian troops.50 In
the winter of 1663, 1500 Bashkir households reached safety among Kalmyks for which Kalmyks
were heavily reprimanded by the Russian officials on the grounds that they (Kalmyks) forgot
their shert (oath) to the great Monarch’ (Tsar) to be his eternal slaves. 51
The steppe politics were more complicated than it may seem. There were many different
variables and factors that determine the decisions of leaders. They were not completely sure of
the loyalties of their tribesmen because loyalties could shift rapidly and the tribal rules among
the nomads in the steppe region could not be determined precisely because each tribe contained
many power groups and tribal chiefs were in fact not all powerful leaders but figures of
compromise. Accordingly, those 1500 Bashkir households among Kalmyks would be forced to
abandon their new patrons due to their position as outsiders within the Kalmyk camps and they
were held in contempt by the new patrons and humiliated at every occasion. So they left the
Kalmyk camp soon after they joined it and begged for mercy from the Russian authorities.
One reason for the lack of cooperation among Bashkirs in their war effort against Russian
was that by the 1660s there had emerged radical changes in the life styles of Bashkirs. Those
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who lived nearest to the Russians, especially in Kazan doroga, had already started a sedentary
life and abandoned their nomadic life style to a great degree. Accordingly they had lost their
mobility due to the fact that they had a village to defend rather than an elusive herd in the steppe
area. So Bashkirs failed to develop a common strategy.
Ironically, the lack of a common leadership was the main reason for the initial Bashkir
success against Russians. The Russian authorities always believed that in the nomadic world the
purchase of the leader would guarantee the loyalties of the lower class people in those tribal
groups. Accordingly when they failed to purchase the loyalty of the tribal leadership they
preferred to contain those leaders by demanding amanat, taking of hostages. If this policy failed,
they eliminated the disobedient leaders by inciting conflict and boosting factions within the tribe.
In the case of war the simplest way to suppress armed clashes would be to assassinate the
rebellious leader. This policy by and large did not work against Bashkirs because there was not
one single leader of these wars. In each case there could be found at least half a dozen different
leaders and it was impossible to kill all of them at the same time. The most prominent leader of
the 1662-1664 rebellion was a man called Sary Mergen. Mergen was killed by the Russian
punitive forces in 1663 but his death in European Bashkiria did not stop the Bashkir war effort
east of Urals because there were many other leaders who emerged to continue Bashkirs’ war
efforts.
The Russian demand of amanats from Bashkirs, even from the loyal Bashkirs (dobrykh
liudiei) for the first time in 1663 proves the fact that there was now an unbridgeable crack
between Russian and Bashkir mutual understanding.52 The system of amanat was available in
eastern Bashkiria where Russian military might had brought Siberian Bashkirs to their knees.
52

I. G. Akmanov, ed., Istoriia Bashkortostana s Drevneishikh Vremen do Nashikh Dnei, v. 1, (Ufa: Kitap, 2007),
147; Materialy po Istorii Bashkirskoi Istorii, part 1: Bashkirskie Vosstaniia v 17 i Pervoi Polovine 18 vv.
(Moskva&Leningrad: Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1936), No. 56 and 60.

65

Such a thing was unquestionable in western and southern Bashkiria because they recognized
Russian suzerainty voluntarily. On the other hand, the conquered eastern Bashkirs had to pay
four times higher Iasak than those western and central Bashkirs. Siberian Bashkirs paid 1 ruble
person while their western brethren paid only 25 kopeck which was further reduced to five
martens per person.53
Boris Nolde contends that major reason for the outbreak of war in 1662 was the gradual
penetration of Russian government into the Bashkir lands, violating the terms of the land charter
granted by Russian Tsar Ivan the Terrible.54 Until the 1660s Bashkirs occasionally and in a
limited sense protested these Russian intrusions, as noted above. A detail must be noted here.
Bashkirs were most of the time portrayed in Imperial or Soviet historiography as savage,
primitive or underdeveloped people. In fact these people were well aware of their rights and
showered Russian authorities in the regions with petitions about the injustices committed by the
officials, protesting land seizures and violations of the terms of their clientage and votchina
rights with the Russian state. In one of these, dated 1627, Bashkirs of Bailarskii volost in Kazan
doroga complained about a certain Russian service person, “Batlaev, entering their votchina,
barring the votchina and making them buy martens and honey to pay their Iasak.”55 In another,
dated 1663, a Bashkir delegate to Prince A. M. Volkonskii, the voevoda of Ufa at the time,
complained about their loss of status and votchinas which were grabbed by service people
(sluzilye liudi) in the area.56 The correspondence between Russian voevodas of the Urals is full
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of such complaints by Bashkirs in their petitions and they demand an end to the officials’
wrongdoings.57
The great rebellion of 1662-1664 was not the result of a haphazard decision by the
Bashkir leaders to renounce Russian patronage. In the depths there were radical reasons and
Russians’ treatment of Bashkirs as simple savages who could be squeezed with impunity was a
grand delusion on the part of Russians. The local officials’ corruption and repressive manners
were universal which was confirmed by Imperial and Soviet or post-Soviet historians. The role
of the central government in the emerging Bashkir disgruntlement is generally portrayed as one
of helplessness due to the fact it was too weak in the region and had limited means to keep local
officials’ excesses or injustices under control.
Though these are correct, this is only one side of the coin. The Russian government also
actively supported land seizures by Russian officials for purposes of establishing defensive
points in the region during the second half of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.58 The land
seizures and colonization in Bashkiria grew by leaps and bounds. For example, in the lands
immediately surrounding Ufa, 25 versts59 of land from all directions were seized from Bashkirs
and distributed to the Russian officials.60 The land seizures by the monasteries were also
considerable. Though these monasteries were allowed by the government they went beyond the
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limits set by the government and enlarged the amount of monastic control of the land on their
own volition.
The most prominent leaders of the 1662-1664 rebellion were Sary Mergen (from Ufa
uezd), Arslanbek Bakkin and Gaur Akbulatov. Sary Mergen was the leading figure who was
killed by the Russian punitive forces in 1663. He was the best known Bashkir leader of this
episode of Bashkir history. He was a very rich man who could have attracted Bashkirs to his
side thanks to his material wealth and leadership qualities. We know less about other leaders,
however, except the fact that Arslanbek Bakkin took over leadership after the death of Sary
Mergen. All these three leaders were from the Bashkir nobility and very influential social
leaders as well.
Sary Mergen was an able leader who revolutionized the Bashkir mindset by persuading
his fellow Bashkirs to open negotiations with Kalmyks. For this purpose he sent a delegation to
Kalmyk leaders to conclude an alliance against Russians.61 This was a radical break with the past
and some of the Bashkirs for the first time looked for some sort of sovereignty by breaking their
ties with the Russian lord. Despite this, the mainstream Russian and Soviet historiography did
not hesitate to call these wars rebellion.62 Sary Mergen’s leadership qualities notwithstanding,
he never fully attracted all Bashkir groups to his side. One reason for this was the internal
struggle within the Bashkir society. The tribal elders had no absolute power over the members
of their clans and they had to walk on a tightrope with another player at the other end of the rope.
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Despite Bashkirs’ growing discontent with the Russian policies and the manners of the local
Russian officials, the level of discontent was not the same everywhere within Bashkiria. Those
who preferred to side with Russians against their Bashkir brethren had clear and absolutely
legitimate reasons to do so. At least the Bashkirs of Nogai Doroga mostly preferred the Russian
side because their territories had been most threatened by Kalmyks. Despite all the Russians’
shortcomings, they nevertheless seemed more reliable and more predictable and more willing to
negotiate with Bashkirs than Kalmyk raiders.63 But when Sary Mergen sent his delegation to the
Kalmyks he knew the fact that Bashkirs of Sibir doroga was least affected from the Kalmyk raids
and they were much less vulnerable to their attacks.64
This was the greatest dilemma of the Bashkir rebellious leadership. They could not wage
a war against Russians alone. They needed allies but only viable allies around were Kalmyks
who were also divided among themselves. Their alliance alienated other Bashkir groups and
prevented Sary Mergen from forming a united front against the central government. There was
an incompatibility between goals and means to achieve those goals. This incompatibility led to
the rift within the leadership of the war party, and while Sary Mergen endeavored to continue the
struggle, Arslanbek Bakkin chose to negotiate with the authorities.65 This rift cost them time and
initiative since Bashkirs were not united and short of means to conclude this war successfully.
Their advantage was time. Until the Russian government gathered and deployed forces against
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them, Bashkirs had to achieve their best and during the first six months of the war they were
successful.66
Bashkirs occasionally gained some success against the Russian regular army as in the
case of the battle that took place in the summer of 1663 when some 30 Russian soldiers were
killed and many others including their commander were wounded.67 But the same Russian
commander after a few weeks of recuperation returned to his army and stormed Bashkir
settlements and villages. The Bashkir rebel leader Uruslan Bakkin was killed by the same
Russian expeditionary force in an ambush and his family was also decimated in the spring of
1664.68 The balance of power was definitely on the side of Russians. The Bashkirs fought hard
to get the most meager benefits, yet even then Russian forces could make a strong comeback and
get rid of the Bashkirs’ meager success at the first opportunity.
One of the salient features of this rebellion is that the leadership was almost totally
monopolized by the Bashkir tribal aristocracy. They dreamed of creating a Bashkir khanate led
by a Chingisid who could legitimately unite all Bashkirs. The Bashkir religious ulama played
only a secondary role. They actively supported war effort in an indirect way by leading
negotiations between Bashkir leaders and other potential supporters of Bashkirs. One of them,
Kara Duvani Bakaik Abyz, was dispatched to Crimean Khan, a Chingisid himself, to get
assistance.69 Such a choice from the religious class was meaningful because most probably
Bashkir leaders expected a Muslims scholar to be more influential by playing on the religious
sentiments of Crimean Tatars.
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Soviet historiography contends that these wars were not directed against the relatively
small numbers of Russian peasants who settled in the region, but primarily against state officials.
In Tipeev’s view, these were voevodas, generals, officers, pomeshchiks (gentry landowners who
held land on condition of service), traders, Rostovshchiks (literally usurer, money lender) and
their system of administration in Bashkiria.70 The leading historian of these wars and author of a
number of several books about the issue, I. G. Akmanov, states that the Bashkirs’ war effort was
against Russian authorities, monasteries and dvoriane. The Russian laboring masses were caught
in crossfire and their settlements were burned down by armed groups, however not all
settlements were destroyed by Bashkirs.71 There are problems with these arguments. In the first
hand, they never give a list of Russian settlements before and after the wars. There seems to be
no data about the number of Russian settlers before and after the wars. There are also problems
with the archival materials. These authors predominantly rely on the accounts of Russian
officials in their area whose impartiality is highly dubious.
Even though various scholars call this 1662-64 war as the first great Bashkir rebellion
against Russia, it was no doubt supported and actively joined by other non-Russian peoples of
the region. Tatars, Chuvash, Mansi, Mari and even prisoners of war, Litovski people, who had
been captured during Russo-Polish wars of the 1650s and exiled to the region, actively took part
in this war.72 Their contribution to the war effort was in fact a reflection of the failures of the
Russian policies towards the nationalities. The Bashkirs initiated this war because their life style
and mobility was threatened by the central government. As for other more sedentary groups
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their livelihood was endangered by government’s increasing financial demands originated from
the Russo-Polish war of 1654-1667.
The rebellion was not only taking place in the frontier. It was in fact an extension of
rebellion that took place in the very heart of the Muscovite system. The Kolomenskoe riot of
1662 in Moscow was the result of the government’s sweeping monetary policies like issuing
copper money and exorbitant fiscal demands from the tax payers. The result was a skyrocketing
inflation and a radical decline in the incomes of the laboring masses of Moscow.73 The same
problem had struck the frontier as well. Even though the rioting in Moscow was crushed within
days, more distant frontier areas remained tumultuous for another two years. The exact amount
of the increased Iasak on the shoulders of Bashkirs is not known since the archival materials
about the issue are still not discovered but some Bashkir families fled to the Kalmyks to escape
the harassment of Russian tax officials.74 The result was a loss of revenue on the part of the
government and an increasing loss of confidence towards Russia on the part of Bashkirs.
There was another side of the coin as well in this flight. Russians were considered worse
than Kalmyks, Bashkirs’ traditional enemies. This was the most important message of this
rebellion which Russian authorities could derive. Kalmyks were still an uncontrollable and
belligerent group of people against whom Russian authorities had to manage relations very
carefully. The possibility of an alliance between rebellious Bashkirs and Kalmyks could have
devastating effects on the Russians. One of the salient features of this kind of frontier relations is
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that the central government hired one nomadic group against the other. To the degree the central
government succeeded in this goal it would better be able to control such areas. The overall
situation was not simply Russians versus indigeneous peoples of all sorts be it Bashkirs or
Kalmyks. They simply intervened as a new power in the steppe politics and became a party.
Their policies seemed unacceptable for many natives and drove them closer to each other but in
fact Russians were much more lenient to those peoples than they were to each other. It is ironic
that those natives who took refuge in the camps, escaping from the Russian excesses many times
regretted fleeing to the Kalmyks.75
The Bashkirs in the 1662-1664 rebellion were not militarily crushed by the Russians but
they sued for peace in return for certain concessions from the Tsar. The oppressive Voevoda of
Ufa, A. M. Volkonskii, was replaced and the Bashkirs were again granted votchina rights. Yet
this war sealed the fate of the Bashkirs despite their success. They had been defeated in their
larger goal: getting rid of Russian suzerainty. They could not boast any more that they had
voluntarily accepted Russian patronage.76 They attempted to find another patron when the
Russian government increasingly had become intrusive. They in vain tried to alter the situation
but Russians proved too strong for them. It had finally become clear that the two radically
distinct cultures could not coexist any longer. They would either go their own ways or the
weaker one would become more like the other. In this case the Bashkirs had nothing to do but to
change their own traditional ways.
By 1663 the rebellion in central Bashkiria was over when the leading Bashkir rebel, Sary
Mergen, was killed, but in the eastern Bashkiria rebellious activity continued a year longer.
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However in the areas where the rebellions ceased to exist, authorities’ terms of the peace were
generous for Bashkirs. First of all the Russian Tsar Alexei personally received the delegates of
the formerly rebellious Bashkirs, a gesture that could be interpreted as the Tsar’s benevolence
and his intentions to honor Bashkirs. In addition, the Russian government replaced the
infamously corrupt Ufa voevoda Volkonskii with a more honest voevoda. The tsar also
reaffirmed the conditions of Bashkir vassalage which had been designed in 1557 prohibiting the
further seizure of Bashkir lands and punishing those guilty of abuses in the collection of Iasak.77
This was a symbolic victory for the rebellious Bashkirs in the sense that the conditions that had
led to their rebellion had barely been reversed but the Russian settlements continued to grow in
the region. Bashkirs for another two decades continued to hope that the Russian land seizures
would cease.
This war indicated that neither Russians nor rebellious Bashkirs were strong enough to
achieve their goals alone. But Bashkirs despite all their shortcomings gained minor concessions.
This was a tactical success for Bashkirs but a strategic defeat. The rebel forces attempted to
evict Russians from Bashkiria but failed. They only delayed the consolidation of Russian
authority in the region for another 20 years and they were in no position to prevent the influx of
the settlers into their territory.78
Considering the results of this first massive rebellion, Bashkirs believed that by resorting
to arms they could protect their interests. The Russians compromised in the face of the
difficulties they had in suppressing the rebellion by means of force. In fact Russian’s
concessions meant only a partially retreat. Land seizures and the arbitrariness of the local agents
of the tsar continued unabated.
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Still the limited success of 1662-1664 war gave Bashkir groups a hope of success if they
did not repeat the same mistakes again. Such a scheme required complex planning and
preparation but the centrifugal character of the Bashkir life made it impossible. This episode of
the Russo-Bashkir relations was a turning point from another point of view. During the second
half of the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth centuries the relations between Russian
government and Bashkir groups was based on mutual trust. This tendency was so dominant that
Bashkirs were not even told to send amanat (hostages) to Ufa at all.79 This period, however,
ended bleakly after the 1662-1664 war and the Bashkirs always treated even the slightest Russian
policy changes with utmost suspicion and hostility.
Muscovite-Bashkir conflicts, 1681-1684 and 1704-1711
The second wave of the Bashkir rebellions started in 1681 on the pretext that the Russian
government ordered their conversion to Christianity.80 This time the uprising was led mainly by
a religious scholar called Seit.81 So in appearance the reasons for the uprising seemed religious.
The governmental ukaz in 1681 ordered the forceful conversion of non-Orthodox population of
Middle Volga region82 which caused another great wave of migrations by the peoples of the
middle Volga. This decree in fact had nothing to do with the Bashkirs who were still at the
fringe of the Russian empire. The Russian colonial policy in the Urals and Siberia in the
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seventeenth century could be described as a policy of indirect rule where the local elite was kept
in place and their privileges were not threatened in principle.83
The reality was quite different. The government had abandoned its policy of
noninterference in the internal affairs of the region as of the mid-1670s. The chronic conditions
that led to the 1662-1664 Russo-Bashkir war repeated themselves. The same arbitrariness of the
Russian elite in the region went undiminished. To make matters worse the rumors of forced
conversion of the Bashkirs accelerated war. The leadership of the war for the Bashkirs as noted
was a mullah. This was quite surprising for a nominally Muslim group where the religion played
the least effective role in the daily life.84
The first armed conflict started in Sibir and Nogai Dorogas in the summer of 1681 after a
massive Iighin, mass meeting, was held in May of that year. Mulla Seit sent most possibly his
disciples to different Bashkir districts to incite population to rise against forced conversion to
defend their religion. One of them, a certain Il’metaika, an abyz85 himself, was caught on the
charges of instigating rebellion mentored by Seit Mulla by the Russians and transferred to Ufa
for execution.86 By the spring of the following year the rebellion had a massive character partly
because of the military weakness of the government in the region.
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Between August 1681 and July 1682, the forces of Seit invaded a number of Russian
villages, attacked larger settlements and besieged Ufa. In the meantime a large Russian force
sent from Tiumen met Seit and his forces. Both sides’ casualties were high. Possibly Seit
himself was wounded but Russians failed to exterminate Seit’s forces in a pitched battle.87
The inability of the authorities to smash the rebellion heartened dormant Bashkir groups
to join the rebellion and the dimensions of war changed. The rebellion had started to defend
religion but it turned out to be after the initial successes an anti-Russian and anti-colonial war. 88
Bashkirs attacked the most hated establishments in the middle of the Bashkir lands: the TransKama defensive line, the forts and settlements created by Stroganovs in Bashkiria; and Ufa was
attacked for the first time which shows the size of the conflict. The government was utterly
unprepared for such a massive war and was forced to relinquish the Ukaz relating to the
conversion of the peoples to Christianity.
In an ukaz dated June 8, 1683, the charter from the Tsars Ivan and Peter called for an end
to the armed hostilities stating that “war mongers spread the false news that the government
attempted to convert inovertsy, adherents of other faiths, against their will. There was never such
a thing and there is not any at the time and never suspect such a thing.”89
This was good enough for some of the Bashkir leaders like Kuchuk Iulaev, and many of
the newcomers to the region who had escaped forced conversion. They ceased to fight and asked

this insignificant individual called Ilmetaike, whose ethnic background whether Tatar or Bashkir is not known to us,
is that the Islamic sensitivities of the people in the region reached to a considerable level so much so that indigenous
people are ready to bear arms in defense of their religion and Muslim clergy started to play a significant role in the
Bashkir society.
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for chelobit’e (literally petition).90 Where government failed to impose its will with armed force
it won with concessions and divided Bashkir forces and leadership. Seit refused to abandon his
struggle because the conditions required more than the abandonment of the forced conversion.91
The fighting continued until the summer of 1684. Briefly Kalmyks joined Bashkirs in the
meantime and they jointly attacked a number of Russian positions in Bashkiria until the time
Russian authorities managed to persuade Kalmyk leader Ayuki Khan to return back to Kalmyk
lands. In the end Russian authorities gave way and promised to stop seizure of Bashkir lands,
reaffirmed Bashkir votchina rights, removed the voevod of Ufa, Korkodinov, for his
maltreatment of Bashkirs, and finally promised to put an end to the forceful Christianization of
inovertsy. This last item was good enough to weaken the arguments of Seit to continue struggle.
No source mentioned his name anymore.92
This war was a success for the Bashkirs in the short run. They received what they wanted
but it was also a partial failure for them and reasons for their failure were in fact harbingers of
the transformation of Bashkir society. They had failed to create a united front against Russians
and they had legitimate reasons for their failure. In the first place not all Bashkirs had been
affected from the Russian policies at the same level. There was an uneven economic
transformation in the Bashkir society. While by this date Eastern Bashkiria (Sibirski Doroga)
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and Southern Bashkiria (Nogai Doroga) were thinly populated by Russians, the Kazan and Osin
doroga had witnessed an increasing sedentarization of Bashkirs and a rising migration into these
parts of Bashkiria by Russians and non-Russians. The governmental control here was stronger
than Sibir or Nogai dorogas. Not surprisingly Kuchuk Iulaev was from Tam’ianski volost which
was located in modern day Meleuz district of modern day Bashkir republic which is only 223 km
from Ufa and it could be reached through Belaia River.93 This vulnerable location of Tamianski
volost forced Kuchuk Iulaev to abandon armed hostilities against Russians. More radical
elements of the Bashkir society who were determined to continue the struggle were left without
allies despite short lived Kalmyk cooperation and remained divided.
The result of this war was that Russia was still not strong enough to subdue this
belligerent people and it became clear that Bashkirs were in a period of extensive Islamization.
The reasons for this are still not clear and there is not any academic work either in Russian or in
English relating to this part of the history of Bashkirs. There are no data about the number of
Islamic schools and masjids in Bashkiria. There is not any figure about the number of more
Islamic Tatar population in Bashkiria who might have had an influence on the Bashkir from the
religious point.
It is a universally recognized view that Tatars during the seventeenth century became
subject to more severe state repressions than Bashkirs and in desperation Muslim Tatars escaped
to Bashkir lands in huge numbers.94 But none of these holders of this universal view gives any
approximate data about the number of Tatars who escaped and resided in Bashkir lands. No one
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has investigated the specific interactions between Bashkirs and Tatars, nor the influences exerted
by one over the other.95
Also until recently Bashkir history was not considered as a field of serious concern. The
historians in the west mostly focused on Volga Tatars and only superficially mentioned Bashkirs
in the most generalized form. Accordingly serious errors were made at times. For example,
Alexandre Bennigsen erroneously argues that Bashkirs were subjected to genocide in the
seventeenth century by the Russians.96 The fact was that the Russian government had neither
willingness nor means to do so in that century. Bashkirs had still not been successfully isolated
from the outside world and the Russian authorities were still more interested in extracting Iasak
payments from the Bashkirs than opening their lands to the systematic colonization of the
Russian peasants. The real focus of the Russian state during the second half of the seventeenth
century was mostly in Ukraine and against Poland. The real massacre of Bashkirs which reached
genocidal proportions took place during the fourth major Russo-Bashkir wars of 1735-1740 (this
will be discussed below). But even then when nearly a quarter of the Bashkir population was
killed the Russian authorities’ main concern was to avoid stirring a Bashkir uprising.
By the end of this period there were sharp differences between the Bashkir community of
the 1550s and 1710s. The transition from an acephalous society to patriarchal political
community was clear. There was a set enemy, an intruder who seized Bashkir lands and violated
the votchina rights, and a mischief maker who planted the seeds of sedition among Bashkir
groups by favoring some against the other. Bashkir organization for war was exemplary for an
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acephalous society. The intentions and decision of war were declared in Iighins (mass
gatherings) and the masses’ support was demanded. Unfortunately there are no records about the
details of these Iighins. There seems to be no evidence about what they debated and how they
persuaded Bashkirs to take arms against Russians. Most probably these Iighins were the
occasions where leaders employed persuasion rather than coercion to get the support of the
people.
By the end of this period the importance of Iighins declined partly because Russian
authorities took a hostile attitude toward these occasions. It had also become clear that there
would never be any more uniformity of opinion among Bashkirs relating to the fate of the nation
thanks to the availability of the pro-Russian elements among the Bashkir tribes. So the last and
greatest Bashkir effort of this period to oust Russians from Bashkiria that took place between
1704 and 1711, was decided by a Bashkir minority rather than the masses. Thanks to the
competent leadership of a number of charismatic individuals, especially Aldar Isekeev, also
known as Aldar Isyangildin, the rebellion took on a massive character. 97
The immediate reason for the 1704-1711 war was the central government’s growing
fiscal demands and ingenuity of its officials to invent all sorts of new taxes, (taxes on baths, bees,
horse collars, storage rooms, masjids, masjid attendees, etc.). This war was fought in four
stages: 1704-1706, 1707-1708, 1709-1710 and 1711. The Russian authorities in the early stages
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thought that they could crush the resistance by brute force and by ruse. In early 1706, the
Russian officials in Bashkiria encouraged Bashkirs to send a delegation to the Tsar to voice their
grievances. Diumeii Ishkeev, the initiator of the rebellion from

Kazan Doroga, and seven

more less known leaders went to Moscow. They were duly arrested and sent back to Kazan,
imprisoned and Ishkeev was executed. This ruse did nothing to relieve the Russians of the
Bashkir rebellion.
During the second stage Bashkirs sent one of their leaders, Murat, possibly from
Karakalpak background, to seek help from the Crimean Khan to open negotiations with the
Ottoman sultan which ended in failure. On his way back to Bashkiria he joined the rebellion of
the north Caucasian peoples and led a small regiment. He was finally captured and executed in
northern Caucasia by the Russian authorities.98
There was even a brief attempt by the rebels to recognize the Karakalpak khan as the
leader of Bashkirs. Possibly Bashkirs would have been unable to agree on any Bashkir noble
around whom they could gather. In any case this attempt bore no fruits. The war ended in a
stalemate. Neither the Russians, who were busy with Swedish wars and Pruth campaign against
Ottomans, nor the Bashkirs, who lacked the means to get rid of the Russians were in a position to
win an armed struggle.
This war was another example of the pattern in which policies of the center caused the
deterioration of living conditions of the indigenous people and led to war. To avoid war, the
center’s demands should not exceed the capabilities of Bashkirs to realize those demands.
Bashkirs never hesitated to resort to war in case the center violated the privileges Bashkirs
jealously protected. In the thick of war with Sweden, however, Peter I was desperate for money
98
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and was in no condition to consider the balance of power in Bashkiria. To make matters worse
the first decade of the 1700s was also a period of rebellions by Cossacks in the Don River basin
under Bulavin and by the Streltsy in Astrakhan. Especially Bulavin’s rebellion was the most
prominent coordinated resistance to Peter’s modernizing reforms and increasing demands of
obligation from the population.99 The Bashkirs were not spared as well. During this tumultuous
decade their obligations were increased several-fold and they suffered dearly under the heavy
pressure of Tsarist officials sent to the region to collect exorbitant taxes. The fiscal demands of
the government reached ridiculous levels and some seventy new types of taxes were imposed on
Bashkirs.
Even though at that time Peter was determined to make Russia a great power and a
modern country, Bashkiria was not in the list of his priorities. But that was not the case for
taxation of Bashkirs. They were pushed hard and they were driven to the spot where Russia’s
new capital would rise and they were forced to join the labor forces that built St. Petersburg. In
addition, Peter began the exploitation of Bashkiria’s natural resources. The first large factories
were constructed in 1701.
Again in 1701 Peter the Great made an administrative arrangement in the status of
Bashkiria within the Russian empire, according to which the Ufa administration was made
subject to the control of the Kazan administrative unit. The duty to collect Iasak was transferred
to Kazan, and all the inventories that designated the names of Iasak payers were delivered to
Kazan voevoda. This arrangement violated the former practices where Bashkirs were directly
under the authority of the Tsar. By being transferred to Kazan they were losing their access to
the Tsar. There was a certain loss of status of Bashkirs and in fact this arrangement was
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evidence of Peter the Great’s determination to abandon past practices and elevate himself, the
Russian emperor, now to a much higher status than the previous Russian rulers. This time the
provincial inorodtsy would have no means to reach the emperor directly. Instead the emperor’s
servants (officials) would deal with the non-Russian subjects.100
This demotion in status also meant a greater financial burden for Bashkirs. As Aznabaev
argues, the imperial government in order to increase its revenues to finance the Swedish war was
determined to bring Bashkirs into a closer orbit of the central government and to achieve this it
first attacked the client status of Bashkirs by making them subject to the military governor of
Kazan.101 The elimination of client status of Bashkirs would result in the imposition of higher
taxes than simple Iasak payments, which were losing their meaning by that time due to the
extinction of the fur bearing animals in the region.
The leverage of revenues of Ufa government from Iasak was declining over the period of
forty years from 1660 to 1700. This decline was evidence that Iasak paying Bashkirs’
importance was also declining for the Russian authorities. In order not to disturb regular
delivery of Iasak payments the central government from an economic standpoint was not willing
to incite Bashkir armed rebellion for the most part of the seventeenth century but as the revenues
from Iasak declined there would be less and less incentives for the government not to antagonize
Bashkirs as seen from the table below.102
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Ruble

%

Ruble

%

Customs

818

9.50%

1000

9.40%

Taverns (Kabatskie)

271

3.10%

500

4.70%

Horse Fees

200

2.30%

951

9.20%

Quitrent

200

2.30%

500

4.70%

Salt

120

1.30%

400

3.70%

Peasants

260

3.30%

320

3.20%

Shops and Trades

30

0.30%

70

0.60%

Petitions

34

0.30%

100

0.90%

Iasak

6725

77.6%

6725

63.60%

Total

8658

100%

10566

100%

The wars between Russians and Bashkirs by 1711 ended in a stalemate. Neither party
could continue to fight, so they reached a compromise. This was exactly what Richard White
described as Middle Ground, where both sides, the intruder (Russians) and indigenous people
(Bashkirs) were unable to gain by force.103 The first episode of the Russo-Bashkir relations fits
into category of the delicate balance between the intruder and the natives. The government was
too weak to impose its will on the natives and the Bashkirs were incapable of removing
Russians. What Terry Martin describes for New Russia of the late 1700s perfectly fits to
Bashkiria in the early 1700s: an outlying region where the economic, legal and social relations of
the nation’s heartland have not yet been reproduced. It was still sparsely populated and the
center’s presence was identified with a considerable military power rather than settler
103
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colonies.104 The Russian state yielded to the natives’ demands to a great degree. So the first
period of Russo-Bashkir relations is an evidence that empires were not entities relying
exclusively on the brute force and wanton violence but rather they tended to be accommodating
entities which desired to keep subject peoples satisfied with their political status to the degree
socio-economic and political conditions allowed. The concessions by the Russian state to the
rebellious Bashkirs were not signs of the weakness of the imperial system but an evidence of the
imperial authorities’ willingness to justify their rule in the borderlands by gaining the loyalties
and accordingly services of the borderland peoples.
The Russian Empire unlike West European colonial empires was a contiguous one,
largely because of the non-existent geographical boundaries, and as settlers’ colonies sprang up
the borderland areas were increasingly considered part of the motherland. Accordingly Russian
authorities were not interested in exterminating native peoples of the borderlands (because they
were subjects of the empire, not chained slave laborers.) but preserving them as valuable Iasak
payers. The cooptation of the local elite into the service of the empire was a good indicator of
the Russian authorities’ determination to make the borderlands inseparable part of the empire.105
Bashkirs jealously defended their privileges and did not hesitate to pay a heavy price for
this. On the other hand Russian central authority did not have a clear-cut plan about the region
except the security of their borders. The region during this first period of Russian suzerainty
presented itself as a genuine frontier area with diverse groups such as adventurers, fur trappers
and land grabbers, who did not have means of livelihood in the European parts of Russia. They

104

Terry Martin, “The Empire’s New Frontiers: New Russia’s Path from Frontier to Okraina, 1774-1920” Russian
History, v. 19, No: 1-4 (1992), 181
105
For greater conceptual details about the imperial authorities’ resolve to integrate borderlands and native elites see
Ronald G. Suny, “The Russian Empire” in After Empire; Multiethnic Societies and Nation Building; The Soviet
Union and the Russian, Ottoman and Habsburg Empires ed. Karen Barkey & Mark von Hagen, (Westview Press:
Boulder , Colorado, 1997), 142-154.

86

sought security and freedom of religion and thereby escaping to the points where the repressive
Russian political regime did not reach firmly. So the region was genuinely a frontier area from
Russian perspective.
Even though the last war of this period took place during the second half of Peter’s reign,
considering the results of this episode, this war was more typical of the Muscovite period than of
Peter the Great’s reign because it ended in the the misleading impression on the part of Bashkirs
that they had emerged victorious in appearance and the central government stepped back which
was good enough for Bashkirs at the moment. Once again the central government proved to be
not strong enough to pacify this belligerent people for the same reasons as were witnessed during
the earlier wars.
Russian rule in Bashkiria was not exclusively rule by brutality. On the contrary the
central authorities at times deliberately punished excesses of the local administrators. Though
brutalization was an inseparable part of Russian policy during the rebellions, these were not out
of a sense of joy but necessity. The Russian government, long after the end of the 1704-1711
rebellion, publicly tried one of the Russian officials, a man called Sergeev, for excessive
brutality and sentenced him to jail. In 1724 Bashkirs and those who lived in Bashkiria were
exempted from poll tax as well.106 The Russian authorities as imperial officials had keen interest
in the tranquility of the frontiers and deliberately avoided harsh policies which could lead to
upheavals. Once they were sure that the region was completely tranquil they followed a discreet
policy to give Bashkirs a greater role in the administration of their homeland. In this context for
the first time loyal Bashkirs were given the task of collecting their own taxes in the late 1720s
when the administration of the region was entrusted to the imperial Senate.107 This policy
106
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definitely led to stratification within the Bashkir society and those who were entrusted with the
task of collecting taxes had greater benefits from the Russian government and would not want to
risk their gains in another futile rebellion.

Conclusion
Bashkir rebellions of this period and the Russian policies in the aftermath of these
rebellions indicated the Russian imperial authorities’ flexibility and their preference for
compromise over conflict. They were not jealous of their gains and were to a limited degree
quite willing to share them with their former native opponents. They were quick to pardon
actual leaders of the rebellions and by treating them with respect, the central government bought
their loyalties. The empire in this context proved to be not an avenger but a benevolent
benefactor.108 The natives on the other hand had to understand one basic priority rule of the
imperial system: tranquility of the frontiers, which could produce a win-win deal in case of
collaboration with the center. In case this rule was is neglected the natives would suffer direly at
the hands of the imperial masters, as was the case during the greatest Russo-Bashkir conflict of
the 1730s.
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Chapter 3
Bashkirs under Russians 1711- 1756
The period between 1711 and 1755 witnessed an expansion of Russian control in
Bashkiria. The Petrine reforms of the early 1700s radically changed the relations
between the center and the periphery. The Imperial regime was now a more imposing
one determined to increase the center’s leverage in the borderlands. A considerably
larger colonial bureaucracy busied itself with the classification of the people and their
peculiarities. It investigated the potential riches of the provinces and conducted
ethnographic studies of the native populations. Peter the Great’s reforms irrevocably
changed the course of history in Bashkiria.1 This trend became prevalent in most of the
colonial empires of the west in the nineteenth century. In those empires, professional
civil servants conducted ethnographic research and wrote reports on the local traditions.2
The more the center imposed its will on the natives, the more the natives willy-nilly were
victimized and the more they became transformed under the weight of an increasingly
alien culture.
Especially during this stage the empire started to play an increasingly influential
role in the lives of the natives as more and more imperial officials flowed into the region
to impose imperial policies with a Europeanized outlook,. The frontier for the Bashkirs
during this period slowly closed and in the most dramatic way in the period that lasted
from 1711 to 1755 when the last genuine Bashkir rebellion took place. The Russia of
1
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Peter the Great’s successors was radically different from Muscovite Russia in its relation
to Bashkirs. For one thing the government became more assertive in the affairs of the
region and more self-confident in its relations with the Bashkirs. During the bloodiest
Russo-Bashkir war the governmental forces were confident enough to reject any
compromise and conducted a nearly genocidal war against the Bashkirs. 3 The Bashkirs
emerged from the war in the most abject conditions. They never fully recovered
demographically from this near annihilation despite two more attempts in a much
debilitated and diminished form to resist governmental incursions.4
Yet the Bashkirs survived and it became clear that the Bashkirs would remain in
their region and would never resort to mass exodus as became the case for Kalmyks in
the 1770s or Crimean Tatars in the 1780 and the 1790s. Despite their near annihilation
this episode ended up with an ironic success for Bashkirs, because it became certain that
Bashkiria, Orenburg gubernia after 1744, was confirmed as the lands of the Bashkirs.
They did not become extinct as did many similar tribal groups to their east. They were
neither exiled in a massive scale,5 despite proposals to this end, nor were they
Christianized to any significant degree. The catastrophe of their bloody wars against the
Russian government was so great that the authorities never dared to christianize Bashkirs
as they did in the Middle Volga region. The government later made one more attempt to
extend their christianization policy to the Bashkir groups, but Bashkirs again resisted by
3
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force of arms. Bashkirs’ and to a lesser degree other non-Russian groups’ resistance
made the Russian authorities abandon their policy of christianization of the non-Russian
peoples of Russia, including those who had escaped from the middle Volga in the 1730s
and 1740s during the peak moment of christianization efforts. So other Muslim peoples
of the Volga region benefitted from Bashkir resistance.
The Bashkir wars of this period resulted in a greater determination for Bashkirs to
preserve their distinct identity. Their attachment to Islam also increased greatly and the
last genuine Bashkir war derived from this factor. I will also argue that even though the
borders were closing on Bashkirs, cultural factors began to play a more divisive role
between Bashkirs and Russians. The Russian authorities never fully solved this problem.
Imperial Russia’s Bashkir frontier, 1700-1734
The Russian government’s concessions to Bashkirs in 1711 were the last of its
kind and would not be repeated. The Bashkir threat continued against those Russians
who settled or served in the region which made the region insecure, a genuine feature of
frontier society. The years between 1684 and 1704 were the formative period of
transition from an extractive empire to an exploitative one. I use the term exploitative in
the sense that the central authority attempts to draw as much income from a region as
possible in the context of its human and natural resources. Peter the Great’s attempts to
impose as many different taxes as possible on the Bashkir people reflected this shift from
extractive period to exploitative period. The imperial administration under Peter the
Great was transformed from a distant entity to the comprehensive and inclusive entity.
Peter the Great was intent on creating an empire, not specifically for the Great Russians
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(Russkii) but for other nationalities as well (Rossiiskii). 6 Nationalities would also bear the
brunt of running the empire which required their closer attachment to the center. During
and after Peter’s reign the imperial authorities tried to make frontier regions an integral
part of the empire. The former Iasak payers would have to join to this effort by giving up
a certain amount of their land to the new imperial projects. If they did not comply
voluntarily, they would be made to do so.
During the 1704-1711 Russo-Bashkir wars Russians were not strong enough to
impose their will, but time was on their side. There had emerged a certain leadership in
this once acephalous society from among the cattle- and horse-rich Bashkir nobility and
Muslim religious opinion leaders.7 Not surprisingly the two great Russo-Bashkir wars of
this period (1735-1740 and 1755) were led by either rich Bashkir nobles or a Muslim
scholar called Batyrsha who was supposedly a Tatar or Mishar scholar.
The period from 1711 to 1755 witnessed great efforts by the Russian authorities
to close down the frontier region and by the Bashkirs to prevent them. By the end of the
period it became clear that the frontier was fully closed down. Bashkirs found
themselves encircled within the Russian Empire and the porous nature of the Bashkir
frontier ceased to exist. This period was also extremely rich in cross-cultural interactions
which took place mainly between Bashkirs and Tatars. Between Bashkirs and Russians
mainly economic relations developed.
The Bashkir frontier closed in this period mainly because of the increasing control
of the region by the authorities. In particular, the Russian government built a new
6

Marc Raeff, Political Ideas and Institutions in Imperial Russia, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 126.
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dire necessity they can even lead the peoples.
7
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defensive line which started in the early 1730s, the famous Orenburg defensive line,
which effectively imprisoned Bashkirs within the Russian Empire. One other reason for
the frontier closure was that Bashkirs were increasingly reduced to a minority in their
own region by the mid-1750s as large numbers of Russians and non-Russian minorities
migrated from the European Russia and the Middle Volga, with governmental planning
and encouragement. Such a migration and resettlement policy became possible only after
the Bashkirs were believed to pose no more threat to the authorities and settlers.
The Russian administrative system in the Volga-Ural region underwent a radical
change. First of all Kazan Gubernia was created and a number of towns were attached to
the guberniia, including Ufa.8 Then the system of voevodas was terminated in 1709 and
as part of Peter’s reforms to strengthen central government authority, Ufa province was
created in 1712.9 This arrangement was designed to put an end to the old pattern of local
government in which voevodas exercised a nearly absolute authority in their seats, which
caused enormous problems for the central government due to their unchecked powers.
The arbitrariness of the voevodas had contributed to all the Bashkir rebellions of the 17th
century, and the Bashkirs had repeatedly demanded their removal. The issue was the bad
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Some other major towns of the region that had been included in the Kazan Gubernia were Iaik, Terek,
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9
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local administration and the government responded with reforms after crushing the
rebellions.
Between 1728 and 1731 Ufa province was under direct administration of the
Imperial Senate. There seem to have been two reasons for such an arrangement. Zufar
Enikeev argued that the Senate directly administered Bashkiria because it recognized the
Bashkirs’ special status for their voluntary incorporation into Russian Empire.10 This
argument seems problematic because the Russian governments repeatedly violated
Bashkirs’ votchina rights during the seventeenth century. The other possible option is
that the Bashkirs were the only people west of the Urals who still posed enormous
troubles to the Russian government. The authorities, in order to deal with the Bashkir
problems, might have decided to take over the direct administration of the region. The
earlier Russian officials in the region, especially voevodas, had dismally failed to
establish an effective Russian administration in the region. The clear evidence for this
failure of the voevodas is that between 1590 and 1708, 55 voevodas served in the region
and 51 of them were dismissed.11
New Imperial Projects in Bashkiria
New imperial thinking was the harbinger of future governmental attempts to tie
the peripheral areas more strictly to the center, which would enable the agents of the
government to make better use of the economic potential of the regions. The first step to
bring Bashkiria within the economic sphere of the empire was to eliminate the factors
that prevented exploitation of the region’s natural riches, where rich deposits of iron and
copper had recently been discovered. Peter the Great and his successors were determined
10
11
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to put an end to “the Bashkir problem”12 and for this reason they adopted a policy of
narrowing the frontier. In this context, the construction of the New Trans-Zama
defensive line was started in 1731 and finished by 1736. The local peoples were forced
to work on its construction and were also levied with an extraordinary tax called
“Zasechnaia Money.”13

The image above is an example of the Russian wooden defensive line
called Zasechnaia Cherta. The government constructed such fortifications
widely in the southern and southeastern steppe in the 16th and 17th
centuries.14

12

Boris Mironov has earlier phrased “Bashkir question” and argued that it was solved by the end of the
eighteenth century. The prohibition of the extension of serfdom was a factor in the resolution of this
question. Boris M. Mironov, The Social History of Imperial Russia, 1700-1917, v.1, (Boulder; Colorado:
Westview Press, 2000), 15
13
V. A. Kuznetsov, “Novaia Zakamskaia Liniia i Obrazovanie Landmilitsii” Izvestiia Samarskogo
Nauchnogo Tsentra Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk, 11, (2009), 35.
14
V. V. Boguslavskii, Slavianskaia Entsiklopediia, v.1, (Moskva: Olma-Press, 2004), 472.

95

Like the earlier defensive lines, the government constructed the Trans-Zama line
to protect against the nomadic groups, to defend villages and Russian settlements, and to
prevent subject peoples of Russia from forming alliances with the nomadic groups
beyond Russian borders against the government. This line originated with the defensive
system of the old Trans-Kama fortifications constructed in the 1650s. The line extended
from the Samara River to the Kama River and effectively cut Bashkir lands into two.
Interestingly, Bashkirs did not rebel against the construction of this line. They rather
waited for several more years to react Russian encirclement policy when the construction
of the Orenburg defensive line was first started in 1734.
This Russian project to construct a major town in southern Bashkiria was not
coincidental and not confined to Bashkir relations. In fact it was the result of long term
Russian projects. After the Great Northern War was successfully concluded in 1721,
Russian foreign policy focused more and more on Asia.15 In this context Peter the Great
fought against Persia from 1722 to 1725. Despite being victorious, military and logistical
problems forced subsequent Russian rulers to abandon Peter’s gains in Iran in the early
1730s. They then turned southeast towards central Asia and in the late 1720s and early
1730s they tried to bring Kazakhs into the orbit of Russian empire by granting them
client status. In this context Bashkiria played a key role as a springboard towards central
Asia.

15

In fact during the war against Sweden Peter the Great sent some expeditionary forces deep into Central
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Even though in the circles of the central government of the Russian empire
Bashkirs were portrayed as mere savages, Bashkirs could perceive the results of the
Russian policies in the region and they apprehensively anticipated the future
consequences of the policy changes in the region. Their most radical problems were their
inability to unify themselves and to win support from the other Turkic groups beyond
Russia. By the 1730s the Russians had already solved many of their military problems
and they were better prepared to deal with the Bashkir resistance. This does not mean
that Russians had already overcome all their problems. Logistical support was still a
great problem that Russian troops in the region had to deal with. In one case when
Orenburg was first constructed at the mouth of the Or river in 1734, troops stationed there
had very quickly consumed their provisions and in order not to starve to death at the
middle of the winter, they abandoned the fortress in search of food on their way to Ufa.
Of 800 troops 2/3 of them died of starvation and frost.
The project to develop a new defensive system originated with Ivan K. Kirilov
(1689-1737). Kirilov was a leading Russian official who was a product of Peter the
Great’s westernization policy. He was a leading mathematician and geographer. He led
researches about astronomy, cartography and topography. In 1727 he wrote the first
systematic economic and geographic description of Russia. He was also a member of the
Senate as of 1712 and its general secretary after 1727.
Kirilov was one of the first protagonists of the ideas of colonizing Bashkiria,
conquest of Kazakh lands, expansion of Russian influence in Central Asia and
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developing trade relations with India. 16 He dreamed of developing trade relations with
Central Asia, for which they needed to establish a secure base in the Kazakh lands by
bringing Kazakhs into the orbit of Russia in the form of patron-client relations. He came
up with the idea and persuaded other top officials to implement his project. Although the
idea of building a town at the mouth of the river Or belonged to Kutlu Mukhammed
Tevkelev17, Kirilov transformed that idea into a comprehensive imperial project with
enormous ambitions, including potentially reaching India.18
The onslaught of Dzhungars on Kazakh lands and Kazakh Hordes (Zhuzh) in the
1720s was an opportunity for the Russians in this context because outside elements like
the Dzhungar invasion of Kazakh lands served as an excuse for Russian expansion into
Fthe region. Desperate Kazakhs fleeing before Dzhungars requested Russian help and
formal protection. Such events facilitated Russian encroachment in the region but this
could be achieved only after securing Russia’s Bashkir region. The privy councilor A. P.
Bestiuzhev-Riumin supported Kirilov’s proposal and in May 1734, Empress Anna
sanctioned it. Kirilov and Tevkelev proceeded to carry out the project.19 Even though he
was in the first place a polymath scholar, he proved that he could be a ruthless frontier
16

L. E Iofa, Sovremenniki Lomonosova: I. K. Kirilov and V. N. Tatishchev, Geografy Pervoi Poloviny 18 v.
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administrator. His main plan, while departing for the frontier, was to suppress Bashkir
resistance and secure the region for Russian expansion at all costs and he was ready to do
whatever was needed for this objective.
The Orenburg expedition was a good example of Imperial thinking. It was an
ambitious project with multiple goals: integrating one region into the imperial system;
creating room for the excess population and distributing land to them; thrusting to the
heart of the Kazakh lands as the target of the next imperial conquests; strengthening the
trade links with Central Asia; and if possible, reaching India which was still not
dominated by any European power. Kirilov, acting vigorously, quickly formed his
expeditionary force and gathered the leading scholars of Russia at the time. The
expedition was composed of about two hundred specialists and a military detachment of
about 2500. Among the participants were professionals, respected scholars including
astronomer and mathematician D. Elton, botanist I. G. Geyntselman, surveyors P.
Chichagov A. Kleshnin, M. Pestrikov, painter D. Kestl, specialist geologists and students
of the Slavic-Greek-Latin Academy. P. I. Rychkov, as an accountant, took part in the
expedition. Realizing the importance of the public and scientific value of the
expedition,20 Mikhail Lomonosov also wanted to join the expedition but this never
materialized.21 Such a sophisticated group of experts had many more goals than simply

20
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constructing a defensive line. The plans for exploration and investigation mean that
Russians had more in mind than mere exploitation. The political aim was to integrate the
region more completely into Russia by breaking Bashkirs’ traditional socio-economic
system and to create necessary conditions for the opening of the region to the future and
more orderly settlement to the Russians.
Just as Western Europeans opened Americas and Africa to the European Christian
civilization, Peter the Great’s and his successors’ policies of sending missions and
expeditions were in the same fashion as Bartolomeu Dias and his contemporaries. The
lands to the east of European Russia were due to be explored and opened to the western
civilization. However, the Russian imperial authorities unlike their counterparts in
Western Europe did not see the subject peoples as objects of mere exploitation and
enslavement. They were lesser partners of Russians who were expected to serve their
Russian tsars. On the contrary while Russian peasants in European Russia were enserfed
and closely tied to the land they tilled, Bashkirs were not even included within the orbit
of excessive taxation let alone enserfment. It must be underlined that the Russian
authorities did not tolerate rebellions and opposition to the central government’s policies.
During such cases, the authorities used a heavy hand to suppress dissent.
The Bashkir groups objected to the project on the grounds that construction of
fortresses violated the privileges granted to them by the Russian Tsar Ivan IV. On the
other hand Kirilov was a haughty administrator who refused to inform Bashkirs about the
real goals of the project. Despite Russian attempts to conceal the direction and goals of
the expedition, they became known to the Bashkirs even before the expedition arrived at
Krepostei v Nachale 18 Veka” Istoricheskie Nauki, 1. (1974); Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs, 2nd ed.,
(Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1995), 30
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the scene. Two Bashkirs envoys visited Kirilov and attempted to persuade him to
abandon the expedition and threatened him with another Bashkir rebellion if the
construction at the mouth of the Or’ river was started. Not willing to delay the outbreak
of the armed hostilities, Kirilov brutally tortured the envoys which resulted in the death
of one of them. The greatest Bashkir-Russian war started in response to the arbitrariness
and brutality of Kirilov on July 15, 1735.22 Such domineering attitudes on the part of the
Russian officials served only to exacerbate the situation not only for the Bashkirs but also
for the Russians including Kirilov himself.23
His arrogant attitude was not exceptional because by the 1730s Russian officials
had already adopted a western orientation thanks to Peter the Great’s westernization
efforts. As a result the Russian mindset had radically turned against the indigenous
peoples of the empire. Russian leaders and intellectuals no longer viewed them as the
descendants of Genghis Khan and no longer some sort of equals with the Russians. They
were now eastern savages who had to be tamed and civilized. Russian officials had
realized that they were the representatives of one of the greatest empires of the time and
their views of the eastern peoples were tinctured with a deep condescension. When
Mukhammed Tevkelev met with resistance during his diplomatic mission to the
Kazakhst, he upbraided them in statements that reflect the new Russian thinking: “The
Russian empire is in high repute among many states in the world, and it is not befitting
22
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16-Pervaia Treti 18 vv.) (Ufa: RIO BashGU, 2005), 184
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such an illustrious monarch to have a peace treaty with you, steppe beasts,…… and
signing a peace treaty with the Kazakhs would only defame the Russian empire.”24 An
ever confident Russian officialdom would no longer tolerate an equal footing with the
‘savage’ peoples of the east, and there would be no more diplomatic missions by these
peoples to the Russian capital to have an audience with the Russian ruler as was the case
in the past. The Russian administrators in the frontier areas would handle the relations
with the local people from then on. As a result Russian treatment of the indigenous
people in the frontier areas turned out to be more and more brutal, fed mainly by cultural
and civilization-based biases.25
These biases led the Russian officials to a new approach about the Bashkir
opposition to Russian expansion. Bashkirs were seen now as subhuman in the most
radical way and the Bashkir problem could be solved through elimination of all Bashkirs
by more violent (slaughter) or less violent (deportation) means. The first recorded plans
about this issue appeared in 1725 in a project prepared by a Russian official in Bashkiria
called Iukhnev who proposed to diminish the Bashkir population by deporting them to
the central regions of European Russian and settling Russians in their place in Bashkiria.
He stated that to solve the Bashkir problem and to preserve the safety of the region from
the Bashkirs, without resorting to bloodshed, Russia should deport them to the interior of

24
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Russia in small groups and then convert them to Christianity. So Bashkiria would be free
from Bashkirs and ready for Russian colonization.26
Another Russian official from the surrounding area, A. P. Volynski, the governor
of Kazan, 27 rejected the proposal of deporting Bashkirs because it seemed impractical to
deport a whole people and repopulate Bashkir lands with the Russian peasants. Instead
he proposed to solve the problem right in Bashkiria by introducing new methods to
minimize the rebellious potential of Bashkirs. Volynski argued that the Bashkirs must be
sent to shed the blood of Kazakhs and Karakalpaks and of course these Bashkirs would
also die, and there would be fewer able-bodied Bashkirs in the region. Also new
legislation had to be enacted to prohibit Bashkirs from owning firearms with death
penalty, the practice of keeping Bashkirs amanats had to continue, and the military
strength of the government in the region had to be increased by strengthening the
garrisons of the towns. New taxes had to be imposed to destroy Bashkirs economically. 28
In Volynskii’s view Bashkirs were Mukhamedans (Moslems) who would never be loyal
to the government. B. A. Aznabaev maintains that Senate did not take Volynskii’s plans
seriously because they were impractical. In 1709 when government deported some
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Bashkirs to Kazan Uezd, 9000 troops from the regular army, 10000 Cossack units and
Kalmyk support were needed.29
Bashkir Moves against the New Imperial Projects
Aznabaev believes that Kirilov and his staff were caught by surprise when the war
started in full scale in the summer of 1735. This seems incredible because during the
winter and spring of 1735, all-Bashkir Iighins were held in several places throughout
Bashkiria and Bashkir leaders extensively discussed what to do in the face of another
Russian attempt to violate the land charter granted some 180 years earlier. In one of
these Iighins, it was decided that rebels would first burn down a Bashkir village,
Buraevo, and then they would destroy the Mishars, Chuvash, Votiaks and Cheremis and
finally attack the Russians. They also decided to gather under the leadership of Akai
Kusiumov with ten thousand fighters.30 The rebels were determined to fight not only
Russians but also all the other minority groups who supported Kirilov’s expedition. The
village Buraevo is located in the Osinsk doroga and was first founded in the early years
of the seventeenth century and from the very beginning it was a farming community. 31 So
the residents of this village who settled down long ago did not care about whether a
defensive line was constructed or not because they were not nomads. So the war, at least
from this perspective, seemed a war between nomads and farmers.
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These Iighins were one indicator that a Bashkir leadership was in the making as
more and more Bashkirs who lived quite distant from each other were coming together,
discussing matters relating to their survival and deciding what to do under whose
leadership. The emergence of a leadership meant greater chances for the Bashkirs to
produce a national identity. Unfortunately for Bashkir society the radical divisions had
also come to the surface as the rebellious leadership decided to cut down collaborators,
“loyal Bashkirs.” For the rest of the war the casualties on both sides would escalate as
hostilities deepened.
What Bashkirs historians have failed to explain so far was the reasons for these
radical divisions within the Bashkir society. They have failed to analyze what factors
made Bashkirs loyal and disloyal and what factors made them cut each others’ throats so
mercilessly. This could be explained by the brutality of frontier life since violence was
always emphasized as a basic fact of frontier life due to the lack of a strong state
authority. But it seems that the real reasons for these hostilities within the same ethnic
groups are deeper. It must have been related to the differentiating level of the
development of various Bashkir groups. Many of the loyal Bashkirs were from the
western parts of Bashkiria where governmental control was stricter and colonization of
the Bashkir lands was more intense and sedentarization level of Bashkirs was higher than
those of the Bashkirs to the east and south of the region.
There was another dimension of this uneven level of economic development. In
the past the Bashkir groups had generally received non-Bashkir peoples’ support. But as
was claimed by Chuloshnikov there was no large support by the other nationalities for
this war. On the contrary the Mishars opposed the Bashkirs and closely cooperated with
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the punitive forces. They were accompanied by two newly emerging socio-economic
groups in Bashkiria by this time, Teptiars and Bobyls, who had been working under
Bashkirs either as tenants or tax payers. So unavoidably there were tensions among these
groups.32 Bashkirs, thanks to the migration to their region, had turned out to be the
renters of their lands to new groups of people, including Tatar, Chuvash, Cheremis, and
Votiaks, who came to Bashkiria in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.
Kirilov and Rumiantsev in their report to the state senate in December 1735 stated that
these groups were occasionally forced by the rebel Bashkirs to take part in their war but
they proved to be highly unwilling33 since the result of the war would change nothing for
these people. So they proved to be highly unreliable for the Bashkirs and an asset for the
Russians.
As for the Russian side during the critical months spanning from winter to early
summer of 1735, Kirilov had many Bashkir tarkhans serving under him and consequently
must have known about rebellious attitudes among the Bashkirs. A loyal Tatar sotnik
(lieutenant) Nadyr Mullah who had joined one of these Iighins reported about the
forthcoming turmoil. He reported that those who attended the meeting almost universally
decided not to move unless the Russians moved; not to let Russians construct the town
and cut them down.34 Alton Donnelly states that Kirilov had been warned by Tatishchev,
the governor of Ekaterinburg, about the real goals of these Iighins but he ignored these
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because he thought that these meetings were about recruiting labor force for the
construction of the fortresses. One reason for his indifference to the reports about the
Bashkir threat was that he was more engrossed with the Kazakhs and ignored the
Bashkirs’ rebellious potential.35 Kirilov made himself believe that Bashkirs were fully
dormant and were extremely pleased (ves’ma dovol’nyi).36 This could be possibly
explained by the arrogance of an imperial official alien to the region’s conditions who
had been assigned the task of changing the fortunes of the largest empire of the time, and
the Bashkir threat was only a trivial issue for such an elevated man. Even though he
highhandedly attempted to recruit a number of Bashkir elite leaders to the Russian
service, his arbitrary manners only antagonized disgruntled Bashkir leaders.
There was more than a cultural gap between indigenous peoples and the
representatives of the central government. The authors of the unrealistic projects in the
region refused to incorporate the cooperation of the local elite and this caused a
catastrophe for the peoples of the region, Russians and non-Russians alike. As the leader
of the Orenburg expedition, Kirilov was possibly aware of Volynski’s ideas and he also
proposed similar plans in one of his reports to the Senate dated 13 January 1735. One of
his plans was to send Bashkirs to perform long military service away from their families
and wives who would lose their fertility and produce no children and this way the number
of Mukhamedans would be reduced. The government decided to send Bashkirs who
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committed theft to Rogervik.37 What is surprising is that the report was penned long
before the eruption of the armed hostilities. One of Kirilov’s tasks in the region may
have been to break the rebellious spirit of the Bashkir people as a secondary goal.38
Without providing the security of the rear it seemed impossible to leap into the affairs of
Central Asia. It is certain that without a pacified Bashkiria there could be no viable
Orenburg project. So the long term goals of the construction of Orenburg and its
projected benefits for the imperial policies of the Russian empire were dedicated to the
Bashkir question.
If the authors of the Ocherki po Istorii Bashkirskoi ASSR are to be credited, the
central government as early as the 1720s and early 1730s had already lost its trust of the
Bashkirs of southern Bashkiria and had decided to weaken them and break their influence
on the Bashkir masses.39 Kirilov was a perfect choice to implement this policy. A selftaught man from modest background, Kirilov was a hardliner and refused to adopt a
resilient policy towards Bashkirs because he interpreted it as a sign of weakness. He also
considered Bashkirs as part of the multinational Russian empire and accordingly, despite
their rebelliousness, they had to be tamed and made loyal subjects of the empire. The
Russian government had conducted diplomatic negotiations with the Bashkir leaders after
the 1662-1664 war and treated them as equals in the peace talks and exchanged prisoners,
all of this was the evidence of the recognition of Bashkirs as negotiable opponents.
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Kirilov stood firm in his attitude despite the opposition of the chairman of Commission of
Bashkir Affairs40 at the time, A. I. Rumiantsev, in fact a quite brutal administrator, who
was in favor of opening negotiations with the Bashkir rebels.41 Nevertheless unlike
Kirilov, Rumiantsev was more of a soldier than a political figure who wanted to put an
end to armed hostilities by any means including negotiations with the rebellious Bashkirs.
Such a scheme was unacceptable to Kirilov who firmly believed in the necessity of
binding Bashkiria to the center and making it an integral part of the empire.
For Kirilov a brutal policy was needed to integrate Bashkirs into the Russian
Empire. In his view, fewer Bashkirs meant firmer integration. He was backed by the
government and was authorized to implement a number of measures to this end in a
governmental ukaz dated February 11, 1736 which opened the way for the settlement of
merchants and artisans from Central Asia and parts of Russia in Orenburg, (It was called
Or’ at the time) from Central Asia and parts of Russia. The ukaz stated that all measures
must be taken to make conditions better for the merchants of central Asian cities in
Orenburg, a place which must be made more attractive for the merchants; Measures must
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be taken to facilitate the stay of the merchants of central Asia, if necessary they must be
given land for their settlement and must be treated with care.42
This invitation of Central Asians to Orenburg, historically Bashkir lands, is a clear
indication of the Russian authorities’ determination to put an end to Bashkir autonomy
and to make Bashkirs, whether they wanted such a scheme or not, obedient and docile
subjects of the empire. This law also indicated that there would be no more concessions
to the Bashkirs. Probably because they did not know of this law, Bashkir leaders
continued to demand the restoration of their former privileges.
This law was also an indication that Russian authorities considered the Bashkir
frontier closed. They were wrong because borders and frontiers are two different things.
Even if the construction of the Orenburg line sealed the fate of the indigenous people
within the empire, their struggle continued. As Mario Apostolov elaborates, “Sovereign
state borders and civilizational frontiers are mental constructions which frame societal
and spatial limits within which social organization become possible. But, it is much more
difficult to define civilizational frontiers than for example state or administrative
frontiers.”43 Based on his arguments it can be stated that the Bashkir frontier in the 1730s
was taking a different form in Russia where previously unseen/unavailable divisive
factors came to the surface; and the Bashkirs’ Russian frontier gained new dimensions
like civilized versus barbarian or Christian versus Muslim. And as the intruder gained
military and economic strength and accordingly self-confidence, it became increasingly
vociferous in its outlook to the indigenous peoples. The Russians now to a degree saw
42
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the native population as untamed and needing to be educated and civilized along the lines
of contemporary Europeans and Russians. The Russian attitude towards Bashkirs and
their brethren was now more and more paternalistic, a father figure who knew the best for
the children and knew how to be brutal.
I. G. Akmanov argues that the expedition was called “The Certain (Izvestnyi)
Expedition” because the Russian authorities intended to conceal the real targets of the
expedition.44 In order to gain the sympathy of the local population, once Kirilov arrived
in Ufa, he punished those Russian officials who had treated indigenous people arbitrarily.
On the other hand he tried to gather the Bashkir elite to his side with the distribution of
gifts and titles. Before his arrival in Ufa, however, the Bashkir groups had already been
warned by some of their fellow Bashkirs who had been in the service of the Russian state.
They were well-informed about the goals of the expedition and the possible consequences
of the completion of such a project. It would mean their complete isolation from the rest
of the independent Turkic world and the loss of their bargaining power in imperial circles
to preserve their votchina rights.
The Bashkir support had to be recruited, for they could be of great use to the
Russian government as intermediaries to conduct negotiations with the Kazakhs. The
Bashkirs already had a close relationship with the Kazakhs despite the earlier armed
conflicts in these two nomadic steppe societies. These potential uses of Bashkirs to the
Russian imperial designs were voiced by Kirilov. Kirilov lacked the tact of his
successors in his views and attitudes towards Bashkirs. But he set a precedent for the
future governors of Orenburg. If Russia wanted to play a dominant role in central Asia
44
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and bring them to the orbit of the Russian empire, Bashkiria must be pacified and
Bashkirs must be integrated into the Russian imperial system. Accordingly Kirilov
briefly toyed with the idea of buying Bashkir loyalties by distributing gifts, titles,
rewards, not with great success however.45
Even though in the steppe politics of the region Kazakhs were their sworn
enemies, Bashkirs suffered from repeated Kazakh raids, and both were ready to clash
with each other over the meager pasture lands, the Bashkirs also benefited from their
connection with the Kazakh world. Their relations were not always hostile. There were
trade relations, and occasionally Kazakh and Bashkir groups would join to raid Russian
settlements in the region, enslave people, and sell them in the Central Asian markets.
Kirilov in his report to the Senate stated that “these people (Kazakhs) are no friends
(nepriateli) to us and they continually attacked Russian, Kazan, Iaitsk, Volga, Ufa and
Siberian frontier settlements in small bands of thieves, causing material damage. They
annually drove cattle and captives to be sold in the Bukharan and Khivan markets.”46
Bashkirs without doubt provided logistical and scouting support for these raids and
benefited from these combined efforts.
During the Russo-Bashkir conflicts the Bashkir ringleaders and warriors often
would take refuge among the Kazakhs, getting a breathing space for themselves to refresh
their struggle against Russians again. The examples of this type of protection abound.
Bashkir leader Seit took refuge among Kazakhs in the 1680s after his war effort was
defeated by Russians. His sons emerged from among Kazakhs in the following decades
45
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and resumed their father’s struggle against the Russians.47 In 1737, one of the leaders of
the Bashkirs, Sultanmurat Diuskeev from Iurminskii Volost of Kazan Doroga took refuge
among Kazakhs of Middle Horde and lived there until 1739. In the meantime he tried to
provide greater Kazakh support for the Bashkir case. A Russian report about Sultan
Murat and other Bashkirs among the Kazakhs states “The leading Bashkir thief, Sultan
Murat, lived among the peoples of Barak sultan, from there with the end of the last winter
he traveled to Urgench with the purpose of trade. However on his way to Urgench his
horse killed him….. Bashkirs among the Kirgiz Kaisak (Kazakhs) people of Barak
Sultan are many but their exact number is not known.”48
Russians’ fear of closer Kazakh-Bashkir relations was reasonable but these steppe
peoples had no common ground to form firmer relations because their enemies were not
common. While Bashkirs were overwhelmed with the Russian intrusions, Kazakhs had
deep troubles with the Mongol Dzhungar invasion from which they dearly suffered in the
1720s and they had appealed to the Russians for protection. As long as Russians
remained above these steppe politics and managed to become adept at exploiting their
differences, there would be no common threat to them from this direction.
The leader of the Little Horde of Kazakhs, Khan Abulkhair, vigorously acted
against any kind of cooperation between Bashkirs and Kazakhs of the Little Horde and
Bashkir leaders in their moments of despair could not dare send any envoy to Abulkhair
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khan for help.49 This bifurcated Kazakh approach towards Bashkirs has its own reasons.
The Khan of the Middle Horde could provide shelter for Bashkirs because his main
antagonist was Dzhungars, not Russians, and Kazakhs of the Middle Horde had no close
relations with the Russians. Any extra Bashkir population could be used against
Dzhungars. But the situation in the Little Horde was complicated. For one thing
Abulkhair struggled for pride of place among Kazakh hordes and his territory was
adjacent to Russian Bashkiria. For another, he had also requested Russian protection
against the Dzhungar threat and hoped to receive Russian help to achieve his goals. By
protecting rebellious Bashkirs he would risk this much needed Russian support. Last but
not least, Kazakhs of the Little Horde did not have a bright record in their relations with
the Bashkirs in the past. The relations between the two had been antagonistic and both
sides raided each other’s territory very often. In fact warfare between Bashkirs and
Kazakhs of the Little Horde was a means of economic livelihood. So there could be little
probability of a steppe alliance against Russians.
But as long as the link between Bashkirs and Kazakhs remained alive there was
little hope for the closure of the Bashkir frontier. So the Russians resorted to their
traditional steppe frontier control tactics and raised another line of fortifications. Below
is the list of Russian fortresses and strongholds constructed right in the middle of the
Bashkir lands.
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Strong Points
(Ukreplenie)
Alekseevsk

Type of
Ukreplenie
Fortress

Kinel'skii

Redut51

Krasnyi

New Trans-Kama Line 1734173650
Location

Composition of Garrison
4 company of Sergievsk Regiments,
1 company of Alekseevsk Regiment

Redut

Samara River (Branch of Volga) and
its branch Bolshoi Kinel'
Reka Rodilsia Samara i Bolshoi
Kinel'
Sok river (Branch of Volga)

Krasnoiarskaia

Fortress

Sok river

Khoroshii

Redut

Chernorechenskii

Fel'dshanets52

Nizhnyi Orlianskii

Redut

Verhniei Orlianskii

Redut

Khoroshaia River
(Branch of Sok River)
Chernaia River
(Branch of Sok River)
Orlianka River
(Branch of Sok River)
Orlianka River

4 company of Sergievsk Regiments,
1 company of Alekseevsk Regiment
1 company of Sergievsk Regiment

Surovskii

Redut

Sok river and its Branch Surgut river

Sergievsk

Fortress

Sok River

Zainskii

Redut

Surushskii

Redut

Kondurchinskii

Fel'dshanets

Lipovka River
(Branch of Kondurcha River)
Malyi Surush River
(Branch of Sok River)
Kondurcha River
(Branch of Sok River)

Tarkhanskii, 1'oi

Redut

Tarkhanskii, 2'oi

Redut

Cheremshanskaia

Fortress

Sheshminskii

Fel'dshanets

Shehsma River
(Branch of Kama River)

Kichuiskii

Fel'dshanets

Kichui River
(Branch of Sheshma River)

Bolshoi Tarkhanka River
(Bolshoi Cheremshan river basin)
Iaurka River
(Branch of Bolshoi Cheremshan
River)
Bolshoi Cheremshan River
(Branch of Volga)

1 company of Sergievsk Regiment
2 company of Biliarsk Regiments
1 company of Biliarsk Regiment

3 company of Biliarsk Regiments
1 company of Alekseevsk Regiment
1 company of Biliarsk Regiments
1 company of Biliarsk Regiments
1 company of Sheshminsk
Regiment,
2 company of Biliarsk Regiment
1 company of Sheshminsk
Regiment,
1 company of Sheshminsk
Regiment,
3 company of Sheshminsk
Regiment,
1 company of Alekseevsk Regiment
3 company of Sheshminsk
Regiment,
1 company of Alekseevsk Regiment
3 company of Sheshminsk
Regiment, 1 company of Alekseevsk
Regiment

Then to this line another string of fortresses was added, this time surrounding the
Bashkir lands and cutting their ties with the Kazakhs. John LeDonne argues that this new
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trans-Kama line became obsolete as soon as it was constructed because the Orenburg
expedition shifted Russian attention further to the southeast.53 This view misses the point
that the fortresses and forts that made this line did not lose their functionality and very
effectively crippled Bashkir movement within Bashkiria. They enabled the Russian
authorities to increase their grasp of the Bashkir lands and open these lands for further
colonization so the integrative role of this line cannot be denied.
The turning point in this period was the construction of the Orenburg line. Peter
the Great’s heritage was an inspiration because Kirilov, in charge of building this line,
was a close disciple of Peter the Great.54 On the other hand, another disciple of Peter the
Great proposed this line be built: Vasily Nikitich Tatishchev, considered the father of
Russian history writing and one of the great imperial officials that the region ever had. In
a report to the government he proposed that the construction of a line be furnished with
towns and settlements. Only after such a complex scheme the true colonization of the
region could be accomplished. The line would provide the security of the region and
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settlements, towns, cities would transform the region ethnically, socially, economically
and politically. Without settlements the region could remain only a military zone
populated by soldiers and an antagonistic and nomadic people.
To minimize Bashkir threats to Russian security in the area Tatishchev
maintained the need for assimilating Bashkirs in a period over the generations by
proposing to “take all the children of the influential families and educate them in Russian
language” But Tatars as tutors should not be trusted. Instead of Tatars, Russians must
have been employed as tutors on the condition that they were not drunkards since such
people were considered abominable by indigenous people. For assimilation of these
people, conversion to Orthodoxy was also considered as an option. It contemplated that
their Christianization must be guaranteed through a certain method of toleration and
understanding. In time they will better inculcate. ”Besides force must not be used in
proselytizing but compassion and clemency must be utilized to teach the student the rules
of Christianity”55 For the first time a top ranking Russian official from the new
generation of enlightened bureaucrats was proposing to solve this problem through
assimilation of the whole Bashkir people in such a way that their conversion would be
ensured through peaceful ways rather than imposing the arbitrary will of the intruder.
The case to make this region an indivisible part of the empire was discussed by many
Russian officials who were familiar with the conditions of the region. Tatishchev as a
genuine enlightened Russian bureaucrat also saw the need to transfer Russian population
to the region because simply construction of the fortification systems would not suffice to
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ensure Russian security. The Russian military existence in Bashkiria would need support
by a loyal population.
There were good reasons to believe that loyal Bashkirs were not loyal or
productive enough to provide food and other provisions to the garrisons because their
level of sedentarization did not produce enough grain for provisioning the garrisons.
Tatar or Mishars were more preferable in this respect and from the very beginning
Mishars fought on the side of Russians who promised them land in the Bashkir region.
The apogee of Russo-Bashkir Conflict: the 1735-1740 War
As mentioned earlier, the 1730s were a turning point for both Russians and
Bashkirs. This turning point came because for the first time central authority firmly
imposed its terms on this indigenous people in a bloody war that had three stages: 17351736, 1737-1738 and 1738-1740. It was the greatest and the bloodiest war between
Bashkirs and Russians, the starting point of which for the Bashkirs was to prevent
Russian encirclement of the area. The fact was that even though during these three
different stages several different Bashkir leaders emerged and nearly all of them were
killed or executed by the punitive forces, the goal (evicting the Russians from Bashkir
lands) remained the same. Accordingly the phases of this war must be considered
connected.
One other aspect of this war was that it was also a war between mainly two rival
Bashkir groups; pro-Russian and anti-Russian. Even though in the previous RussoBashkir wars there were tensions and armed conflicts among rival Bashkir factions, in the
1730s the scale of this infighting reached an extraordinary level. Nearly a whole society
was polarized between loyal and rebellious Bashkirs. This polarization was also not
118

confined to the Bashkir people. Other non-Russian groups in the region had undergone a
similar polarization. Bashkir rebel groups never hesitated to storm Mishar, Tatar or loyal
Bashkir auls (villages) which refused to join them. This was partly working to the
advantage of the rebellious Bashkir groups who had no or meager provisions because
loyal indigenous settlements were not burned down or sacked by the Russian forces so
there was food available in these places.56 Even though Mishar groups were mostly in the
Russian service, a number of them preferred to fight on the side of the rebellious
Bashkirs. A Tatar mulla called Urazmet wrote in his report to the Russian officials in
Ufa about an incident when he was briefly captivated by disloyal Bashkir groups where
he noticed Mishar fighters in the rebel camp .57 Tatars had been divided among
themselves as well. According to the report of a captivated Tatar rebel called Arslan by
the Russian forces, in his native region in Kazan Uezd, which was located just outside the
original Bashkir lands, fourteen Tatar villages agreed to join rebels.58
The 1735-1740 rebellion was bloody and almost no one in Bashkiria was
unaffected by the destruction. This war was good evidence for the new imperial
historiography because it was not simply between Russian oppressors and the freedom
loving peoples but was more complex and differentiated. Rebellious Bashkirs fought
against the Russian settlers, the Russian government, the loyal (vernyi) Bashkirs and
other ethnic groups, i.e. Tatars and Mishars. Some groups of Tatars and Mishars fought
the Russians and cooperated with the rebellious Bashkirs. In August 1735, Bashkirs from
a number of volosts in Nogai Doroga and Kazan Doroga, Tatars from a number of
56
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villages and Chuvash from the village of Ulu Arema, in total more than one thousand
people, destroyed two Bashkir, three Tatar and three Mishar villages.59 Loyalties
constantly shifted in this case and there were no fixed boundaries between enemies. One
day’s enemy could easily be other day’s ally.
The 1735-1740 war could perhaps be classified as a genuine frontier war because
militarily weaker and disorganized rebels first and foremost direct their hostilities to the
easier targets, that is to say to the settlements of the loyal groups. This was the main
method of the war in the frontier. This rebellion also proved that large-scale armed
rebellions could be extremely costly for the natives. The rebellious Bashkirs resorted to
guerilla-style warfare because of their military weakness and backwardness or lack of
training. Since they were heavily depended on the settlements for provisions they were
also extremely vulnerable to the Russian punitive expeditions. It is by no means an
exaggeration to say that casualties among non-combatant Bashkir population
substantially exceeded those among Bashkirs who actually fought.
As a result of the unbending policy of Kirilov, some 12 to 14 percent of the
Bashkir population perished. More than 60.000 were killed, executed, enslaved or died
of starvation and exposure.60 It must be added here that there is not one common
universal view about the exact population of the Bashkirs. The cruelties of the Russian
commanders, in particular Orthodox Tatar convert Tevkelev’s, were told in the folk songs
of Bashkirs of the period in a bitter tone.
Our land Tevkelev scorched
The valley of Ak-Idel he burned
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He simply burned Bashkirs
The golden epaulettes fell on the shoulders.61
In January 1736, Tevkelev’s troops committed unspeakable atrocities, as was
reported by P. I. Rychkov, a firsthand witness of the 1735-40 Russo-Bashkir war and the
first historian of the Orenburg region. Seiantus was a Bashkir village in the Sibir doroga
which was pro-rebel, and its able bodied males had joined the rebel forces. To set an
example for the other Bashkir settlements in the region, Tevkelev stormed this largely
defenseless village. Rychkov’s accounts of the events are revealing of the Russian
intentions and methods in the region. “They, Bashkirs, were all surrounded by us. After
brief resistance they were all captured, nearly 1000 people with their women and
children. Women and children were taken away and hacked to pieces with bayonets by
loyal Bashkirs and Mishars.” Over 105 people were taken into a barn and it was burnt
down with people inside. All these happened in one night. However the most surprising
thing was that, for Rychkov, even within the barn those thieves, Bashkirs, managed to
wound some dragoons with their spears which they hid in the barn. At the end of the
night there was nothing but ashes left from this once large village. Everybody young or
old was killed.62 Even though Rychkov claims nearly one thousand dead, this figure is
highly dubious since Bashkir villages were at most a quarter of this population a half
century later.
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Bashkir rebel groups attacked Russian settlements to seek the revenge for the
massacres of Tevkelev and Kirilov,63 but these settlements did not suffer as heavily as the
non-Russians. I. G. Akmanov argues that this proved the anti-government nature of the
war by the rebels. He concludes that Bashkirs’ hostility was not directed against the
Russian people. However he ignores the nature of the Russian settlements. For one thing
Russian peasants for security reasons had settled in the lands surrounding Russian
fortresses and their major function for that reason was to produce food needed for the
supply of the armed forces. So they were less vulnerable to the attacks of the rebels. For
other, while the Russian government prohibited the sale of arms to the indigenous people
and the blacksmithery was forbidden to the natives, the government imposed no similar
limitation on the Russian peasants. So the Russian settlements could better defend
themselves against the incursions of the rebels. From the very beginning Bashkir
rebellions had been directed against all types of settlements that prevented them from
performing their traditional nomadic lifestyle and Russians had never been an exception
for their hostilities.
The story told by Kidras Mullakaev64 after an incident is revealing in this respect.
Kidras, a Bashkir noble in the service of the Russians, with his companions attempted to
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join Kirilov’s expedition. On his way to Kirilov’s camp, he was captured by a “disloyal”
Bashkir group from the Nogai doroga and was released only after he promised not to help
the Ufa administration, a promise he did not keep. He rushed to the Russians and
explained what he witnessed in the Bashkir camp. He claimed that Bashkirs had been
divided among themselves and some groups of Bashkir leaders were planning to
exterminate those collaborators, loyal Bashkir nobles.65
The Russian authorities were extremely adept at exploiting this cleavage within
Bashkir society, and the magnitude of hostilities within that society contributed greatly to
the government’s success in suppressing this rebellion. Since the modest Russian armed
forces were inadequate to subdue the restive Bashkir tribes which composed much of the
population of the region, it was vital for them to rely on the loyal elements of the Bashkir
society. The division within the Muslim community in the region gained momentum and
loyal elements within the indigenous groups with their families started moving into the
Russian fortresses to escape death at the hands of the disloyal groups.
I. G. Akmanov argues that the Bashkir rebellions of the 1600s and 1700s were not
directed against the Russian people in the region but against the Russian government.
Akmanov is much less tolerant of the Tatar groups because, he maintains, these Tatar
groups, especially their feudal leaders, were collaborators who attempted to seek
protection of the Russian forces. On the other hand he maintains that the religious
establishment in the region, mostly composed of Tatars, was pro-Russian during this war
and Bashkir groups intermittently killed them while they were serving Russians against
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their Bashkir brethren and coreligionists.66 In the same way, some of the Bashkir
tarkhans who had declared their loyalty to the Russian government and promised to join
the expedition were attacked by the rebellious groups. In some cases they were killed
and as in the case of Kidras Mullakaev they were released only after they promised to
cease to support Russians. These hostilities prevented any possibility of a unity of
indigenous peoples against the intruding Russians.
The Russians had managed to divide indigenous communities by distributing
lands which did not belong to them. Kirilov proposed to kill rebel Bashkirs with their
wives and children and distribute their lands to Russian settlers, Tatars and loyal Bashkir
nobles who served governmental forces in suppressing rebellion. Also on the Bashkir
lands fortresses must have been established with the Mishar settlements in the vicinity.
The promise of distribution of gifts had a devastating effect not only on the Bashkirs but
also other non-Russian societies in the region. But winning the loyalties of a minority of
Bashkirs was not good enough because the rebellious potential of the Bashkirs continued.
Because the allegiances in the frontier areas were extremely fluid, those loyal Bashkirs
could not be trusted fully. A more radical plan by Kirilov was proposed in the summer of
1736 to reduce the density of the Bashkir population in the region by opening their lands
to colonization, which would dilute Bashkirs’ demographic dominance in the region.
When their lands were distributed to the Russian peasants and Mishars they would be
forced to mix with them and would lose their rebellious spirit.67
Kirilov’s proposal would have been the most reasonable solution to Russia’s
Bashkir problem, but that objective could have been realized only after a generation
66
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during which Bashkirs became fully familiar with a sedentary society. If it could have
been started, the achievement of such a program could have fully closed the frontier in
this area. At least the frontier, even if it did not disappear fully, could have been
internalized, that is to say, the frontier society could lose their ties with the people beyond
the control of the government. The frontier could gain a new, religio-cultural dimension
in which indigenous people after losing their means and hopes to solve the problem of the
intruder revert to cultural areas and attempt to preserve their distinct religious and
cultural ways.
Last but not least up until the 1730s the Bashkir groups had increasingly
sedentarized and accordingly their settlement became the targets of punitive expeditions.
During the rebellion Russian punitive forces burned or otherwise destroyed many Bashkir
villages. Sedentarization of Bashkirs made them more vulnerable to the Russian attacks
and less capable of conducting a successful guerilla warfare based on hit and run tactics.
The Russian imperial historians by and large called this war a bunt, riot or peasant
rebellion. While the nineteenth century Russian historian, N. Firsov based his views on
struggle between European civilization and Muslim fanaticism and Asian barbarism, 68
for others historians of the same period, Russia had the mission to insert the elements of
European civilization among these barbarians and had to be the carrier of the message of
the New Testament in the spirit of the Orthodox Church.69
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Bashkir leaders of the first stage were Kilmiak Nurushev, one of the leaders of the
1704-1711 rebellion,70 Akai Kusiumov, the son of the famed Kusium Tiukeleev, the hero
of the 1704-1711 war and 71 Iusup Arykov.72 Their deaths at the hands of the Russians
reveal the lack of institutional basis of the steppe politics. All these unsuspecting leaders
were lured into the hands of Russian authorities and they all perished. So it was highly
possible that the lack of an institutional basis and the predominance of personal relations
between Russians and indigenous people was a basic aspect of the frontier life.
Other more obscure Bashkir leaders troubled government forces for a long time.
One of them was Bepenia Trupberdin. He was from Sibir doroga and in a sense he was
one of the main ideologists of the Bashkir cause as a literate abyz. Just like Kilmiak
Nurushev he grasped the main direction of this Bashkir movement and heavily criticized
Russian officials in the region for their violation of the votchina law of Ivan IV. In his
letter to Tatishchev in August 1736 he clearly defined the reasons of their movement,
blaming Tatishchev for establishing factories in his own native region and eliminating
traditional Bashkir life. He attempted to conclude an alliance with the Lesser and Middle
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Horde leaders of Kazakhs. He also suffered in Menzelinsk just like previously mentioned
Bashkir leaders.
The major distinguishing feature of these Bashkirs was that they were all from the
southern and eastern Bashkir lands where they had enjoyed to a great degree a free
nomadic life unlike their brethren who led a sedentary life in western and northern
Bashkiria. Russian incursions from the beginning of the 18th century in the forms of
establishing factories, constructing fortifications and carving out Bashkir lands for
settlement made their lives increasingly unbearable. As we saw some of them had
already developed a family tradition of fighting Russians and these leaders were from
wealthy Bashkir elite who controlled traditionally large livestock herds, which needed
large pasturelands. It was reported by a European traveler that as late as second half of
the nineteenth century an ordinary Bashkir had twenty or thirty heads of horses; the richer
Bashkir families owned at least 500 heads of horse while the richest ones would have no
less than 2000.73
Between 1735 and 1740, the Russian punitive measures caused enormous
sufferings for Bashkirs.74
Orenburg Commission
Burnt

Bashkir Commission

Total

300 Villages

396 Villages

696

Sent to labor camps

135 People

3101 People

3236

Executed

7455 People

9438 People

16893

Given to Nobles
(Women and children)

2882 people

6909 People

9791
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Horses and Cattle confiscated

1097 heads

17154 Heads

18251

The number of villages destroyed by the authorities may seem small but for a
partly sedentarized community these losses were huge and the results of sedentarization
were dispiriting. Though we do not know what Bashkirs thought about their losses and
the causes of them, probably they were already remorseful considering the possibility that
nomadism could give them greater mobility and better ability to escape before the
advancing punitive forces. Once the construction of the Orenburg line was completed
they could no longer take refuge among Kazakhs. In fact their effective encirclement
prevented them from abandoning their homeland and from creating a large Bashkir
Diaspora group. This may partly explain their lack of an enlightened Diaspora
intelligentsia in the later stages of the Russian Empire which could have played a more
influential role in the formation of Bashkir national formation. Thanks to the great
efforts by the Jadidists and the Russian government’s insistence to give at least a basic
education to the local nationalities, the gap was closed to a degree. By the year 1917
Bashkir national self-consciousness still remained far behind those of Volga Tatars or
Azerbaijanis.
The Batyrsha Rebellion, 1755-1756
The Bashkirs’ struggle during the first half of the 1700s ended in a national
disaster. The Bashkir society was more divided than ever and the lines that separated
Bashkirs groups were now clearer. Despite their divisions the elements that defined
Bashkir identity were still the same. The most important of these was their adherence to
Islam and Bashkirs, despite Russian authorities’ wishful thinking of their potential to
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convert to Christianity, remained devout Muslims at least at a confessional basis rather
than reflecting their devotion to Islam at practical level. The Bashkir rebellions not only
enabled Bashkirs to preserve their identity, they also helped other non-Russian peoples
residing in the area preserve their identities. Because the Russians had many times faced
a formidable enemy, Bashkirs, many times they had to curb their excessive policies or at
least were forced to follow a more lenient policy in Bashkiria.
The Batyrsha case was the most clear-cut example of this. Right after the
suppression of the Batyrsha event Russian authorities felt compelled to abandon their
forced conversion policy in the Middle-Volga region which had started in the early 1740s
in earnest and caused the flight of the people away from the middle Volga region to the
Urals. It also caused the emergence of new convert groups who numbered in thousands
especially among Volga Tatars. It made the Russian authorities reconsider their religious
policies against the nationalities and under Catherine the Great a new law on religious
tolerance was enacted and the brief period under this brilliant empress turned out to be a
rare period of religious toleration in the whole of Russian history since Russia emerged as
a political and military force in the late fifteenth century. This incident also led to the
creation of an official branch in the state which specifically dealt with the Muslim affairs
in the empire.
Batyrsha’s ethnic background is still a matter of debate. Regional historians have
presented differing accounts of his origin. It is widely believed however that he was a
Mishar noble whose parents had moved to Sibir doroga of Bashkiria in the late
seventeenth century to escape Russian proselytizing attempts while many of their kin in
Kazan province had converted to Christianity and found themselves high positions in the
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Russian administration. So Batyrsha’s parents were in a position to educate Batyrsha,
born in the second decade of the 1700s, as a religious scholar.75 His father, Tukhtargali
Dusaliev settled in Karysh in 1702 and was also a mulla. Though he received his first
religious education in his native village in Sibir doroga, Karysh (now Verkhekarysh),
founded by Mishars in 1693, Batyrsha in order to become a mudarris traveled widely in
Russia’s Middle Volga region, which may indicate Russian government’s sporadic
indifference to Muslim religious scholars and institutions. He spent some ten years in
major madrasas of Kazan Gubernia in the 1730s and 1740s. So when the storm over
Muslims of Kazan Gubernia started in 1740, he was a close witness of the events. In
1749 he returned back to his native village in Karysh and established his own madrasa,
raising his own shakirds,76 and increasing his fame and influence among the indigenous
people. His relations with the Bashkirs remained warm and his scholarly side was held in
high esteem due to his ability to find answers relating to people’s problems in religious
matters.
It was not a state secret that Russian authorities time and again attempted to
convert especially Middle Volga peoples which sometimes extended to the Bashkir
regions of the empire. By the year 1708 the number of Tatars of Bashkiria who had been
converted to Orthodoxy was about twelve thousand according to the accounts of a British
diplomat who travelled in Russian at the time.77 Though this number seems exaggerated,
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(because the Tatar population in Bashkiria was still a small fraction of the overall
population of the region.) there were Russian attempts to hunt down Tatars to convert
them to Christianity. This was a policy of the government which occasionally repeated
itself despite intervals of noninterference.
Since its emergence as a multinational entity after the conquest of Kazan in 1552,
the Russian Empire relentlessly expanded and continued to add new nationalities into its
territorial body and by the end of the eighteenth century only 49 percent of the empire
was Russian. The first peoples who had been incorporated into the empire were Finnic
and Turkic peoples along the Volga River basin and they remained distinct from the
Russian culture and many of them even refused to learn Russian language. By the 18th
century Russian authorities viewed cultural and religious diversification as a threat to the
integrity of the empire and began to try to impose uniformity through religious
conversion. The first great and systematic proselytizing campaign was launched with the
foundation of the Novokreshchenkaia Kontora (New Convert Office) in 1740.
The Russian state until then lacked a clearly designed conversion policy. The
attitudes of the tsars varied from generation to generation. The infamously cruel tsar,
Ivan the Terrible, at the height of religious zeal, ordered the conversion of Tatar people
only through peaceful means. The modernizing tsar, Peter the Great, urged the use of
force against the Russian Muslims, though he was anticlerical.78
The Russian volunteers who explored derelict parts of Siberia and took over those
lands in the name of the sovereign Tsar encountered pagan foreigners called inozemtsy
(literally people from other lands) and these first volunteers were ardent baptizers. In
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principle the conversion was supported but in practical terms Muscovite rulers were
against mass conversion in the long run due to the fact that those who converted were not
expected to pay Iasak in the form of fur which formed a big chunk of the Russian
revenues in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries.
The most outrageous attempt to proselytize pagans and Muslims of this period
started when Novokreshchenkaia Kontora (New Convert Office) was founded in
September 1740 soon after Bashkiria was pacified by the central government. Possibly
this success encouraged the government to resort to forceful conversion of the masses.
With the foundation of this office, the Russian officials attacked Islam more
methodically. While in the past the missionaries were encouraged to proselytize nonorthodox populations on their own initiative, in the 1740s the central authorities strongly
backed them and provided necessary funds and institutions. But the government
authorities recognized their limited capacity to convert all the non-Christians, so they
limited the sphere of activity for this office in four provinces; Kazan, Astrakhan, Nizhnii
Novgorod and Voronezh. Bashkiria, by this time Orenburg, was not included in these
schemes of conversion.
The activities of this agency were violent because one of their tasks was to
destroy the mosques in these regions built after 1552. As a result Russian authorities
razed 418 of the 536 mosques in the region. Michael Khodarkovsky argues that those
remaining 118 mosques could not be demolished for fear of a general uprising.79 In fact
a substantial uprising occurred in Bashkiria when a large number of Kazan Tatars
migrated to the region where the conditions for a successful rebellion were riper than in
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the Middle Volga region. They escaped to Bashkir lands and sought refuge among their
co-believers. As a result of this mass exodus of Tatars and other non-Russian
nationalities Bashkiria’s demographic structure changed to the disadvantage of Bashkirs.
Tens of thousands of Bashkirs had been victimized during the 1735-1740 wars and now
with the rise of the population of non-Bashkirs in the region Bashkirs were reduced to a
minority in their native lands. The Tatar refugees in Bashkiria were not brought back to
the middle Volga region by the Russian government because authorities feared another
rebellion in Bashkiria. However Bashkirs were again brewing for another rebellion
against the government for some other reasons since they did not in particular suffer from
the activities of the Novokreshchenskaia Kontora.
The Russian officials, clerical or secular, who served in Bashkir lands, might have
dreamt of proselytizing Bashkirs but the realities of the region, the treasure’s need for
Iasak payments and the grant of the tsar Ivan IV conflicted with their religious zeal. All
in all the Russian higher authorities never systematically attacked Islam in Bashkiria
unlike their enthusiastic religious persecution of the Muslims and Pagans of the middle
Volga region. The Russian methods of proselytizing often lacked sophistication. Though
the tsarist officials offered various gifts to the converts most of the time conversion took
place at gun point.80
The Russian Tsarina’s ukaz in the early 1730s which preached forced conversion
of peoples of Mid-Volga into Christianity and the Russian anti-Islamic practices in the
1740s led to Bashkirs’ last great rebellion to preserve their identity. Bashkirs under
Batyrsha Mulla once again rebelled in 1755-56. But this rebellion differed from the
80

N. A. Abramov, “Materialy dlia Istorii Kristianskogo Prosveshcheniia Sibiri” Zhurnal Ministerstva
Narodnago Prosveshcheniia, v. 81, no. 5, (1854), 15-54

133

earlier great rebellions. Batyrsha was a well-educated intellectual and madrasa professor
who could better grasp the desperate situation in Bashkiria. So his demands were
confined to the redressing of grievances. The rebellion was crushed by the authorities
without much difficulty because Batyrsha was not a battle hardened military leader but
once again a Bashkir rebellion saved not only Bashkirs but also surrounding non-Russian
peoples from greater damage to their cultural and religious identity. After Batyrsha
incident, the Russian authorities greatly restricted the powers and movements of the
missionaries in Middle Volga. The energetic leader of the proselytization movement,
Luka Konashchevich was sent to Belgorod bishopric, which in fact was a demotion.81
So the governmental attack on non-Christians started which lasted until 1764 in
fact ended in failure for the government. The most violent and active years of operation
of this agency lasted until the eruption of the Bashkir revolt of Batyrsha in 1755. Then
for the rest of its duration this office remained dormant and was finally abolished by
Catherine the Great in 1764.
After these reforms, the Bashkirs’ main bone of contention became the
government’s economic policies in the region. The most caustic economic policy of the
state was the abolition of the Iasak payments in 1754 which appalled Bashkirs since they
believed that their Iasak paying status guaranteed them their rights to the land without
which they considered themselves demoted to the status of peasants.82
The Batyrsha revolt’s main contribution to the Bashkir society was its indication
of the transformation of the society since 1552. For the first time in Bashkir history,
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religious leaders embraced leadership of the Bashkir society. Batyrsha’s movement
signaled the end of the struggle for preservation of their client status. In a fully encircled
Bashkiria, these people moved their struggle to another sphere away from the military
field. The abolition of Iasak, the introduction of indirect taxes in salt, the motives of the
uprising of Batyrsha are all evidence than Bashkirs were no more semi-independent
clients of their Russian patrons but instead their subjects. Their main concern as subjects
of the Russian Empire was to preserve their Bashkir identity.

Conclusion
The more Bashkirs resisted Russian incursions the more they suffered. Peter the
Great’s Russia visibly experienced a great transformation after 1725. The more Russian
culture resembled western culture the more Russian officials became hostile to the
eastern peoples. Peter’s Europeanized scholar officials more ardently embraced the idea
of integrating the borderlands. Culturally it was also a matter of prestige for these scholar
officials to become engaged in bringing western culture to the eastern ‘savages’.
Russians, now as conquerors of Bashkiria, expected that an acculturation would take
place and Bashkirs would be assimilated into the Russian ways. To their great surprise in
some ways the opposite took place.
Peter Stern argues that the European conquerors took on some aspects of the
conquered and they usually expected that acculturation would take place to be primarily
in one direction – theirs. The Europeans assumed that their perceived cultural superiority
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would persuade the conquered to embrace the blessings and benefits of their European
way of life.83
Stern’s assertion is partly true for the Bashkir society. While some of the Bashkir
nobles chose to become agents of the Russian state and enrich themselves, the majority of
the Bashkirs chose to resist in different ways when the armed resistance proved futile and
too bloody. By the end of the 1750s, Bashkirs were to a great degree were pacified and
the Russian authorities, sure of their victory over the Bashkir resistance, embarked upon
reforming Russian administration in the region and invited Bashkir delegates to join
Legislative Commission (Ulozhennaia komissiia) of 1767.
The results of the events of this period indicate that the Russian governments
from a point of military, political and economic strength dictated their terms on Bashkirs
and seriously considered a drastic transformation in the economic life of Bashkirs. The
authorities developed various projects to this end and Bashkirs futilely resisted them. The
result could have been a total extinction if Bashkirs had pursued a relentless resistance.
There emerged a thin line that separated total extinction and unconditional surrender.
Bashkirs opted for the second and succumbed to the empire’s transforming will but only
for the time being.
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Chapter 4
Strange Bedfellows: Bashkirs during the Pugachev Rebellion
The Pugachev rebellion of 1773-1775 was the largest popular rebellion in Russian
history. The rebellion affected large areas in southeast Russia, including mainly Orenburg,
Kazan, Astrakhan and Voronezh gubernias where perhaps six million people lived at the time. 1
The area affected by the rebellion was about 600,000 km², and stretched from Penza to
Cheliabinsk and from Perm Gubernia to the Caspian Sea.2 These areas were mostly non-Russian
in population despite increasing Russian immigration. Accordingly one of most salient features
of this war was the large scale participation of the non-Russian nationalities in the war, on the
sides of both the rebels and the government.
Many scholars, Russian and Western, have written studies of the Pugachev rebellion. Yet
this vast literature has devoted too little attention to the important role that national groups
played in the rebellion, especially Bashkirs. 3 There are two main reasons for this neglect both in
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Preobrazhenskii and Iu. A. Tikhonov, “Narodnye Dvizhenie v Rossii 17-18 vv. i Absoliutizm” in Absoliutizm v
Rossii, 17-18 vv. Sbornik Statei, ed. Nikolai M. Druzhinin, (Moskva: Nauka, 1964), 77.
2
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in Absoliutizm v Rossii, 17-18 vv. Sbornik Statei, ed. Nikolai M. Druzhinin, (Moskva: Nauka, 1964), 77.
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of 1773-1775, (Lawrence, Kansas: Coronado Press, 1973); John T. Alexander, Autocratic Politics in a National
Crisis; The Imperial Russian Government and Pugachev's Revolt, 1773-1775,(Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1969); In Russian historiography the volume of works are enormous just a couple of them are as follows
Vladimir V. Mavrodin, Krest’ianskaia Voina v Rossii v 1773-1775 Godakh: Vosstanie Pugacheva (Leningrad : Izdvo Leningradskogo Universiteta, 1961); A. I. Aksenov, R. V. Ovchinnikov and M. F. Prokhorov, comp., Dokumenty
Stavki E. I. Pugacheva, Povstancheskikh Vlastei i Uchrezhdenii, 1773-1774 gg. (Moskva: Nauka, 1975); Iu. A.
Limonov, Vladimir V. Mavrodin, V. M. Paneiakh, Pugachev i ego Spodvizhniki, (Leningrad: Nauka, 1965); I. G.
Rozner, Kazachestvo v Krest’ianskoi Voine 1773-1775 gg. (L’vov: Izd-vo L’vovskogo Universiteta, 1966); S. S.
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Sobraniia Gos. Ist. Muzeia.(Moskva: Nauka, 1973); Iu. A. Limonov, Vladimir V. Mavrodin and V. M. Paneiakh,
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Istochnikovedcheskoe Issledovanie, (Moskva: Rossiiskaia Akademiia Nauk, 1995); I. G. Rozner, Iaik pered Burei,
(Moskva: Mysl’, 1966); Kh. I. Muratov, Krest’ianskaia Voina 1773-1775 gg. v Rossii, (Moskva: Voennoe izd-vo
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the west and in Russia. First, most studies tended to focus on the history of the Cossacks or the
Russian people in conflict-ridden areas, an approach which makes nationalities a marginal issue
in the Pugachev rebellion. Second, Russian historians tended to take an imperialist perspective
that viewed nationalities as small backward groups, lacking initiative and unimportant. Some
Russian historians hold that the frontier peoples simply invited the Russians to take over to
liberate them from the yoke of local nobility. The historians in the west largely remained
ignorant of the issue and went along with the Russian literature. Accordingly they neglected, by
and large, to study the alliance of the intruder and the native.
The cooperation between the intruder and the natives was a unique case in Russia. The
frontiers in the modern period never witnessed such a case. Though it may seem a contradiction
since the intruders and the natives were considered intractable enemies, the nature of the Russian
frontier in Bashkiria was apt to produce such an outcome since most of the intruders were also
victimized by the Russian government’s centralizing policies. So the study of Pugachev from the
standpoint of the nationalities and cooperation of different ethnicities is an important example of
rebellion and collaboration by national groups in one of the largest popular rebellions in Russian
history.
This chapter examines Pugachev rebellion from standpoint of Bashkirs and their relations
with both Pugachev’s rebels and Russian government forces. It shows that the Bashkirs still had
some rebellious potential and that the Russian governments’ policy of colonizing Bashkiria and
subsequently eliminating Bashkir belligerence was still incomplete.

Ministerstva Oborony Soiuza SSR, 1954); N. V. Gorban’, “Krest’ianstvo Zapadnoi Sibiri v Krest’ianskoi Voine
1773-1775 gg.” Voprosy Istorii, 11(1952); Ia. K. Grot, Materialy dlia Istorii Pugachevskogo Bunta, Bumagi Kara i
Bibikova, (1862); N. F. Dubrovin, Pugachev i Ego Soobshchiki, Epizod iz Istorii Tsarstvovaniia Imperatritsy
Ekateriny II 1773-1774 gg. Po Neizdannym Istochnikam, 3 volumes, (1884)
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Bashkirs supported Pugachev ambivalently. As happened in the past, some of them fully
joined the rebellion, some vacillated and changed sides more than once, and a minority remained
fiercely loyal to the Russian government. What began as one rebellion was divided into two after
the capture of Pugachev in September 1774. Bashkirs probably joined Pugachev with ulterior
motives and as the Pugachevshchina dissipated, a new rebellion of Bashkirs emerged from it.
While from the Russian point of view the Pugachev rebellion was in the borderlands, from
Bashkir standpoint Russians were still intruders.4

Background: The Russian Government and the Urals Nationalities in the 18th
Century
The Pugachev rebellion was in part a war of nations against a common enemy, the
Russian state, considering the serious contributions of the non-Russian peoples of the Volga-Ural
region. Aside from Russians nearly all the peoples of the Volga-Ural region became involved.
Bashkirs, Tatars, Kalmyks, Mishars, Maris, Mordvins, Chuvashs, Udmurts, Kazakhs, and even
German colonists had grudges the imperial policies of the Russian empire and Catherine the
Great’s enlightened reforms had come too late and offered too little. A glance at the situation in
the Volga-Urals region illustrates the reasons why these people so willingly joined Pugachev’s
Cossack army. The Tatars of the Volga were oppressed during the term of the Office of the New
Converts in the 1740s and the 1750s. Bashkirs and Kalmyks indignant over Catherine II’s
sedentarization and centralization policies willingly joined Cossack rebels.5 In a similar way the
Russian engagement in the Kazakh lands had been strengthened by Catherine the Great which
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5
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& London: Cornell University Press, 1992), 140-141
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triggered Kazakhs participation in the Pugachevshina.6 These three largely nomadic groups,
Bashkirs, Kalmyks and Kazakhs, suffered at different rates from the Russian government’s
policies destructive of the local nomadic economies. Although they were traditional enemies and
rivals for the pasturelands, and their enmities had been skillfully exploited by the Russian
authorities, with the emergence of an impostor they were too willing to fall for his generous
promises and participate in the rebellion.
The hold of the Russian government in the frontier areas had increased during the
eighteenth century. The foundation of Orenburg Gubernia in 1744 enabled the government to
increase its control in these once free frontier areas. The rise in power of the Russian officials
(chinovnik) was remarkable during the period from 1744 to the early 1770s. This greatest
frontier rebellion in the history of Imperial Russia also was a result of the success of Russian
absolutism. This became possible with the strengthening of the Russian nobility throughout the
imperial system partly due to the fears of Catherine II about another palace putsch that haunted
Russian monarchs after Peter the Great.7 As part of this strengthening of imperial control in the
frontier areas, all aspects of life came under greater control of the Russian officials. Their
legendary arbitrariness and corruption antagonized not only non-Russian populations of the
remote areas of the empire but also the loyal guardians of the Russian borders, the Cossacks,
whose story falls beyond the scope of this essay but has been discussed in many previous studies.
By the 1770s the Russian authorities had not won all the Bashkirs’ loyalties by
distributing gifts, material benefits and rewards to all Bashkir nobles, and had only partially
transformed the region’s economy to a completely agricultural one. As long as Bashkirs
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remained nomadic to a certain degree the tensions would inevitably lead to the renewal of armed
conflicts. As Marc Raeff maintains during the eighteenth century the Russian government
attempted to sedentarize the Bashkirs, a policy which would bring supposedly their assimilation
and Russification as well. If this policy had succeeded the Bashkir lands would have been more
open to Russian colonization and Russian peasants would have migrated to the region without
the fear of nomadic raids.8 The events that took place after September 1774 were the evidence of
the limited effects of Tsarist policies in the region.
By this period disgruntled masses sought a way to solve the problems that the Russian
state’s policies had caused throughout the empire. In the early 1770s the Russian state was at
war with the Ottoman Empire while absorbing large chunks of the Polish state after the first
partition of 1772. The demands of wars were immense and the population was overwhelmed
with taxes, recruitment, and other obligations to meet war requirements. For example, the War
College ordered Cossacks to join the regular army, abandoning their traditional role in the
imperial army as irregulars, and to shave their beards, a loathsome action for Cossacks who
followed the traditional creed of the Old Believers.9 Mobilization for war required a strict draft
system and over the five years 323,326 men had been drafted by the central authorities.10

The Bashkirs and the Beginning of Pugachev’s Rebellion
While Cossacks under Pugachev began the rebellion, the Bashkirs soon played roles
nearly equal to those of the Cossacks in leading it. The mainstream Soviet and western
historiography call this war the last great peasant war by the Russians. Yet the Bashkirs were the
8
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most numerous national group on the side of rebels. Without them, the rebellion would have
been doomed to remain just another Cossack bunt. Bashkirs provided horses, fodder, provisions
to Pugachev’s forces in Berda, some ten miles from Orenburg city, intercepted correspondence
of the governmental forces and reported their whereabouts to the headquarters of Pugachev.
Most important of all, the Bashkirs fought alongside Pugachev.11 They had gained
experience against the Russian state in military fields during their numerous rebellions. No other
non-Russian group had rebelled as often and with such a degree of success against the Russians
as the Bashkirs. 12 They also may have suffered more than any other group and consequently
may have thought that they had the least to lose. Accordingly, a larger share of Bashkirs joined
Pugachev’s rebels than any other minority group including Pugachev’s own Cossacks; only a
minority of Cossacks fought against the government while the majority remained loyal. 13
Accordingly the Pugachev Rebellion might also be considered as another Bashkir-Russian war.
At what point did they unite their powers? The initiative, many sources maintain, came
from Pugachev who was keen on extending the front against the government by winning the
support of all nationalities in these regions from the Urals to the Middle Volga. The war mainly
took place in Orenburg Gubernia during the early stage of the war and the peoples of Orenburg
region with some minor exceptions sided with the rebels.
The rebellion began on 17 September 1773, when Pugachev dictated his first manifesto
as tsar Peter III, promising land and freedom, amnesty for those who had taken part in the
11

I. M. Gvozdikova, Salavat Iulaev, Issledovanie Dokumental’nykh Istochnikov (Ufa: Kitap, 1992), 148.
The criterion for their success is the Russian state’s timidity in imposing new and radical policies in Bashkiria.
They had to think twice about the Bashkir reaction.
13
A. G. Biishev, Istoriia Bashkirkogo Naroda i Ego Bor’ba za Svobodu, (Ufa: Kitap, 1993), 105 (In Bashkir).
There are counter views by the Russian historians who considered Pugachevshchina mainly a Cossack rebellion
against the state by minimizing other nationalities’ contribution to the incident. S. G. Pushkarev, Obzor Russkoi
Istorii (New York: Izdatel’stvo Imeni Chekhova, 1953), 340-341. Interestingly Pushkarev, a Soviet historian, calls
Pugachevshchina a bunt (riot) rather than vosstanie (rebellion). On the other hand Dimitriev argues that Bashkir
efforts on the side of Pugachev were considerable V. D. Dimitriev, Chuvashskie Istoricheskie Predaniia
(Cheboksary: Chuvashskoe Knizhnoe Izd-vo, 1993), 316.
12

142

previous rebellions, a definitely Bashkir-oriented promise, and freedom of religion again for the
Muslim-Turkic peoples of the empire. The next day 20 or so Bashkir cavalrymen joined him.
Within a few days the manifesto of Pugachev was translated into Bashkir language by Iderkai
Baimekov, a Bashkir from the Iaik Cossack host with a modest social background. From the
very beginning Iderkai played an instrumental role in attracting Bashkirs to the side of Pugachev.
He was also responsible for writing letters to the Kazakh Khan Nur Ali to join Pugachev.14
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Posing himself as Tsar Peter III, who allegedly survived his ouster in 1762 by his wife
Catherine, Pugachev promised to serve the Bashkirs as he did earlier and to treat them graciously
and with compassion. He promised to restore the conditions that were set by Ivan the Terrible in
1552. He also assured to return their lands, fishing rights, fields, and forests. He would restore
law and order in the region from which everybody would benefit. Religious freedom would be
granted to all those who suffered under the yoke of the autocracy. Old believers, Pagans and
Muslims would be all free to practice their religions. Those who had their lives based on the
steppe would again enjoy their old privileges. They would again as free as stepnye zveri, steppe
15
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animals. They would be as free as their grandfathers and their children and grandchildren would
be as free as they, i.e. Bashkirs.16
In Pugachev’s appeals, the Bashkirs found at last responses to their grievances about the
land seizures by large factories and landlords (pomeshchiki), repressiveness of the local
administrators and the overwhelming demands by the state, the most burdensome of which was
military service.17 One other grievance of Bashkirs was the abolition of the Iasak payment
system by the Russian government in 1754 and the imposition of the special tax on salt, which
was free up to that time, by the government at a fixed price (35 Kopeks per pud18) on Bashkirs
and Mishars. The revenues of the government from the salt tax exceeded those of Iasak
payments and it was financially a more burdensome obligation on Bashkirs. To the Bashkirs this
reform seemed to violate their historical privilege of Votchina rights. They concluded from this
that, the government was attempting to deprive the Bashkirs of what they considered their earlier
privileged status, demoting them to the level of other peoples in the region, a dramatic loss of
status.19
Last but not least, the absolutist policies of Catherine II’s reign caused another blow to
Bashkir pride. Traditionally Bashkir starshinas were elected by their own people and since the
starshinas were rich people, their election was fairly certain and the title of starshina could be
inherited by their sons. The administration of Catherine II, however, abolished this method and
decided to appoint Bashkir starshinas. Those who proved to be loyal, submissive, and docile
16
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would be appointed by the local governors as the new leader of Bashkirs. However on the other
hand these appointed starshinas were treated as lower ranking officials by the local
administrators which represented a significant loss of status. So the government had alienated
both the Bashkir people and likely supporters of the regime.20 After all, Pugachev’s manifesto
was a fresh hope for the Bashkirs to restore their former ways of living.
However, Pugachev had no clue about how to restore the former privileges of the
Bashkirs since it was impossible to get rid of settlements created by Russians and other ethnic
groups by the 1700s, and it was impossible to reverse the conditions created by newcomers. At
the time nobody paid any attention to the impossibility of the promises of Pugachev.

The Bashkirs and Conflicts within Pugachev’s Forces
One of the main tenets of the Russian policy in the borderlands was to keep different
groups separate from each other and prevent their fraternization. There are accounts that Russian
authorities deliberately attempted to keep Russian settlers and indigenous people hostile to each
other by telling Russian settlers that Bashkirs were not reliable in any way, and claiming that the
Russian peasant must be on guard when they see Bashkirs who are nothing but horse thieves and
robbers.21
The Bashkirs’ cooperation with Pugachev was a unique case in the history of frontier
societies (European vs. indigenous peoples) where intruders and indigenous peoples joined to
fight a common enemy. Usually by default intruders and indigenous peoples were natural
opponents. In the American West, for example, Indians and White settlers never combined their
forces to fight to overthrow the existing American political regime. In the Russian case, by
20
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contrast, the tsarist regime and its servitors or officials had managed to antagonize both the
intruder and the native.
To win the support of the local people, Pugachev felt compelled to win a major military
success to counteract government efforts to deter the Bashkirs from siding with the rebels. They
were the most belligerent of all local groups and had a strong anti-Russian character in their life
style and historical background. A post-Soviet Bashkir historian claimed that the majority of
Bashkirs joined Pugachev’s effort,22 but he fails to provide reliable evidence. A Soviet
publication of 1957 on the other hand claimed that laboring masses of Russians and other
nationalities time and again united against the oppressive and exploitative tsarist system. 23 Such
an argument was natural because in the 1950s predominant theme in Soviet history writing was
the friendship of peoples.24 This Soviet saga of “friendship of nationalities” was told in similar
lines repeating the same themes stating that none of the previous class wars that took place in the
Russian empire had such a nature of comradeship of Russian laboring masses and Bashkir toiling
peoples against the central authority and feudal lords in the provinces.25
Economic changes also support this interpretation. The economic gap between two
groups was closing during the eighteenth century thanks to the accelerated rate of the
sedentarization of Bashkirs. I. G. Akmanov, a prominent Bashkir historian, argues that after two
hundred years of Russo-Bashkir relations at grassroots level, Bashkirs quite naturally had turned
22
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out to be seriously affected by the Russian and other settlers and learned quite a lot from them,
buying their agricultural tools and learning their habits and accordingly ipso facto passed to the
stage of sedentarization. When the war broke out against the Russian government it was
unavoidable for both groups to form an alliance against their common oppressor; the tsarist
regime.26
While the Bashkirs’ cooperation with Pugachev was relatively unique, however, the links
between them should not be overestimated or exaggerated. The Bashkir and Cossack alliance
was partly an alliance of convenience, and throughout the war their relations remained tense.
Since the conditions which had caused so many wars, especially land seizures by the intruders,
did not cease to exist, a base for a permanent alliance between Russian peasants or Cossacks and
Bashkirs seemed impossible. Also the religious and cultural barriers remained the same and the
land seizures had already created hostilities. While Bashkirs needed allies to regain their former
client status and Cossacks needed fighters against the central authority, these two groups
radically differed from each other. Bashkirs were Muslims, Cossacks were devout Christians.
Bashkirs were steppe peoples, while Cossacks were the ones who delimited Bashkir movements
in the steppe region. Bashkirs were nomads; Cossacks were sedentary. Bashkirs were very often
rebellious; Cossacks were most of the time loyal and fought against Bashkirs. The real details of
their cooperation remain obscure to the historians; only from a general perspective there are
rooms for speculation available. The existing archival documents hint that the centralizing
policies of the Russian government drove these two indomitable rivals toward each other. This
was a fatal combination which the Russian authorities feared most.
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These two different groups and their different life styles and world views could barely get
along with each other. The tensions had always existed and would continue to exist due to the
fact that Bashkirs had difficulties to adjust themselves to the socio-economic conditions created
by newcomers. Even those seemingly submissive Bashkir groups had grudges against the
government and settlers who grabbed their lands and reduced them to mere beggars of favors. It
was very unlikely that the cooperation between Bashkirs and rebellious Russian peasants under
Pugachev’s command could last longer than the rebellion.
The Russian government had managed to form a large Bashkir armed force, numbering
perhaps twelve thousand cavalrymen, against Pugachev during the initial stages of the war.27
Yet the rebellious Bashkirs managed to bring together under Pugachev almost the same number
of Bashkir cavalrymen by Kinzia Arslanov.28 Both the government and Pugachev were racing
against time to win the support of the Bashkirs. According to other evidence, however, Russian
authorities somehow were sure of the loyalty of the Bashkirs against Pugachev, probably
considering the Cossacks’ Russian-Orthodox nature under Pugachev. The military governor of
Orenburg, I. A. Reinsdorp, assumed that the Pugachev rebellion was just another Iaik Cossack
“riot”. He was so sure of the loyalty of Bashkirs that when the rebels appeared before the walls
of Orenburg he did not hesitate to send a Mishar-Bashkir brigade of 500 troops to crush the
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social background he had greater chances to persuade Bashkir masses to join the rebellion than Iderkai Baimekov
who was reduced into a much diminished position in the entourage of Pugachev. Kinzia was appointed colonel
major of the Pugachev’s main force and he provided a vital link between Pugachev and indigenous people. A. N.
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rebels. The same wishful thinking about Bashkir loyalty in suppressing rebellion was shared by
Catherine II.29
One of the most formidable tasks of the rebellious camp of Pugachev was to provide
some semblance of government and put an effective resistance to the excesses of the rebellious
military groups against the civilians, whose support for their cause was vital. From the very
beginning Pugachev’s leadership faced the deep crisis of interethnic conflict among the
rebellion’s many supporters. The leadership received numerous complaints about the Bashkir or
Mishar troops’ excesses against the Russian settlements. So they decided to defend the Russian
villages near Ufa against the attacks of Bashkirs and Mishars.30
Despite these troubles of providing balance between his goals and keeping non-Russians
within his camp, Pugachev did something remarkable that had a transforming effect at least for
the Bashkirs. As noted above in relation to the Bashkirs, Pugachev also sent such nativelanguage documents to Tatars, Mishars and Kazakhs. For the first time these peoples received an
official document from the highest authority of the empire in their own languages. In these
documents Pugachev repeatedly guaranteed their religious, social, economic and cultural
rights.31 Without doubt these factors played a determining role in the emergence of ethnic
consciousness among these peoples. Of course, to come together they did not need anything in
their own language. Any strong leadership promising what they wanted could unite these
people. Still, the publication of pamphlets in indigenous languages in Pugachev’s camp
indicated that many members of these national groups sided with Pugachev and served as his
emissaries among the native peoples of the region.
29
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It can be argued that the results of the policy of recognizing Bashkir identity and a return
to the old system was extremely successful despite government’s attempts to prevent this. As a
result some 50,000 Bashkir directly took part on Pugachev’s side. The interesting point is that
nearly all starshina groups of Bashkirs in Ufa and Isetsk provinces, formerly pro-government
groups against rebellious Bashkir in the past, sided with Pugachev. While no evidence that I
have seen about Bashkirs’ attitudes in the documents is available, it is possible that they were
either overwhelmed or disappointed by the Russian policies in the region. They might also have
believed that they were fighting on the side of a deposed Russian tsar who represented the real
Russian power, not a usurper and a woman, Catherine II. Last but not least, these starshinas’
powers over their people had limits as had been stressed in the previous chapters. If their people
chose to side with the rebels, starshinas had no other option but to join them.

The Bashkirs between the Russian Government and Pugachev
The native groups did not form a monolithic front during the Pugachevshchina. Some
groups of Bashkirs effectively evaded officials’ orders to join the governmental forces. When in
October of 1773, the governor of Orenburg, Reinsdorp, ordered the formation of a detachment of
5000 Bashkirs in Ufa Uezd, Bashkirs were in no hurry to join the punitive forces of the
government at this stage while the dice had just been cast. 32 At the same time Cossacks and
Bashkirs distrusted one another. Since Bashkirs had an anti-Russian attitude it was difficult to
form a coalition against the Russian government and its local agents in the region.
However the early defeat of the Russian general V. A. Kar by the forces of Pugachev on
November 9th and his adjutant general P. M. Chernishev on November 13th, 1773 created the
32
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necessary backdrop for the Bashkirs to abandon their hesitations about the future of the
conflict.33 The initial underestimation of the government about the size of the conflict and their
constant efforts to neutralize non-Russian peoples of the region brought them to the camp of the
rebels thanks to these two shocking rebel victories.
The government’s efforts to crush the rebellion at such an early stage were dashed due to
its misinterpretation of the allegiances of seemingly loyal Bashkirs. At this time nearly half of
the punitive forces were composed of Bashkirs. The government was arming them and ordering
them to the front against the rebels, but these units began deserting to join the rebels en mass
with their precious guns, so the government was indirectly helping rebels gain strength. On
November 20, at least 1200 Bashkir cavalry units under Alibai Murzagulov from Nogai Doroga
took their guns and left the government forces to join the rebels. At the end of November, 1236
Bashkir and Mishar soldiers under the command of General Major F. Iu. Freiman deserted and
went to the rebellious camp. A few weeks later they were joined by 726 Bashkir soldiers who
had just returned from the Polish front. On December 7, the voevod of Isetsk province, A. P.
Berevkin, sent his report to the Imperial Senate emphasizing the situation that Bashkir-Mishar
troops were joining the rebel camp as soon as they were recruited. 34
Surprisingly this time Bashkirs and their former enemies Isachnye Tatars and Mishars
ended up in the same camp, in much the same way as Bashkirs cooperated with the Cossacks.
By December 1773, all four dorogas of Bashkiria (Kazan, Nogai, Sibir, Osin) were in disarray
and these peoples including Iasak-paying Cheremis were not indifferent to the Pugachev
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rebellion. The accounts by the local Russian officials reveal the fact that most Bashkirs had
joined Pugachev’s camp in December of 1773 only a few months after the outbreak of the war.
A report dated 30 December 1773 by the Senate to general Aleksandr I. Bibikov (1729-1774),
who played a very active role in the defeat of the rebellion later on, noted that the majority of the
Bashkir people, believing the promises of Pugachev were genuine, joined his camp and their
numbers were rising fast.35 Orenburg governor Ivan A. Reinsdorp (1730-1781) reports that at
least five thousand Bashkirs were available in the camp of rebels besieging the town. This
number was several times larger than the number of Cossacks of the same group. 36
In the same context, independent of Pugachev’s directives, some Bashkir armed groups
acted on their own volition and attacked Russian defensive positions, with some cooperation
from Pugachev’s forces, of course. The most important leader of these independent Bashkir
forces was Kaskin Samarov. He was formerly a loyal Bashkir who had competently served in
the Russian military expedition against Poland from 1771 to 1773. Upon his return to Bashkiria,
he himself embarked upon gathering forces. He managed to attract to his side the 400 battlehardened Bashkir troops returning from the Polish front and took part in storming Ufa with
Pugachev’s lieutenant I. N. Zarubin. He was more interested in attacking Russian settlements
but in March 1774 when the siege of Ufa was defeated, he submitted to I. I. Mikhelson, a
Tsarist colonel who played the determining role in crushing the Pugachevshchina militarily. Yet
Samarov again joined the rebel camp in the May of the same year.

35

V. M. Paneiakh, “O Stepeni Uchastiia Narodnostei Bashkirii v Krest’ianskom Voine 1773-1775 gg. na Pervom ee
Etape” in Uchenie Zapiski Permskogo Universiteta, 158, (Perm, 1966), 51-52.
36
V. M. Paneiakh, “O Stepeni Uchastiia Narodnostei Bashkirii v Krest’ianskom Voine 1773-1775 gg. na Pervom ee
Etape” in Uchenie Zapiski Permskogo Universiteta, 158, (Perm, 1966), 52. This number was at least two times
bigger than that of mid October. See Kh. F. Usmanov, ed. Istoriia Bashkortostana s Drevneishikh Vremen do 60-kh
Godov 19 v. (Ufa: Kitap, 1997), 233.
153

Samarov was a typical native frontier warrior. Such figures when overwhelmed
submitted but when they found opportunity again rebelled. Interestingly the Russian authorities
recognized the influential positions of such figures among the natives and never treated them
sternly during the war, but when they believed they were of no use any longer they exterminated
such leaders. Samarov again finally submitted to the authorities in February 1775. He was taken
to Kazan where he was interrogated by the Kazan Secret commission. His ultimate fate is not
known.37
During the initial stage of the rebellion which lasted from September 1773 to January
1774, the whole of Bashkiria was under the impact of the war and nearly all Bashkirs had sided
with the rebels. In terms of the land occupied by rebels it was the widest stage. While half of
the participants were either Cossacks or Russian peasants, more than one third were Bashkirs and
the rest came from other non-Russian groups whose participation made the event a more
widespread one. If the Cossacks had been the only group of insurgents most probably the
rebellion would have remained an extremely localized one and been easily crushed.38
For the first time since the outbreak of first massive Russo-Bashkir war in 1662, most
Bashkir starshinas joined the rebellious group during the first stage of the Pugachev rebellion.
While 77 starshinas of Ufa province took up arms against the government only 9 Bashkir
starshinas preferred to stay on the side of the government.39 On an ethnically more varied context
of 126 starshinas of Bashkirs, Mishars and Iasak paying Tatars of Ufa province, 114 of them (77
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Bashkirs, 37 Mishars and others) were on the rebellious side while only 12 of them remained
loyal to the government.40

Starshinas

Position

Those

Those

Those

Those

who

who

who

whose

supported

remained

switched

choices

rebellion

loyal to

sides

are not

the state

Ethnicity

Total

known

192

1

Bashkir

158

13

11

10

2

Tatar

26

8

5

3

42

3

Mishar

5

20

3

-

28

4

Mari

8

1

-

-

9

5

Udmurt

2

-

-

1

3

6

Unknown nationality

1

2

-

3

6

7

Total

200

47

16

17

28041

A starshina in a Bashkir community had the determining role in influencing the decisions
of the Bashkir masses. So when a starshina decided to fight against the government the rest of
40
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his community would be compelled to do so. However it must be born in mind that everything
in the steppe frontier was fluid including loyalties of the people. The nearly universal uprising of
Bashkirs in this war may be misleading because loyalties constantly shifted as we saw above in
the case of Kaskin Samarov. This is what the Soviet / Post-Soviet historians failed to emphasize.
They assumed that if a group chose one side at the beginning of the war they would by default
remain in the same camp until the end of the war. Kaskin Samarov’s case is also a genuine
example of the application of the new imperial history. How the Russian authorities were
relatively tolerant of these Bashkirs who changed sides, and the divisions within the ranks of the
different national groups can be evidence that the imperial Russian history was more complex
than simply crude oppression by the Russian authorities.
There were three types of Bashkir leadership during this war. The first group started as
rebels and ended as rebels. Their numbers, while not large, were sufficient to provide leadership
to numerous Bashkir groups. Kinzia Arslanov was the most distinguished of this group, which
included Kutlugil’dy Abdrakhmanov, Karanai Muratov, and Iulai Aznalin and his famous son
Salavat Iulaev, who is the most popular Bashkir historical hero and a national poet. The second
group was not as large as the first one. Its members remained loyal to the government from the
beginning to the end. A few of them were Iusup Nadyrov, Ziubair Iusupov, and Sagit Baltasev.
Even though they were few, the rewards for their loyalty would be great at the end of the war.
The last group was the largest one: Bashkirs who shifted their loyalties whenever conditions or
their interests required it. The great majority of them began in the camp of Pugachev, receiving
titles, grants and generous gifts from him. When the tide turned toward the government they all
abandoned their initial camp and submitted to the government and actively took part in the
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suppression of the rebellion.42 These leaders’ shifting allegiances reflected less opportunism than
the dynamics of Bashkir society. In many cases these leaders had to face the criticism and
insubordination of their tribes. When the tribe chose to fight against the government these
leaders also had to go along with them.
When we have a closer look on the first group, the great majority of them were from the
southern (Nogai Doroga) and eastern (Sibir Doroga) parts of Bashkiria which means these parts
of the region were more nomadic and least amenable to the incursions of the settlers. So they
were the ones who most rabidly resisted colonization of their lands and transformation of their
nomadic life toward a more settled one.
Below is a limited list of Bashkir rebellious leaders and their origin. 43
Abdulzialil' Uruskulov

Sibir Doroga

Bazargul Iunaev

Sibir Doroga

Il'chigul Itkulov

Sibir Doroga

Iulai Aznalin

Sibir Doroga

Iulaman Kushaev

Sibir Doroga

Karanaev Muratov

Nogai Doroga

Kaskin Samarov

Nogai Doroga
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Kinzia Arslanov

Nogai Doroga

Kutlugil'da Abdrakhmanov

Nogai Doroga

Salavat Iulaev

Sibir Doroga

Sliausin Kinzin

Nogai Doroga44

Those who took part in the suppression of the rebellion were generally from the western
and northern parts of Bashkiria where Russian control was older and deeper and the
sedentarization level was higher. There were also other non-Russian loyal groups who had
settled as service people in the southern and eastern Bashkiria and these groups had no desire to
lose the privileges that the Russian government granted them. The success of the rebels would
have been their death verdict. Not surprisingly these loyal groups were again mostly nonBashkir Turkic groups of Mishars and Tatars. One of their leaders was Ziamgur Abdusalimov, a
Mishar noble from Osin Doroga who had been granted land and settled in 1765-76 in Nogai
Doroga where many rebellious Bashkir leaders originated. He and his elder brother Mustafin
Abdusalimov were the ones who chased and captured Salavat Iulaev and his companions and
delivered them to the Russian authorities for interrogation and thereby served their Russian
masters in the way they were expected to.45 These brothers were certainly not alone in their
services.
The Russian government’s treatment of these loyal service people was quite generous:
they were granted lands and presented titles and various other gifts. Another Mishar leader,
Ishmukhamet Suleimanov and his brother Kil’mukhamet from Duvan Tabynsk district of Nogai
44
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Doroga settled in Urshak-Minskoi district of Nogai Doroga. They served leading a battalion of
1000 in the Sibir Doroga for frontier service. As a reward for their loyal services during the
Pugachev rebellion they were invited to St. Petersburg and presented saber, sword, silver medal,
60 Rubles and expensive clothes.46
The rebel Bashkirs were divided among themselves about the ultimate goals of the
rebellion, and the determination to resist Russian policies that harmed Bashkir economy varied
among the Bashkir leaders. While some of them were inflexible and unbending opponents of the
Russian regime, some others were all too willing to quit resistance in the face of concessions
from the government. Such factors enabled the Russian authorities to divide them at an
increasing pace as the military failures of the rebels became increasingly apparent. Even though
the countryside in Orenburg Gubernia was under the control of the rebels, the major towns in the
region were still controlled by the state forces. Ufa, Kungur, Orenburg, Menzelinsk were all
controlled by the state and especially the lingering siege of Orenburg was tying a significant
rebel force in a single spot when they were desperately needed against the actual fighting force
of the government. These failures created hesitations about the end of the endeavor which paved
the way for switching sides among starshinas, either Tatar, Mishar or Bashkir. Bibikov, the
Russian commander in the region, wrote to Catherine II in February 1774 that the defeat of the
villains everywhere had begun and those who less ambitiously joined Pugachev submitted to the
authorities asking for forgiveness.47
So state forces and Pugachev were both tightrope walkers and the one who won military
successes could undermine the other because of the constantly shifting loyalties of peoples in the
region. With the defeats of the main rebel army in the early months of 1774, the tempo of the
46
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rebellion slowed down and the first desertions started to take place among the Bashkir rebels.
One of the prominent Bashkir leaders, Iamansary Iaparov, not only left the Pugachev movement
but also joined the punitive forces against Pugachev and other fellow Bashkir leaders. By midApril 1774, when it was still far from clear that Pugachev would be defeated, 37 Bashkir, Tatar
and Mishar starshinas abandoned the rebellious movement and joined the punitive forces.
The factors that led to desertions from the Pugachev camp and the reasons for divisions
among Bashkirs were difficult to determine but at least it can be maintained that by the 1770s
Bashkir society had undergone a considerable transformation and it was more stratified than it
had been in the seventeenth century. The dynamics of Bashkir society were changing toward a
more sedentary mode of life. While much work remains to be done on a historical and
sociological analysis, it is possible to gain insight into these divisions through comparing two
Bashkir leaders - Kulyi Baltachev and Iulai Aznalin, father of the famed Salavat Iulaev.
Baltachev and Aznalin were of the same nationality, Bashkir, the same faith, Islam, and the same
socio-political background, starshina. They were both from the same region in Bashkiria, Sibir
Doroga. They were of approximately the same age: both of them were born either in late 1720s
or early 1730s. Finally they had the same career in the service of the Russian state until the
outbreak of rebellion in 1773. Both had fought in Poland in January 1772 and both of them
before the Pugachev rebellion served in patrolling along the Orenburg defensive line.48
Despite such similarities in their backgrounds, they ended up joining different camps
during the Pugachev rebellion. While Baltachev never lost his confidence in the Russian state’s
military capabilities, Aznalin became a significant leader of the rebellious Bashkirs. Baltachev
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successfully defended Ufa and then Angasiaksk factory against the rebels, contested them on
several occasions near Birsk and took part in the repression of Pugachev’s supporters.49 It is not
clear what factors really determined their different decisions.50 Possibly not all Bashkir leaders
benefited from Russian rule at the same level. Some, unlike the other Bashkir leaders, were
victimized. Baltachev’s and Aznalin’s different political choices were typical examples of the
chronic disunity of Bashkirs. It is also a significant reason why they could never achieve any
fundamental success like independence from Russian authority.
The Bashkirs had some chance to win this war, because the Russian government was also
fighting a protracted and increasingly exhausting war against the Ottoman Empire, and the
Bashkirs had found a valuable ally, Cossacks and other Russian settlers. Pugachev’s rebellion
could have pushed the government to redress at least some of their grievances. Despite these
suitable factors, Bashkirs failed to unite as happened in the previous rebellions. While the
explanation for this failure is complex, my evidence indicates that several factors were
particularly important. While differential levels of economic progress among various Bashkir
groups played a divisive role within the Bashkir society, the economic might of the Russian
government which offered varying degrees of economic benefits to those Bashkirs who served
the state partially led to these divisions. Traditional nomadic structures were also important.
The still predominant tribal loyalties prevented the development of a full-fledged national
identity and the rebels failed to devise a future for the tribal leaders who were satisfied with their
49
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own scrappy leadership subservient to the Russian state. Many Bashkir leaders saw no future in
an independent Bashkir state and in fact many of them had no reason to join to such an
adventure. Militarily Bashkirs suffered from lack of equipment, supplies, soldiers and
organization which necessitated a successful military struggle against a modern army.
The starshinas who remained loyal to the Russian state knew full well that the Russian
army was a formidable fighting force. They were realistic and not willing to take risks and knew
well where their advantages lay.51 The Russian state had obligated non-Russian nationalities to
serve in the Russian imperial army and Baltachev and many other loyal Bashkir leaders had
taken part in one or another military expedition of the imperial army. In comparing imperial
forces and the Pugachev’s ragtag army they saw no chances of success in a rebellion.
Their hesitations had gained support from the results of the battles. The rebels captured
none of the major Russian garrison towns in Bashkiria. Ufa, Kungur, Menzelinsk, and Orenburg
all successfully resisted the sieges of the rebels. The reasons for the failure of the rebels to
capture these forts can be explained in material terms; they were short of fire arms, ammunition,
artillery, especially heavier ones to breach the strengthened defensive walls of the towns, and
most important of all they lacked experience, coordination and necessary training.52 Even
though Cossack and Bashkir brigades were formidable soldiers in the open steppe, their cavalry
units were useless before the fortified walls.53
So the rebels, despite their numerical superiority in the open field, never gained control of
the larger garrison towns, which could have been decisive for the rebellion’s success. At times
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they even did not dare to attack relatively smaller garrisons as was the case before Troitsk
fortress. In January 1774, two thousand Bashkirs and a number of Russian peasants, Cossacks
and factory workers who had been sent to them as supplemental forces appeared before the gates
of Troitsk and demanded the surrender of the fortress. Even though the defenders were greatly
outnumbered, the garrison commander flatly refused to submit. By the end of February the siege
of the fortress from all sides was firmly in place cutting all the contact with the other fortresses
nearby. Despite the lack of any support for the defenders on the horizon the besiegers never
stormed the walls of the fortress and they lifted the siege in March 1774. 54
As a result of these shortcomings rebel leaders had to race against the time and win
remarkable victories while the main Russian army was away in the Turkish front. Only a series
of quick victories could ensure the loyalties of those wavering elements of the local population.
But after a few months of small successes and the capture of a number of small garrisons, the
tide turned against the rebels and the already fragile coalition of rebels began to fall apart. Those
Bashkir starshinas who were waiting for an opportunity to abandon the rebels after underlining
the fragility of Pugachev’s cause managed to persuade their own fellow Bashkirs and joined the
punitive forces. The Russian sources named some of them like Bashkir Valishah Sharipov from
Kazan Doroga, Sharip Kiikov from Osinsk Doroga, Mishar Bakhtiiar Ianyshev from Sibir
Doroga, Bashkir Tupeev and several others.55
These desertions by no means brought an end to the rebellious cause of the Bashkirs
because the reasons for their rebellion were still in place. Pugachev, thanks to charismatic
Bashkir leaders like Kinzia Arslanov, Salavat Iulaev, Kachkin Samarov, and Mishar leader
Kanzafer Usaev, still attracted Bashkir and other nationalities’ support for the rebellion during
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the second stage which overwhelmingly took place in Bashkir territory. In May 1774 Pugachev
was still in a position to command a 7000-strong multinational rebellious force before
Magnitnaia.
On the other hand the Bashkir leaders who joined punitive expeditions of the government
provoked more violence within the indigenous population. The rebels increased their pressures
on the collaborators and widely punished those who joined the punitive forces or their relatives.
In particular wealthy Bashkirs were victimized. In April 1774, 13 Bashkir and Tatar starshinas
from Nogai and Kazan Dorogas, led by Kidrias Mullakaev56 from Nogai Doroga, appealed to
general Bibikov, the Russian officer in charge of the campaign against the Pugachevshchina.
They noted that supporters of Pugachev “took the advantage of the anarchy and victimized the
rich people everywhere and those who had earlier submitted to the state and asked for
forgiveness were compelled to escape towards the woods to save their lives from the wrath of the
rebellious masses.”57 This was the clear evidence of class conflict within the Bashkir society, a
war between haves, who benefited from the Russian political system which relied on indigenous
agents to continue its control of the region, and have-nots who were suffering from the existing
regime, and they constituted the majority of the Bashkir society. Have-nots came especially
from the eastern and southern parts of Bashkiria where the economic life of the indigenous
people relied predominantly on a nomadic economy. These Bashkirs were the one who most
fiercely fought on the side of Pugachev.
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Unlike the Cossacks, the Bashkirs never had a single leadership. On the contrary they
had a multitude of leaders from nearly every Bashkir volost. The most epic Bashkir leader was
Salavat Iulaev, son of a famed Bashkir noble from Sibir Doroga, Iulai Aznalin who had served
Russians in a number of occasions. Despite his fathers’ fame Salavat won the pride of place in
Bashkir history and Bashkir folk songs as the national hero of this people thanks to his great
talents as a national poet and military leader. When the rebellion broke out, Iulaev’s qualities of
leadership, despite his young age (he was born in 1752) caught the eye of Pugachev who quickly
elevated Salavat to the rank of colonel. He was a relative late-comer compared to Kinzia
Arslanov. He joined Pugachev on 10 November 1773 when his brigade was sent against
Pugachev by the governor of Orenburg, Reinsdorp, to suppress the rebellion. Instead he and his
Bashkir-Mishar brigade, numbering 1200, joined Pugachev without a shot. This incident
strengthened Pugachev’s hand in attracting wavering Bashkirs to his side.
Salavat was the most important Bashkir leader in the second stage of the rebellion after
Pugachev left Bashkiria in June 1774. His forces were multiethnic, composed of Bashkirs,
Tatars, Russians, Mishars, Maris and others. He led both nomadic and sedentary peoples as
fighters against the punitive forces. Thanks to his energetic leadership Pugachev on several
occasions diverted the pressures of his relentless pursuers towards Salavat Iulaev who bore the
brunt of the war after April 1774, thereby saving Pugachev’s neck.
Iulaev’s forces generally were composed of several thousand men and we do not know
how he recruited non-Bashkir peoples to his regiments. But there are certain documents stating
that Bashkirs did not hesitate to visit non-Bashkir villages and agitate them against the
government. In one case a Bashkir brigade visited a Russian village near the town Kungur, one
of the larger towns in northern Bashkiria. They tried to provoke people to join Pugachevshchina,
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addressing people about the forthcoming punitive expedition to the village on the grounds that
they were sympathizers of Pugachev.

The Bashkir Phase of the Rebellion
The pretender finally left Bashkiria on June 21 and headed to Kazan after sacking Osa,
the town at the western edge of Bashkiria, leaving Bashkir insurgents under Salavat behind. As a
result the rebellion in Bashkiria took a new form; a war between loyal and rebellious Bashkirs.
With the departure of the main rebellious army under Pugachev the loyal Bashkirs became more
daring. They quickly formed punitive forces consisting of Bashkirs and unleashed a series of
attacks against Salavat’s forces. This period also witnessed a radical turn in the loyalties of the
Bashkir starshinas. They increasingly appealed to the Russian authorities and asked for
forgiveness. The chief official of the Kazan Secret Commission,58 P. C. Potemkin, in his report
to Catherine II on November 10, 1774, just five days before Salavat was captured, stated that up
to 200 Bashkir starshinas appealed to him asking for forgiveness.59 These Bashkirs not only
asked for forgiveness but also worked hard to get favors from the authorities.
In May 1774, while Pugachev was still in Bashkiria, Bashkir rebels under Salavat and his
father Iulai attacked Ust-Katavskii foundry, Kudeiskii Volost, Sibir Doroga, founded in 1758 by
Ia. B. Tverdyshev and I. S. Miasnikov along with many others like Simskii, IuriuzanIvanovskii, and Katav-Ivanskii. Ust-Katavskii included 156 households with 809 people of both
sexes in 1773. This factory was one of the earliest factories that joined Pugachev’s rebellion in
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November 177360 and had fiercely fought against Mikhelson’s punitive force in May 1774. So it
was one of the centers of insurrection. Despite this, proving the fact that Bashkirs were in fact
fighting a desperate war against intruders, they chose this foundry as their target and evicted the
workers and their families declaring, “You must leave your homes now because your time is
over. Our fathers, having given you these lands are long dead and we do not want you here any
longer.”61 The rebels in particular targeted factories and foundries which affected their life style
in some ways more negatively than the settlements of the migrants. It is not an exaggeration to
say that no other Russian institution created such hostility among them. These factories had
become the agents of the most sinister subjugation of Bashkirs and their loss of status and
impoverishment. Most of the time, Bashkirs were deceived by the factory owners who bought
their lands at ridiculously low prices. No currency could pay the real price of Bashkirs’ valuable
land since they did not know what to do with the money and they could not buy anything with
the Russian money in the region. Once they were relieved of their lands those Bashkirs were
reduced to miserable conditions.62
This period also witnessed the rise of interethnic violence. This was dormant while
Pugachev was in Bashkiria, but once he left the region for the Middle Volga, it reached its
apogee. After the arrest of Pugachev on September 15, 1774, the Bashkirs intensified their
attacks on the Russian settlements and factories. In early October 1774, Salavat Iulaev
commanding a force of Bashkirs, Tatars, Mishars and Chuvash, attacked Katav-Ivanovskii
Factory, burnt its buildings and a number of surrounding villages like Orlovka, Arskaia,
Lomovka and Eral. It must be added that when the factory was burnt down, factory
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(possessional) peasants connived and even supported the rebels. This interesting act of
collaboration on the part of the Russian factory peasants is not all that surprising. As General
Shcherbatov noted, the factory peasants were mercilessly exploited by factory managers and this
experience pushed them into the arms of the rebels.63 Most of these factory workers had been
serfs, brought to the area from European Russia and they were yearning to return home. On the
other hand this group of factory peasants was not monolithic. Within their ranks all sorts of
people could be found due to the fact that as the industry developed in the region since the early
days of the eighteenth century. The Russian industrialists increasingly demanded more and more
workers for the newly established factories whose numbers reached more than one hundred
especially in the southern Urals, the traditional homeland of Bashkirs. The government
responded to these appeals with enthusiasm and “paupers, vagabonds, convicts, dissenters,
tribesmen and other combustible elements were recruited for the metal works and mines.”64
Salavat realized the dangerous potential of ethnic conflict among the Bashkir starshinas under his
command. He was forced to appoint a Cossack, Semen Shemetev, as the commander of the
El’diask fortress upon the requests of the Cossacks of the same fortress ‘in order not to let the
inovertsy (Bashkirs) do any harm to the Cossacks of the fortress.”65
Salavat’s capture on 25 November 1774 by the state forces by no means ended the
struggle of the rebels. Long after the arrest and exile of Salavat and his father Iulai to Rogervik
there were still insurgent groups operating in the countryside harassing the local population and
security forces. In Isetsk province for example, as late as 22 February 1775, it was reported that
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persistent Bashkir groups remained at large under the leadership of starshina Baiazit
Maksiudov.66 So the complete pacification of the region took longer than the suppression of the
Cossack insurgency. For fear of a resurgent rebellion, Russian forces remained in the region on
alert through 1775, more than a year after the capture of Salavat. In the meantime widespread
persecutions by the Russian punitive forces took place, and especially those Bashkir villages
which joined Salavat’s forces suffered most.67 This is the evidence that the Bashkir rebellion
eventually became independent of Pugachev’s and they had their own designs for the future of
their country like getting rid of at least Russian and other settlements which undermined
traditional nomadic economy.
On the other hand this rebellion was the last rebellion of Bashkirs against the Russian
government and militarily they emerged defeated. It was the clear expression of the success of
the Russian government’s attempts to encircle Bashkirs effectively through a string of defensive
lines. Salavat as he approached his end desperately sought ways to escape to the Kazakh steppe
to gather his forces again and renew his efforts in late October 1774, but all points of passage to
the Kazakhs steppe had already been closed in the previous decades. So this last-ditch attempt to
achieve Bashkir autonomy only became possible because of the emergence of a rebellious
leadership, that of Pugachev’s among the intruders, Cossacks and Russian population of the
region. It also became clear that without giving serious concessions to Bashkirs, they would
continue to be a stone in the boot. This was evident from the fact that some of the apparently
most loyal Bashkir leaders had sided with the rebellion briefly despite all Russian attempts to
reward their loyal services. Those who remained loyal to the government were rewarded by the
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government; 26 Bashkir starshinas were rewarded golden and silver medals from the senate;
seven were given official titles and many others received money, swords and other rewards.
Salavat Iulaev played a key role in the development of Bashkir national identity and
Bashkirs’ sense of motherland thanks to his superb poetry in which he time and again stressed
the importance of a motherland for the Bashkir people. His poem “Tovgan Ilim” (the country
where I was born) is the most remarkable expression in this context;
The prairies where I was born
My waters sweeter than honey
My plains and forest
My skyscraping Urals
My sacred place
My heart loves you all68

It must be borne in mind that Salavat, as one of the last true sons of the Bashkir
nomadism, strongly emphasizes the beauty of the steppe, not the Bashkir settlements. In another
poem written in the dungeons of Rogervik, where he was banished, he appealed to Bashkirs and
Bashkiria without making any distinctions between sedentary or nomadic Bashkiria:
My beloved motherland! You are far away.
I would want to return to you
I am in the chains, O Bashkirs!

Snow covers my way
But it thaws in the spring
68
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I am not dead O Bashkirs!69

Conclusion
The end of Salavat is also the end of Bashkirs’ fighting spirit against the centralizing
policies of the Russian government. There were no more Bashkir rebellions for freedom except
a minor riot in 1835. By the time of Salavat’s death in the late 1790s Bashkir spirit for freedom
was no more because by this time they were something completely different from the Bashkirs of
the early 1700s. By the end of the eighteenth century there were more sedentary Bashkirs than
nomadic ones. The more they were sedentarized the more capably they were able to deal with
the intruders. To be able to deal with the intruder means the preservation of the Bashkir national
identity and its defining tenets like language and religion. So in the final context Bashkirs
emerged victorious in the face of irreversible socio-economic, cultural and demographic changes
imposed by the intruders. The real use of those century-long wars for Bashkirs, despite their
destructiveness, was the molding of Bashkirness.
The Pugachev rebellion and the Salavat’s leadership were crucial events in the history of
Bashkirs. From a certain perspective this rebellion played the most significant role for the
formation of the Bashkir ethnic identity as was explained above. Salavat was certainly the first
national hero whose influence lasted to this day. He can easily be portrayed as the first Bashkir
nationalist who raised the steppe people of Bashkiria for a fight to oust alien elements, most
significantly Russians from the Bashkir lands.
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This rebellion was a good example of the new imperial and frontier history from several
perspectives. It has become clear that imperial Russian authorities had no intention to remove
indigenous population from their lands. There were no deportations and no massive penalization
of those who fought against the government. The loyal Bashkirs were generously rewarded and
thereby their services were guaranteed. As Ronald J. Robinson called, it was a “collaborative
mechanism” which served both parties well.70 Such a system was the centerpiece of Russian
empire building in the steppe region for several centuries.71 The events in the aftermath of the
Pugachev rebellion do not contradict with this traditional Russian imperial policy. Those rebels
who wavered were attracted to the Russian side with material rewards and promises of tolerant
treatment of those who were repentant. Their social status was guaranteed and some of them
were even promoted as has been explained in the case of Kulyi Baltachev above.
Catherine the Great’s post-Pugachev policies in Bashkiria were designed to bring a long
lasting peace to Bashkiria. In order not to cause further disturbances her administration’s
treatment of those rebellious Bashkirs was relatively mild when Salavat’s punishment was put
into consideration. Though he was heavily tortured he was not executed just like Pugachev.
Some other Bashkir rebel leaders were even rewarded for their services to the punitive forces
after they reneged. The authorities for a brief period considered fining rebellious Bashkirs
heavily. Those Bashkirs who took part in the rebellion were forced to pay their fine in horses but
considering Bashkirs’ wretchedness economically this fine was commuted to 25 rubles. By the
end of 1775, 13,409 Bashkir households paid 78,691 rubles, nearly 5 rubles per household
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instead of 25 rubles.72 Though this amount may seem large, it must be considered that there were
no deportations or widespread state terror to intimidate the population further. Catherine the
Great’s administrators were pragmatic enough to create an agricultural Bashkir community and
thereby to populate Bashkiria, an imperial policy which resembles Theodosius the Great’s
attitude towards the Visigoths.73
The Bashkirs’ persistent fighting and ardent participation in the rebellion could be
evidence that Bashkiria was still a frontier rather than a borderland. By the end of the rebellion,
however, it had become clear that Bashkiria was an effectively bordered land. All their external
contacts in particular with the Kazakhs were cut. The number of forts, outposts and fortresses
that surrounded Bashkir lands was 77 by 1750.74 Accordingly the Russian government at the end
of the Pugachevshchina effectively claimed dominion in Bashkiria. With it, Bashkirs lost their
ability of maneuver and mobility since the free passages through the Russo-Kazakhs border was
effectively cut. Bashkirs could no longer rebel against the state and the authorities were sure of
their authority in the region. When a colonial state effectively closes the borderland, intercultural
frontiers yield to hardened and more exclusive hierarchies.75 The middle ground fades away and
the defeated party (Bashkirs) is subject now to the socio-cultural domination of the intruder
(Russians and other settled groups).
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Chapter 5
The Colonization of Bashkiria, 1730s to 1790s
Sedentarization is a very radical transformation for any nomadic or semi-nomadic society
and its swift occurrence can only take place under drastic socio-economic or political upheavals.
Without such conditions, sedentarization may never take place or may take much longer, maybe
a thousand years. Without external factors few nomadic communities would seek a radical shift
in their traditional life styles.1 The lack or weakness of native political institutions may seriously
affect a tribal society’s decision to sedentarize or continue nomadism. Social differentiation and
the loss of the herds of the poor nomads force them to adapt themselves to a new economic life,
but such cases are extremely rare and short-lived.2 On the other hand radical political changes
(i.e. conquest) in the areas where nomads roam may trigger radical socio-economic alterations by
destroying the natural rhythm of nomadism and may make a swift sedentarization possible, as
will be explained below.
The colonization of Bashkiria by Russian and non-Russian peoples was a phenomenal
event in the history of the Bashkirs. It was the most important reason for many Bashkir
rebellions against the Russians and it consequently molded Bashkir identity. The colonization
also brought a radical shift in the mode of Bashkir living. It had destructive as well as
constructive consequences for these nomadic people. Colonization left them no option but to
embrace a semblance of their colonizers’ culture which made them sedentarize gradually and
thereby brought them closer to their Russian masters and non-Russian neighbors. Doubtless,
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sedentarization is a difficult process for the nomadic societies and it entails enormous adjustment
difficulties. So it must be a gradual process which requires many generations but Bashkirs did
not have so much time since they were under the control of an alien culture which paid no heed
to Bashkirs’ traditional form of life.

Historiography
While there are many works about Bashkir people, the colonization issue in imperial
Russian historiography has not been studied from the perspective of Bashkirs aside from brief
references to the Russians’ arrival in the region and their creation of settlements. Almost all
imperial Russian historians who have written about the Bashkir rebellions identified the
colonization in the region and land seizures as the main reason for these rebellions. They usually
have viewed the history of the colonization of the region from the Russian perspective.3 Two
historians, however, Cheremshanskii and Vitevskii, did address the colonial history of the
Bashkirs.4 These two historians of the Imperial period produced the first works on the Bashkir
economic life and political history covering a period between the sixteenth and the twentieth
centuries and the history of peoples in southern Urals and nearby regions (Priural’ia) and they set
the standards for future generations in writing Bashkir history.5
The Soviet and post-Soviet historiography paid more attention to colonization of
Bashkiria from the perspective of Bashkirs but they rarely studied the process through which
3
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Bashkirs completed their sedentarization. Some of the clichés from the imperial Russian
historiography were preserved while new clichés were produced like ‘Russian conquest and
Russian colonization of the region had a progressive effect on the indigenous peoples.’ The
unavoidable price of this transformation and the invisible side of this progressive result were
almost never studied.6
Among the Soviet historians of Bashkir history, Ravil Kuzeev focused most specifically
on Bashkir tribal life, the development of the Bashkir economy from nomadism to
sedentarization and the formation of Bashkir identity under the Russian empire. He argued that
Bashkir economic life was for most of their history based on nomadism and semi-nomadism
which lasted nearly one thousand years. He further argues that there was a slow process in
Bashkir history from the fourteenth century towards sedentarization.
Imperial and some Soviet historians claimed that the Russian conquest of the region had a
positive effect on the lives of Bashkirs because it made the Bashkirs sedentarize. This claim
does not reflect the whole truth because Bashkirs in the regions adjacent to the former Kazan
khanate had already been sedentarized farmers before the arrival of Russians. Long before the
beginning of the full scale colonization of the region, individual Bashkir groups had already
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achieved varying degrees of sedentarization and shifted to agricultural production. The reports
by the Russian officials and Russian settlers to this end reflect a partial truth that even in the
regions where nomadic forms of life seemed inescapable like Nogai doroga, Bashkirs were
moving to an agricultural form of life.7 While the Russian conquest of Bashkiria accelerated the
process towards sedentarization in the region at a great human and material cost, even without
Russian conquest Bashkirs were in a process of sedentarization and becoming an agricultural
society albeit a very slow and awkward one.
In the west the best studies that address the colonization of Russia’s steppe region are
those of Michael Khodarkovsky and Willard Sunderland. Both scholars extensively analyzed the
Russian governmental policies in the steppe region over the centuries and the results of such
policies for both the colonizer and the colonized. Both studies provide valuable insights into
Russia’s penetration into the steppe and consolidation of its authority over the centuries. On the
other hand neither study provides a detailed account of Russo-Bashkir relations and natives’
complex responses to the colonization of the steppe.

Russian Government Policies
The frontier groups are the peoples of the “open spaces” with no state of their own. Such
places had long been attractive for people who were overburdened by the demands of the central
governments. These spaces were centers of resistance because rebellious elements of such a
society would locate in such regions. Russian authorities especially with the beginning of the
1700s increasingly defined such places as the regions of barbarity and anarchy. In these areas
there was neither state, nor tsar, nor order because in the absence of these such spaces were the
7
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abode of bandits, rebels and princely pretenders, such as Pugachev. Any ambitious ruler would
spend efforts to establish his control in such spaces. The main instruments of establishing such a
control were “sedentarization, concentration, order and legibility.”8
The governments’ plans relating to Bashkiria were not predetermined but evolved in
time. Accordingly colonization of the area followed different patterns from the 1550s to the
early twentieth century. History has proven that Ivan IV’s land grant to Bashkirs was a
temporary one as one Bashkir historian contends. F. Kh. Gumerov argues that initially the
Russian attitude towards the Bashkirs was a very restrained one. The Russian tsars from 1552 to
the early years of the eighteenth century most of the time avoided violating Bashkir votchina
rights partly because they did not have enough military might in the region and partly because
there were more urgent problems.9
Imperial Russian historian V. N. Vitevskii in this context brings a very traditional view
forward about the colonization of Bashkiria and argues that as the Russian colonization in
Bashkiria grew stricter and more pervasive, land seizures in Bashkiria, in violation of the land
charter that Ivan IV granted to Bashkirs, took place in an unbridled way. Consequently Tsar
Alexei Mikhailovich forbade colonization in Bashkiria and prohibited the migration of people
from European Russia, and land acquisition in Bashkiria for any reason. This rule was added
into the 1649 Law Code. Despite this however, land seizures continued in Bashkiria as before
with the connivance of the Tsars.10 The state authority in the region was militarily still weak
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despite governmental attempts to construct defensive lines in the region and the tsars in the
seventeenth century feared that Bashkirs could rebel and shake Russian authority in Bashkiria.
On the other hand because of the spread and intensification of serfdom in European
Russia there was a growing Russian peasant movement into the region which the central
authority could not prevent. The Russian Tsars in their first period of rule in Bashkiria had no
clear cut plans about the Bashkirs. In order not to risk a decline in Iasak collection arguably they
attempted to prevent colonization in the area. The other motive for their ban on the colonization
of the Bashkir lands may have been the shortage of manpower experienced in central regions of
Russia. So for the first hundred and fifty years or so of Russian rule, Bashkiria witnessed
spontaneous colonization by fugitives in the region and the encounters between Bashkirs and the
Russian settlers remained limited.
The first period lasted until the second half of the seventeenth century. The northern and
northwestern parts of Bashkiria witnessed colonization. Russian peasants in this area considering
the suitability of the climate and type of soil for agriculture started their first settlements without
authorization of the government and ignored Bashkir hostility. Not surprisingly the first settlers
arrived to the region after the establishment of the first fortresses in the area.
The second stage, from the 1650s to the 1730s, was more organized and more statedirected but again lacked a massive character. Settlements moved further east and south east.
The lands as far east as modern day Cheliabinsk, (216 miles from Ufa), the foundations of which
were laid in 1736 by Kutlu Mukhammed Tevkelev, and Kurgan (369 miles from Ufa), founded
in 1679, witnessed the creation of settlements. But the pace of the creation of settlements was
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slowed down by the insecurity of the area and the attacks of the nomadic groups. During this
period many Russian settlements like Kungur and Birsk were burnt down.11
The colonial powers usually sought to increase their revenues as their imperial claims
increased. By the time of Peter the Great, the Polish wars of the seventeenth century had added
an enormous financial burden on the Russian treasury and Peter the Great’s imperial ambitions
brought the Russian economy under even more strain. The Russian state fought wars in the west
against Sweden (1700-1721) and in the south against Ottoman Empire (1696-1699 and 1711).
Under such dire financial difficulties, the Russian government attempted to bring idle lands of
Bashkiria into active use for farming, mining, and other purposes, guided in part by developing
Russian mercantilist thought in the mid-seventeenth century.12 The exploitation of these lands
required extension of greater control by the Russian government and in the process radically
transformed the lives of the indigenous peoples.
The third period from the 1730s to the beginning of the twentieth century was the era of
great transformation in terms of demographic structures and economic relationships. By the end
of this period Bashkirs were only the third most populous group in their own native lands and
they were to a great degree sedentarized, although a few Bashkir groups remained nomadic.13
The Russian government took every measure to increase the population of the region and in a
11
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much more organized way opened the Bashkir lands to the colonization, totally ignoring earlier
guarantees by the Russian tsars about the protection of Bashkir votchina rights.

Actual Migrations
The first Russians had appeared in the Bashkir lands as early as 1468, intending to trade
for furs with Russian goods. These Novgorodian Russians did not stay long enough to leave
their imprint in the region but nearly a century later the Muscovite Russians appeared in
Bashkiria again, this time in the form of officials and Cossacks who had intended to stay in the
region for political and military motives rather than for the purposes of trade. Initially their main
concern was to collect Iasak from the indigenous people as was discussed in the first chapter.
These Russian officials and soldiers were followed shortly afterward by ordinary Russian
peasants who escaped from the yoke of the government under Ivan the Terrible. They continued
to arrive to the region because of the catastrophe of the Time of Troubles that left the countryside
in ruins. But not all those non-Russian peoples escaped from increasing governmental control.
On the contrary some of them were encouraged by the government to settle down in parts of
western Bashkiria around the Kama River. The Russian authorities first opened state lands to
colonization in eastern parts of Kazan region. The stated goal was to create free farmers
(zemledelets), not bound by local gentry, in the frontier region. These settlements during the
seventeenth century made great inroads in western and northern Bashkir lands.14 Bashkir lands
to the east of Kama region remained within the limits of the land grant by Ivan the Terrible in the
1550s and therefore Bashkirs never tolerated the state sponsored land distribution.
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The fugitive Russians were not great in numbers, but it must be stressed that they were
the most daring and enterprising ones of their society who readied themselves to take on the
onerous and dangerous life in the frontier areas. For a very long time Russian governments
forbade the colonization of the Bashkir lands and in this context the trade of the Bashkir lands
was prohibited in a number of decrees and laws, the most important of which was stated in the
Law code of 1649.15
These laws to prevent fugitive peasants from settling in the Bashkir frontier areas were
futile for two reasons. First, the pressure of the government in the form of military recruitment,
forced construction labor and taxation in European Russia was too great, which left the vigorous
Russian peasants no alternative but to flee. The second factor was that the early Russian
presence in the region was military. Therefore there was a string of fortifications in the region
which provided at least a minimal sense of security for the newcomers. These Russian troops
and officials in the region needed provisions from the center which were not easy to send, so
they increasingly relied on the labors and surplus food produced by these illegal settlers in the
region. Since most Bashkirs had no habit of producing surplus agricultural goods at this stage of
their history the only alternative to achieve this was to get provisions from these Russian
settlements.
The Russian fugitives were not the only ones who appeared as intruders in the region
after 1552. There were also a large number of Tatar refugees whose property had been destroyed
by the Russian forces in the aftermath of the fall of Kazan to Russians in 1552. The Russian
government tried to force these people deprived of their khanate to convert to orthodoxy, and
many refused to submit. The only alternative for these people was to escape to the regions where
15
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the Russian control was weak or non-existent and these people found temporarily a safe haven in
Bashkiria. So these Tatars formed another intrusive group who endangered the traditional life of
Bashkirs.
There were other groups like Mishars who had been mainly transferred to the region by
the Russian government. Ethnically speaking Mishars could be considered a sub-Tatar group
with some slight differences in their accents and their physical appearance. They are mentioned
in the Russian sources as Meshcheriaks or at times simply Tatars. But their history differed from
those people known as Kazan Tatars because the defining feature of their history was their long
association with the Russian state. 16 As Muscovite Russia expanded towards the East, Mishars
were also transferred in that direction as the service people to serve the Russian state. Their
services were more valuable than those of the Cossacks in Bashkiria because these people were
ethnically, linguistically and religiously from the same background as Bashkirs. Their loyal
services to the Russian state combined with their affinities with the Bashkirs to facilitate the
integration of Bashkirs into the Russian state system.
There were also some other groups whose ethnic composition is still a matter of debate.
These are the above-mentioned Teptiars17 and Bobyls.18 I. K. Kirilov described the Teptiars as a
mixture of Tatars, Chuvash, Mordvins, and Votiaks, who since time immemorial continued to
16
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live in Bashkir lands. Bobyls on the other hand were still coming to the region. Teptiars and
Bobyls were two similar groups with different names. The former one is called settler
(pripushcheniki), whom Bashkirs allowed to settle in Bashkir lands and they paid tribute or Iasak
to the Bashkir landlords; these transactions are recorded in an inventory. The Bashkir landlords
then transferred this revenue to the state treasury for their own Iasak payment.19 These two
groups seem to have played a more distinctive role for Bashkirs’ ethnic composition by the end
of the eighteenth century because they mostly lived side by side with Bashkirs, had closer
contacts and accordingly it was easier to form marital unions with them.
While Teptiars concluded written agreements that determined the quantity and size of the
land and obligations, Bobyls settled without written conditions. Their numbers with respect to
the Russian settlers in the early 1630s were huge.20 These people, pure refugees, were more than
willing to join the ranks of Bashkirs. They wanted to be registered as Bashkirs because Bashkirs
were at the time considered privileged people. So in the long run it was no surprise that many of
these people were assimilated into the Bashkir culture after spending so much time with their
neighbors but never abandoning their sedentary culture. While no scholarship is available on
relations between the Bashkirs and the Bobyls and Teptiars, some considerations make it likely
that these groups contributed to the Bashkirs’ adoption of this pattern of life gradually.
State-sponsored systematic colonization of Bashkir lands started after the official
foundation of Orenburg Guberniia in 1744. Prior to this date, colonization was spontaneous and
on occasions due to the security concerns of the tsarist authorities it was confined to the Tatar
service people, Mishars who showed competence in suppressing Bashkir rebellions. Deti
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Boiarskie (literally Sons of Boyars but in fact lower ranking nobles) were granted Bashkir lands
by the government. This could be interpreted as evidence that Russian tsars considered Votchina
Bashkir lands as their own. It can also be argued that the real reason for their prohibition of
colonizing Bashkir lands was that they did not want to lose control of the events in Bashkiria.
They were also reluctant to let Russian peasants slip out of their control when Russian was
entering a period of feudalization and tying the peasants to the land and subjugating them to their
lords.
In the eighteenth century Orenburg Gubernia covered a large area including historical
Bashkir lands and more. It stretched from the Kama River in the north to the Caspian Sea in the
south which had never been a Bashkir land but a Nogai country and from the Volga River in the
west to the Tobol River in the east. The climatic conditions were suitable for the production of
crops for a traditional peasant society; wheat, rye, barley. The size of the Gubernia was around
35 million desiatinas21 and most of the arable land was black earth.22
The natural riches of the region were attractive for the settlers; the rivers abounded in
fish, the forests were thick which provided wood for construction and heating and beekeeping in
the forest was a traditional occupation of the native people. The diet of the people could be
supplemented with wild game as well. So the region became one of the focal points for the
settlers after the 1550s. On the other hand, one of the major characteristics of this early
colonization was that most of the settlers were non-Russians; Volga Tatars, Mishars, Chuvash,
Mansi, Votiaks and Bobyls and Teptiars. During the two centuries before the foundation of
Orenburg Gubernia, Russians came to the region only in small groups. Often they had to fight
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against harassment by indigenous peoples and against efforts by Russian officials to keep them
out of the region with orders from the central government. So those who managed to make their
way to the region were the most energetic and adventurous ones. These were the people who
escaped from the oppression of Ivan IV’s oprichnina or from the chaos of the Times of Troubles.
Even though the government prohibited the sale of the Bashkir lands to the newcomers
either Russians or non-Russians, its other policies in the region in fact produced opposite results.
The construction of defensive lines, fortresses, later towns, and strong points brought a sense of
security to the region gradually and accordingly the flow of Russian peasants to the region
accelerated especially after the completion of trans-Kama defensive line in the 1650s. As the
defensive lines were moved further east during the following decades, the number of migrants
increased and step by step Bashkir lands which once provided a fertile ground for the Bashkir
herds were lost to agricultural fields.23
The real number of Russian settlers in the region in the sixteenth and first half of the
seventeenth centuries is not fully known but it is clear that their numbers were not more than a
few thousands until the 1650s. On the other hand, the number of Russian fortress towns was
growing steadily. During this period Menzelinsk, Sheshminsk, Akhtachinsk, Birsk, Tabysnk and
others were founded and were manned by the Russian officials, streltsy and others whose
numbers were not sufficient to pacify the Bashkir rebelliousness.24 But these defensive points
were adequate enough for intruders to seize the land. In the early seventeenth century a village
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called Duvanei was founded not far away from Birsk of Osinsk Doroga where the defensive
strength of the Russian administration was much higher. As the population of the village grew
the extra population left the village and settled in nearby area and they formed new villages
called Krasnyi Iar in 1634 and then Pokrovskoe in the 1650s and a number of smaller settlements
called Osinovka, Burunovo, Iaroslavovo, Bazhenovo, etc. These large villages and smaller
settlements were all formed on the Bashkir lands and the settlers had rented these lands from
Bashkirs for short and long term with permission. They also seized some surrounding Bashkir
lands freely, declaring them wild fields which belonged to no one.25
I. K. Kirilov reported that during the initial period of Russian colonization in the lands
surrounding Ufa there were only 193 Russian people. The Bashkir lands, fishing rights and
forest uses (beekeeping) were distributed by the government among the pomeshchiki, lesser
nobles who had to serve in the army, and Cossack cavalry units more or less freely.26
The number of non-Russian settlers who accompanied Russian colonizers was higher
than those of Russian settlers. According to the Iasak Inventory (Iasachnoi Oklad) of 1631 and
1632 they numbered around 8355.27 These people were mainly farmers and generally settled in
Osinsk Doroga (northern parts of Bashkiria). Some of them occupied Bashkir lands with no
previous arrangement and against the will of the Russian authorities and Bashkirs. This
occupation took place relatively easily because at this period their number was small and free
land was abundant. However some of the other newcomers who arrived in the region later had to
make specific arrangements with the Bashkir communities and they made deals with them. Not
25
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surprisingly these types of settlements took place around the end of the 1640s when the amount
of free land was diminishing.28
On the other hand the Russian government was determined to bar non-Russian migrants
from settling in Bashkir lands. The 1649 Law code relating to Bashkir lands was reconfirmed in
a number of governmental decrees which strictly ordered Russian officials to take necessary
measures. An order by the government to the voevoda of Ufa, F. I. Somov, in 1664 clearly
stated that the voevoda must implement “the order strictly on Bashkirs of all four dorogas and
Isetsk volost. The sale of the Bashkir votchina lands to Russians, Tatars, Chuvash and Cheremis
was prohibited and no facility must be provided to these migrants in Bashkiria in the sectors
relating to Bashkir economy like beekeeping and the quitrent between Bashkirs and these
peoples must be prevented in order to avoid future conflicts.” But Bashkirs could give their
lands in quitrent to other Bashkirs for periods no longer than a year or two. The voevoda must
strictly consider, the order continued, that “in Ufa no Russian servicemen or city people
(zhilitskie liudi) or any kind of people of various ranks must conclude any written contract,
neither mortgage nor bondage (kabaly), with the Bashkirs about the Bashkir lands and
beekeeping lands.”29
From this document we have two clear conclusions. The first one is that not all Bashkirs
were nomads. Some of them were full time peasants who rented the lands of non-agricultural
Bashkirs. But the government limited rentals to a short period for fear of causing troubles in
Bashkiria arising from the property problems pertaining to the land because in the long run the
renters could start to consider these lands as their own. On the other hand the issue of land
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rentals in Bashkiria at the time is evidence that even the nomadic Bashkirs started to consider
land as property which could belong to an individual. Earlier, in the late sixteenth century,
nomadic Bashkir tradition held that the land belonged to the community and could not be owned.
If individuals could rent the land now it could be owned individually as well.
Yet this and many other governmental orders failed to solve the migration problem in the
region. Russian and non-Russian peasants continued to migrate to the region and through the
region to areas further east despite increasingly stricter governmental interventions. In the first
quarter of the eighteenth century the government was now operating in a mobile form through
frontier guards (Karauly) to capture fugitives and establishing outposts to detect them along their
tracks of flight.30
The flight of peoples to Bashkiria could not be halted by military measures. The peoples
of the Middle Volga region were running away because of the Russian policies in their native
region. In Kazan region in the years following the fall of Kazan, at least 1.5 million desiatinas of
lands were seized by Russian nobles, pushing the indigenous people to the worst quality land or
making them totally landless.31 In the Chuvash lands of the region Chuvash people were
categorically expelled from their lands and many Chuvash people were reduced to serf status
(krepostnicheskie poriadki).32
While in many cases the government tolerated violation of Bashkirs’ votchina rights,
more generally the government and its officials tried to respect those rights well into the
eighteenth century. They did this to avoid provoking Bashkir rebellions, especially given the
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Russian military weakness in the region. The Russian military in Bashkiria throughout the
seventeenth and first quarter of the eighteenth century was weak and there were very few
Russian troops in the region. A significant part of the Russian military force was composed of
Cossacks. While very effective under strict discipline, they were not thoroughly reliable. As a
result Russian policy in Bashkiria could be called one of appeasement. In 1728, the Supreme
Secret Council (Verkhovnyi Tainyi Sovet) instructed the new voevoda of Ufa that local Bashkirs
be treated gently in order not to cause any unnecessary resentment among Bashkirs and his
subordinates be tactful when they were among Bashkirs and respect their customs.33 A decree by
the Senate on 27 July 1731 ordered that the new Trans-Kama defensive line be constructed in
places where Bashkirs did not occupy land.34 Another Russian sensitivity about the issues of
Bashkir votchina rights came around the same time when there emerged a need to construct
factories in the Urals. V. I. Tatishchev was sent to the Urals as the chief director of the Urals
metal industry with full powers of a governor.35 The Senate decree promoting him to this
position instructed him to pay attention to the land rights of Bashkirs while inspecting already
available factories in the region and establishing new ones.36
There were already a number of Russian factories (mostly foundries) in the region whose
history dates back to the 1630s when the first copper works were founded along one of the
tributaries of Kama by Nedei Sveteshnikov, one of the leading merchants of his time. In the
1660s, when the Russian entrepreneurs requested government’s permissions, they were granted
rights to establish iron works in the Urals.37 So when the state needs were considered primary
33
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importance, the authorities did ignore the natives’ reaction in the 1600s. Under Peter the Great
new foundries were established in the early eighteenth century: Nev’ianskii (1701), Alapaevskii
(1704), Kamenskii (1701), Uktuskii (1704).38 V. I. Tatishchev was one of the most brilliant
Russian scholars of his time, a polymath and an avid supporter of Peter the Great’s imperial
vision and had great designs for the region. He envisaged making it an industrial zone of the
Russian empire to exploit the immense underground riches of the region. The industrial
potential of the region was enormous; low hills, vast forests for firewood, cold climate and huge
distances where factories could be established. The greatest problem for the beginning of the
industrialization of the region was the low population density and unsuitability of Bashkirs for
factory work.
The construction of factories required an increasing flow of migrants to the region.
Tatishchev as a pragmatic administrator against the orders of the Senate prevented the expulsion
of Old Believers from the Ural region who were mostly working in the factories and enlisted
them in the factories as legal workers.39
But the full exploitation of the region's riches required more people to man the garrison
towns and to create a work force for the factories. A transfer of agrarian population from the
European parts of the Russia and middle Volga region was needed to feed the rising
population.40 In fact for the most part of the 1730s and the 1740s Russian and non-Russian
populations in the region were increasing and adding fuel to the already fervent ethnic tension in
the region.
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The most vivid period of factory foundation in Bashkiria was between 1740 and 1762
when Russian authorities became fully convinced that Bashkirs would no longer pose a threat to
the tranquility of the region. I. I. Nepliuev’s energetic and tactful policies as the governor of
Orenburg Gubernia between 1744 and 1758 paved the way for industrialization of the region at a
quickening pace. His term witnessed the peak of industrialization of the region. His real task
was to restore economy of the region on a healthy ground, in this context bringing industry to the
region to exploit the potential of the region to the fullest.41 Yet, data about the worker
population reveals that the region was far from fully industrialized because as late as 1859 the
total number of factory workers was only 96,100 out of a population of 1,977,000 in Orenburg.42
Then why did many Bashkir rebels attack these factories and blame them as one of the
principal reasons for their rebellions? For one thing their foundation and survival required
rounding up of large tracts of land and felling huge areas of forest for lumber and firewood.
While the government used state lands in Bashkiria for those factories, private entrepreneurs
simply invaded Bashkirs’ votchina lands. Each factory used an area of at least 30 desiatins of
land and surrounding forests which very effectively harmed the Bashkirs’ economy, barring
them from crossing these factory lands with their herds and using forests for beekeeping.43 It
must be stated that these factories were founded near fortresses which themselves also covered
large areas and with these consolidated factory-fortress lands Bashkirs were twice surrounded
and their free movement was twice difficult. In the final analysis the total amount of land
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seized/used by factories at the end of the 1760s was about 3,079,837 desiatin, 9.1 percent of all
Orenburg territory and 18.1 percent of all Bashkir votchina lands.44

Relations between Natives and Migrants
Increasing governmental control in the long run had transforming effects on Bashkirs
because inter-cultural contacts accelerated as the newcomers (both Russian officials and settlers,
Russian or non-Russian) induced Bashkirs to adopt a sedentary life. Neither Russian brutality
during the times of the rebellions nor the Russian policy of non-interference played any such
positive role. The colonization made intercultural exchanges possible and it became clear that
the frontier region with the arrival of so many colonists by the second half of the eighteenth
century turned out to be a “middle ground.” Richard White argues that in the middle ground two
distinct cultures meet and affect each other. Neither the indigenous people nor the newcomers
have to be assimilated into each other’s culture. Both cultures initially were radically different.
Hence “they had to arrive at some common conception of suitable ways of acting; they had to
create what I have already referred to as a middle ground.” 45
Unlike Richard White’s middle ground where only two groups (French and Algonquians)
interacted, in the Bashkir case there were several different groups, Russians, Bashkirs, Tatars,
Mishars, Chuvash, and a number of Finnish groups like Maris, Udmurts, Votiaks and even Komi
Permiaks.46 There was even a wider gap within the Bashkir community between three groups:
sedentary, semi nomadic and fully nomadic.
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The existence of such diverse groups and interethnic tensions notwithstanding,
colonization formed a bridge that conveyed different cultural values to the Bashkirs, many of
whom were still, even if partly, nomadic. It was the bridge which in the long run enabled
Bashkirs to survive against the inexorable incursions of alien cultures. As mentioned above, the
middle ground in Bashkiria was much more complex than in Richard White’s colonial America
because of the fact that Bashkirs had to deal with already repressed peoples by the Russian state
in middle Volga. The Bashkirs’ relations with these peoples, excepting Finnish groups, were
quite complicated because they shared the same ethnic, linguistic background with Bashkirs and
they could easily form marriage alliances and other contacts with them. But their relations
remained tense for a very long time. Then fugitive Russian peasants arrived in the region in ever
increasing numbers, and Bashkirs had nothing in common with them. Their influence on
Bashkirs was minimal because of the cultural, linguistic and religious obstacles. Finally the
Russian state appeared in the region with full force and crushed Bashkir resistance in all military
forms. But the Russian armies’ belated arrival in the region failed to solve the eternal Bashkir
problem in the region due to the fact that Bashkirs remained an exclusive ethnic group.
The process of creation of a sedentary and agricultural society did not take place at the
same level in every Bashkir district. Those Bashkirs who adapted themselves to the new
economic conditions were the ones who lived in the northwestern districts of the region where
cross cultural encounter took place in a more amicable environment thanks to the availability of
a large group of ethno-culturally identical people. In the southern and eastern parts of the region
non-Russian peoples were in short supply and Bashkirs’ only contact with the intruders took
place with the Russian officials, soldiers and Cossacks who were more alien to the culture of
Bashkirs. These parts of Bashkiria resisted fiercely the new conditions and the central authority
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in these areas was consolidated only after a century of interethnic fighting, as discussed in
previous chapters.
While in the early stages of Russian presence in the region the conflicts were solved to
the benefit of Bashkirs, as of the 1640s Votchina rights of Bashkirs were increasingly violated
both by the central and local administration. In this context for example the conflict between
Bashkirs and Savvo-Storozhevsk Monastery over the fishing rights in Kama and Belaia Rivers
was solved in favor of the Monastery which in fact exacerbated the crisis.47 While the fishing
rights for the monastery did not constitute a big part of the revenues of the monastery, it was a
vital part of the tribal and semi nomadic Bashkir society. Its loss could not be supplemented
with agricultural production at this stage.
During this stage the Bashkirs found it difficult to start agriculture for some practical
reasons. In a tribal nomadic society agricultural activity may exist but its scope is limited
because they collectively own the land and have a very limited division of labor.48 If there is a
rich natural food supply as was the case for the Bashkir tribal communities, the process towards
sedentarization and agricultural life is even more difficult. In such a case only the outside
interference of a superior force could make them settle down and look for their livelihood from
the tilled lands. So the Russian governmental intrusion into the nomadic economy forced
Bashkirs to search for other ways to survive.
There is another dimension in the sedentarization process as well. Even if a tribal
community settles down it is not easy to abandon nomadic ways immediately. For the most part
of the early years of the sedentarization the tribal customs and ways were preserved and
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nomadism turned out to be a part-time life style for the most Bashkirs. Since they were new
settlers their inexperience in agriculture was clear and in order not to face starvation they did
their best to preserve their nomadic ways to a great degree. In fact for many other tribal societies
this was the norm.49
On the other hand these difficulties experienced by Bashkirs in passing to sedentarization
were not universal. Fighting among Bashkirs over farmland indicated that some Bashkir groups
were well advanced in their agricultural lives. For example in 1675 two Bashkir groups of
Eneiskoi Volost of Kazan Doroga clashed over 30 polos (strips) of pashni (ploughed field).
Bashkirs of another volost in the 1690s were complaining about crop failure. In Gireiskoi volost
of Kazan Doroga, it is recorded that Bashkirs were operating two types of mills: Mel’nitsamutovka (whisk) and Mel’nitsa-Koleschataia (wheel). The latter one was constructed by
Bashkirs. Their relations in this respect with the newcomers were increasingly determined by
their insistence on agricultural economy. Bashkirs of Karshynskii volost allowed a number of
Chuvash people to farm in their votchina lands on the condition that Chuvash tenants would have
to construct a mill.50 On the other hand it must be noted that these Bashkirs groups were mainly
from Kazan Doroga where sedentarization of Bashkirs was more widespread than among the
Bashkirs of Sibir and Nogai Dorogas.
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Changing Status and Conditions of Bashkirs
The transition from semi-nomadism to sedentary form of life in Bashkiria was a long
process which lasted from the mid-1500s to the first quarter of the twentieth century.51 When the
Russians first appeared in Bashkiria what they found was a tribal society with different modes of
economic life. Bashkirs who lived mostly in the regions adjacent to the former Kazan khanate
were predominantly sedentary. In one account from a Bashkir elder from Gaininsk volost of
Osin Doroga, those Bashkirs who lived in Nogai and Sibir dorogas were mostly nomadic and
semi-nomadic. Since they had to drive their herds from pasturelands to other pasturelands on a
seasonal base, the Russian defensive lines, which restricted their migration, hurt them most. Not
surprisingly, these nomadic Bashkirs were the ones who in fact most fiercely fought against the
Russian authorities throughout the seventeenth century and well into the eighteenth century.
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The turning point for the history of the region and the fate of the Bashkirs was the
Orenburg expedition of 1734 and the foundation of the Orenburg defensive line and the town of
Orenburg with many other smaller ones as initially garrison centers and then small towns as of
1734. Willard Sunderland argues that the Orenburg expedition was the clearest expression of the
new (Russian) imperialism, which was a product of Petrine thinking which he calls
“scientifically inspired mercantilist imperialism.”53 Even though the project’s architect, I. K.
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Kirilov, expressed his goals of reaching India in the final analysis, the main goal of the project
was to open the vast and idle Bashkir steppe region to colonization and exploitation of the riches
of the region. This plan required massive migration of farmers to the region to populate it.
Empress Anna put it that “firstly it is needed that the city be populated by the settlers and its
inhabitants be provided funding so that new trades may spring up and economic life develop and
more and more people may settle down….”54
The destruction caused by the 1735-1740 war had to be repaired, a task which fell to
Nepliuev. If careers of the governors of the region were taken into account it will be noticed that
the governors of Orenburg Gubernia were by and large from the highest administrative and
intellectual elite of the imperial Russian system. Though not a governor of the Orenburg region
but the architect of Orenburg project, I. K. Kirilov was a distinguished scholar graduated from
the Petrine school. He was also a brilliant geographer and a senior secretary of the Senate.55 His
successor Tatishchev, as noted earlier, was a polymath and father of modern history writing in
Russia. Nepliuev was also a leading Russian politician who suffered disgrace when his mighty
patron Count Biron was toppled down in political struggle. Nepliuev was sent to Orenburg as
governor which was in a sense a demotion but he turned out to be the true founder of Orenburg
gubernia when he finally moved the city to its current location in 1744.56
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Under his governance full colonization of the region started. His predecessors had
founded many fortresses and sealed the fate of the region. From 1735 to 1758, the number of
fortresses constructed was 58 and 21 of these were constructed under Kirilov’s administration
from 1735 to 1737.57 Such a complex web of fortification brought all Bashkir hopes of
autonomy and nomadic life to an end. In a report to Senate in 1740, Orenburg Governor V. A.
Urusov wrote that each fortress directly controlled an area of 10 to 12 versts in all directions and
lands beyond these distances were now available for colonization.58 Accordingly the availability
of such a complex fortification system enabled the migrants to populate these lands surrounding
the fortresses.
To make matters worse for Bashkirs relating to land issue, the Russian government
authorized the sale of Bashkir lands or their distribution to officials, soldiers and officers in a
much-debated law of 11 February 1736, which was also a turning point for the Bashkirs. This
law distributed land to several different groups of people varied group of people. According to
the law, retired officers received between 50 and 100 chetverts, retired soldiers, dragoons and
sailors received from 20 to 30 chetverts, Mishar elders were given up to 200 chetverts and
ordinary Mishars received 50 chetverts of land. The sale of land was allowed in such a way that
all the previous laws of the center and decrees of the voevodas were annulled and those who
were willing to, were allowed to buy Bashkir lands.59
However this permission to trade turned out to be a rapacious pillaging of the lands of
Bashkirs who after long years of fighting against Russian armies and their local agents and being
per day. He also authorized the foundation of a mosque near Orenburg by Tatar while hundreds of mosques were
destroyed in Middle Volga region. This religious tolerance shows his pragmatism and determination to make
Orenburg an important imperial provincial center. See; V. G. Semionov and V. P. Semiovna, Gubernatory
Orenburgskogo Kraia (Orenburg: Orenburgskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel’stvo, 1999). 52.
57
I. G. Akmanov, ed., Istoriia Bashkortostana s Drevneishikh Vremen do Nashikh Dnei v Dvukh Tomakh, v. 1, (Ufa:
Kitap, 2007), 219.
58
Materialy po Istorii Bashkirskoi ASSR, v. 3, (Moskva & Leningrad: Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk, 1949), 502.
59
PSZ Tom 9 No: 6890; PSZ Tom 11 No: 8623

200

decimated were helpless to prevent the plunder. In one case a Russian official called R. Urazlin,
a Tatar translator in the Orenburg Commission, seized a Bashkir, Ursai Baskunov, from IlkeiMinsk volost and forced him to abandon parts of his land.60 He also drew up a document in the
Ufa Provincial chancellery which stated that above mentioned Bashkir had given his land for
good to R. Urazlin and his offspring. Three years later in 1741, R. Urazlin arbitrarily arrested
Baskunov and 10 other Bashkirs from the same volost and forced them before the voevoda to
sign a document which stated that they sold their lands for 200 rubles. In fact such a payment
never occurred.61 The amount of the Bashkir lands seized by Russians or non-Russians is not
known for certain but it is clear that Bashkirs showered Russian authorities both in Ufa and in
the capital with petitions complaining about unlawful seizures of their lands62
Nepliuev and his vice-governor P. D. Aksakov argued that the existing laws on the sale
of the Bashkir lands had loopholes that produced highly undesirable results for the security of the
region and could lead to another Bashkir rebellion. For this reason they proposed some
adjustments. For example the sale of Bashkir land should be confirmed by the whole volost
population rather than the individual Bashkirs or Bashkir starshinas. They also criticized and
tried to persuade the central government to rescind the decree relating to the seizure of Bashkir
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horses as part of fine to be paid to the Russian government by the former Bashkir rebels who
asked for forgiveness.63
In fact the seizure of Bashkir horses in the form of fines was one of the most direct
reasons for the constant revival of Bashkir rebellion against the Russian government during the
1735-1740 Russo-Bashkir wars. As Mukhammed Eldashev, one of the Bashkir rebellious
starshinas from Sibir Doroga relates the Russian government had left them no option but to
revive the rebellion time and again. “Our Bashkirs again have started robbery since spring of
this year because your Empress imposed heavy fines on people and horses….”64 This
governmental effort to force Bashkirs to pay fines in horse had a quite detrimental effect on the
Bashkir mobility and nomadic manners. With their horses gone, in an indirect way Bashkirs in
fact were forced to abandon their nomadism and settle down.
Last but not least, Nepliuev and Aksakov moved against the governmental ban on the
ironsmithery of Bashkirs arguing that the ban did not prevent Bashkirs from rebelling but on the
other hand it had quite destructive results for the development of an agricultural economy within
the Bashkir society. So they proposed to allow three ironsmiths for each Doroga for agricultural
purposes. This would encourage Bashkirs to sedentarize.65 Nepliuev’s long term goal for the
Bashkirs was to strengthen them economically and thereby collect taxes. It would be a futile
attempt to collect Iasak payments which Bashkirs had not paid for the last three years from 1737
to 1740 . Under the circumstances and after the devastating effects of the 1735-1740 Bashkir
rebellion it was impossible to integrate them into the Russian system if they were pushed to the
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brink of desperation.66 Their proposals were gradually accepted by the end of the eighteenth
century.
The Muslim population also increased in the region by the 1740s. While the number of
Muslims in the Trans-Kama region was about 220,000 according to the census of 1719 this
number in 1744 was higher. Considering the fact that the Bashkir population suffered terribly
from the Russo-Bashkir war of 1735-1740, this increase was largely due to the migration of
Middle Volga Tatars to the region. Religious persecution of these Tatars gained momentum
after the foundation of Office of New Converts (Kontora Novokreshchenskikh Del') on
September 11, 1740 when Empress Anna issued an ukaz relating to the issue.
The physical attacks on Muslims started in 1741 and the subsequent increase of Tatar
migration to Bashkiria was not within the jurisdiction of the Office of New Converts. This flight
of Kazan Tatars was facilitated by the foundation of Orenburg Gubernia in 1744 and not
coincidentally the officials in Orenburg invited Kazan Tatars to the region and exempted them
from the obligations which were imposed on Tatars in Middle Volga. The most famous Tatar
66
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settlement which was established during this period was the village Kargala, not far away from
the Orenburg town center.67 While in the 1740s and the 1750s Muslim people of the Middle
Volga region were under the pressure of the Office of New Converts and forcefully converted
into Christianity, the Tatar Muslim migrants in Orenburg were spared from these pressures and
granted freedom of conscience.68 These two seemingly contradictory policies actually provide
an example of the way pragmatism won out over dogmatism in the Russian imperial system.
The Russian military governor, I. I. Nepliuev was determined to populate Orenburg Gubernia
and for this reason the best policy was to recognize freedom of conscience in order to attract
migrants. On the other hand, Muslims of the Middle Volga region posed a potential threat to
Moscow, the heart of Russia, because of the proximity of the region. So the authorities
considered conversion as a necessary policy in the Middle Volga.
By the year 1744 the total number of Tatars in the region was more than 70,000. This
high number could be attributed to the religious persecution in Middle Volga but it must be born
in mind that Tatars in Bashkiria were service people under the imperial system. The Tatars of
Orenburg numbered around 19,000 in 1719, 73,000 in 1744 and 87,000 in 1762.69 Bashkirs on
the other hand were too backward to serve Russia’s imperial needs in the region and further
south. More educated and more urban Tatars could be used as intermediaries in Russians'
relations with the central Asians.
One of these Tatars, Seit Khaialin, was a Tatar merchant from Kazan Gubernia and was
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potentially subject to religious persecution.70 The governor of Orenburg Gubernia, Ivan
Nepliuev, determined to make Orenburg a springboard to move Russian influence and authority
further southeast, deep into Central Asia, invited Khaialin and a number of Tatar families to
establish the village Kargala (later called Seitovskii Posad) and immediately granted them
freedom from the state-directed religious persecution that was taking place in the middle Volga
region.71 The foundation of Seitov Posad was prime example of Russian pragmatism in this
context. In fact it is evidence that Russian religious policy in the empire lacked coordination and
synchronism.72
Seit Khaialin and his fellow Tatars were invited to region with issuance of a specific law.
The Imperial Senate with the insistence of Governor Nepliuev issued this law on 8 March 1744,
about the settlement of Kazan Tatars in Orenburg and their right to construct their masjids in
their settlements. While the government actively sought the conversion of non-Orthodox
population in parts of its empire, it simply out of necessity protected and served Muslims in other
parts of the empire. The law clearly opened Bashkir lands (now fully within Orenburg Gubernia)
to colonization, and even European farmers were invited to the region. This law marked de facto
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the end of the Bashkir votchina rights. The law attempted to make the region and the city of
Orenburg in particular an attractive economic spot for various foreign nationalities (merchants,
artisans, artists and other professional groups) who would make business in the region. Such
people were expected to settle down, live, trade and perform their arts. 73 This law was a very
important one for the rest of the history of the region and the Bashkirs because with its issuance
the road for colonization in Bashkiria became wide open. From the perspective of religion it is
also a turning point for the Muslim peoples of the region.
The declaration of the central governments’ intentions about colonization in the Bashkir
lands so far kept hidden was evidence that the Bashkirs were no longer active inhabitants of their
own lands where they had a right to stay in the past and oppose central government’s decision in
matters relating to their region. They were now reduced to the position of bystanders in
Bashkiria as they desperately watched the migration of other national groups in to their lands.
They had two options: fiercely rebelling and each time being crushed, which sometimes could
mean extinction (the collaborationist Bashkir minority would be assimilated within the more
dominant Muslim groups) or accommodating themselves to the new conditions and intercultural
interactions that had begun long before. Available evidence proves that Bashkir groups having
realized the benefits of an agricultural sector in the economic life of the region slowly started
seeking ways to accommodate themselves to this new form of life and economy. A certain
Bashkir called Nurkeika Emashev and a number of his Bashkir friends, from the Min tribe, sent a
petition to the officials in Ufa in 1700 requesting that they needed “plowed fields, hayed
meadows, forest, land transport with all means” since in their votchina “the city of Ufa was
founded, inhabited by the grain producing Russians surrounded by Tatar villages.”74
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Apparently the foundation of the towns in the territory of Bashkirs and the influx of
Russian officials and soldiers to the region created a lucrative food market. Under the influence
of other nationalities and Russian peasants alike, the neighboring Bashkirs grew determined to
get their share from this trade by becoming producers themselves. The market opportunities
provided an incentive for Bashkirs to sedentarize and farm, and then in the long run, to be
discussed in next chapter, it led to Islamization.
However, not all Bashkirs were as quick minded as Nurkeika Emashev and his friends,
and most Bashkirs suffered from their lack of experience in dealing with the colonizers in the
new economic era. Their lands were grabbed from them with no or ridiculously low payments
and their slowly evaporating nomadic naivety caused their victimization in many instances. S. T.
Aksakov relates occasions in Bashkiria where Bashkirs were fooled by the newcomers.
(After heavy drinking with the potential leasers,) “Casual remarks will follow about the
boundless possessions of the Bashkirs, and of the scant reliance to be placed on leaseholders,
who are ready enough to pay the ground rent for the first two or three years, and then will cease
payment altogether, and refuse to quit the land, thereby forcing the Bashkirs into wearisome
lawsuits, which, as often as not, are decided against the landlords.”75
Bashkirs were now facing a new world in which legal rights of an alien culture imposed
on the Bashkirs brand new manners like defending their rights in the courtroom, dominated by
the same alien culture. Land was not private property in the nomadic Bashkir society. Maybe at
most the pasturelands were used commonly by the members of each clan which they fiercely
defended in the past against the other Bashkir groups. This was what they understood from the
notion of property. The crafty Russian landlord was adept at fooling the naïve Bashkir and
persuaded him to sell his land whose limits were poorly defined. “Frequently whole districts are
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purchased for trifling sums, and the purchase duly legalized by a formal deed, in which it is
impossible to state the exact area of the land, as it has never been measured. Usually natural
features of the land serve as boundaries. ‘From the mouth of the Konlyelg rivulet as far as the
withered birch tree beside the Path of the Wolf - and from the withered birch straight along to the
Parting of the Waters - and thence to the Fox Holes, and so on.’ Such accurate and incontestable
boundaries would often enclose tracts of ten-twenty-even thirty thousand desiatinas. And for
these vast properties a few hundred silver roubles were willingly accepted, not counting a
hundred or so of roubles for the feast.”76
So it is clear that Bashkirs, after being defeated in their wars against the Russian
government, were also losing their lands to the newcomers who brought and imposed their own
conditions, mentality and legal system into the region to which Bashkirs were alien. The
Russian-Bashkir encounter resembled many interactions in other empires between naïve natives
and cunning and greedy newcomers from more advanced European societies and for the most
part, these encounters ended against the natives. The newcomers’ ways of living, like excessive
alcohol consumption, dramatically undermined the tribal and traditional way of life in most of
the frontier societies. Alcohol and disease (in the Americas not in Bashkiria since Bashkirs had
already developed their immunity against the known diseases) had always been a weapon of
conquest in the frontier areas in South Africa or in the Americas. The Bashkirs unfortunately for
themselves shared the fate of other frontier native peoples as Aksakov clearly put forth above. 77
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The Bashkir rebellious spirit was crippled by the end of the eighteenth century. There
were several reasons for this. The Russian imperial system had firmly established itself in the
region, leaving no room for maneuver to the Bashkirs. With the nearly complete pacification of
Bashkirs, the region had already become a multinational region. For example the number of
Tatars had grown to exceed that of Bashkirs, in several uezds of the region like Menzelinsk,
Sarapulsk, Bugulminsk, Elabuzhsk.78
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the demographic structure of Bashkiria had
radically changed. At the beginning of the eighteenth century the majority of the population
(more than 2/3) in the region was Bashkir. The 1719 census shows that share of Russians in the
total population was 15 percent; the Tatar population was 13 percent. This picture was
astonishingly different in the early 1800s. Russians were 37 percent, Tatars were 27 percent and
Bashkirs were a minority now, 23 percent.79 The total Muslim population was higher than the
Russian one and by this time Bashkirs and Tatars had much more in common in their life styles
because of the fact that Bashkirs to a great degree had been sedentarized and accordingly more
Islamized. The flow of peoples into the region enabled Bashkirs to enter cross cultural
encounters with their Middle Volga kinsmen. A significant amount of marriages (43 percent) by
the end of the eighteenth century took place between Bashkirs and Teptiars.80
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The population of the region by the end of the eighteenth century had significantly
increased thanks to the governmental policy of the colonization of the area. Even Bashkirs
despite all their sufferings during the great age of rebellions against the Russian government
recorded some natural growth. For U. Kh. Rakhmatullin the Bashkir population was
approximately 110,000 in the 1730s and the 1740s and at the end of the century there were as
many as 184,000 Bashkirs. Though it must be considered that during the same period the nonBashkir population had increased perhaps 6.6 times reaching to 577,30081 it is clear that Bashkirs
nevertheless achieved a natural growth in demographic terms. Iu. M. Tarasov relates this natural
growth to the success of the sedentarization of Bashkirs but he argues that the population of
Bashkirs in 1794 was 212,000.82
Under the circumstances it was clear that the former demographic density was much
higher than a century earlier. The Orenburg defensive line had effectively surrounded Bashkir
lands and factories and settlements of all types had mushroomed. Agricultural life dominated the
countryside with fields everywhere in the region. So it is not difficult to assert that Bashkirs
after being heavily pacified by Russian authorities had no other choice but to sedentarize. It is
worth noting, however, that this sedentarization initially took the form of partial settlements.
The nomadic Bashkirs did not all of a sudden abandon their herds. The results of their
rebellions against the Russian rule in the region were devastating materially. Their herds were
driven away or after each rebellion was over they were fined to pay in kind to the authorities. So
in time in parts of Bashkiria they were left with no herds and little land in their own hands.
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So the number of animals declined significantly thanks to the both devastations caused by
the rebellions and the impossibility of spending winters hundreds of miles to the south near Aral
Sea because of Russian fortifications which hindered crossing the border. So in time the
livestock grew thinner. In 1763 a leading Bashkir elder from the Nogai Doroga, Sel’tiasha
Nurkuuev, reported to the governor of Orenburg, D. V. Volkov, "We are only not familiar with
toiling in the fields very much. We have generally between 200 and 300 horses and 100 cows
and not a few sheep.”83 In the seventeenth century a rich Bashkir could have from 2 to 3
thousand horses on average, but in the mid-eighteenth century there was little need to keep large
herds and in fact it was practically impossible. In the regions where agriculture had begun
earlier and was more developed like Osinsk doroga, this radical shift towards sedentarization and
abandonment of large herds was even more visible. Iukhnev relates that “All Bashkirs live in
houses. They produce grain a lot and during the summer they do not go to the steppe but they
stay in their houses like Russians. Their cattle are not many and just like others they mow hay a
lot. They produce enough honey and wax.”84
The famous Orenburg historian Petr I. Rychkov (1712-1775) who played a significant
role during the early years of the Orenburg project and Orenburg Gubernia argued that the only
way to solve the Bashkir crisis of the Russian empire and the only effective method to help
Bashkirs was their sedentarization and the development of agriculture as the main economic
force among them. He argued that Bashkirs had everything for a successful agricultural
economy. The land was fertile; the climate was suitable; their draft animals, horses in particular
were strong; abundant opportunities for hunting, a long-established Bashkir skill; they were also
used to mowing grass and harvesting abundant hay to feed their animals during the winter time.
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Still they were accustomed by long tradition to pastoral life (skotovodstvo) and a fully
agricultural life and working in the fields seemed to be backbreaking and hellish. So Rychkov
warned caution against forcing these people to start new types of production like agriculture.
Instead they had to be persuaded in time about the positive results of an agricultural life. To help
them start agriculture and settle down, Bashkir elders could be used to convince Bashkirs
because they had immense respect and trust for such individuals.85
The approximate estimate of the amount of the land seized by different social groups and
for different purposes is huge but at any rate Bashkirs were left with adequate amounts of land
for a successful agricultural economy. Until the 1820s in Orenburg Gubernia the total amount of
land was 28.2 million desiatinas and 12.8 million desiatinas belonged to Bashkir votchinniks but
9.6 million desiatinas of these lands were tilled jointly with Bashkirs and pripushchenniks (any
person who settled in Bashkiria with certain conditions). Nobles (dvoriane) and factory owners
owned 3.6 million desiatinas of land while Russian peasants (state and udelnyi together) used 6.4
millions of desiatinas; service people enjoyed the ownership of 4 million desiatinas and finally
1.3 million desiatinas of land were owned by the state treasury. 86

85

M. M. Kul’sharipov, Politika Tsarizma v Bashkortostane (1775-1800 gg.), (Ufa; RIO BashGU, 2003), 27; S. I.
Rudenko, Bashkiry: Istoriko-Etnograficheskie Ocherki (Moskva-Leningrad: Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR,
1955), 63; R. Z. Ianguzin, Etnografiia Bashkir (Ufa: Kitap. 2002), 26.
86
For A. I. Akmanov’s article about the landownership (Zemlevladenie) in Bashkiria see; I. G. Akmanov and
Aznagul Uruskulov, ed, Bashkirskaia Entsiklopediia, v. 3 (Ufa: Nauchnoe Izdatel’stvo, 2005), 56. The author of the
article used the following sources for his article. N. A. Chuloshnikov, “K Istorii Bashkirskogo Zemlevladeniia i
Russkoi Pozemel’noi Politiki Posle Ukaza 1832 Goda” Trudy Orenburgskogo Obshchestva Izucheniia Kirgizskogo
Kraia, Vypusk 1 (Orenburg: 1921); N. F. Demidova, “Zemlevladenie i Zemlepol’zovanie v Ufimskom Uezde 16-18
vv.” Ezhegodnik po Agrarnoi Istorii Stran Vostochnoi Evropy, 1962, (Minsk: 1964); F. L. Shakurova, Bashkirskaia
Volost’ i Obshchina v Seredine 18 – v Pervoi Polovine 19 Veka, (Ufa, 1992); A. I. Akmanov, Bashkirskoe
Zemlevladenie v 19 –Nachale 20 vv. (Ufa: 2000); A. I. Akmanov, “Voprosy Bashkirskogo Zemlevladenie v
Materialakh Gosudarstvennoi Dumy, 1906-1917 gg. (po Vystupleniiam Musul’manskikh Deputatov)” (Unikal’nye
Istochniki po Istorii Bashkortostana: Materialy II Period, Region. Nauch. Prakt. Konf. Ufa, 20 Dek. 2001)

212

87

Russian nobles until the second half of the eighteenth century owned 8 percent of the
arable land in Orenburg region. Individual Russian pomeshchiks had incredibly large
latifundias. For example the Timashev family owned 212 thousand desiatinas of land in Birsk,
Buguruslan, Orenburg and Ufa uezds. The Levashov family managed to round up 172,973
desiatinas of land in Menzelinsk, Verkhneuralsk and Sterlitamak uezds. The Kuroedov family
owned 40,425 desiatin of land. The Osorgin family had 35,300. The Zubov family in different
uezds had 43,272 desiatinas of land. The famous Aksakov family owned 35,300 desiatinas of
land in four different uezds of Bashkiria. In total at the end of the second half of the eighteenth
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century the total amount of Bashkir lands controlled by the Russian nobles was 2,651,481
desiatinas.88 Comparison of the figures from the late 1700s and the 1820s shows that Russian
nobles steadily enlarged their land ownership in Bashkiria. The distribution of the dvorian lands
concentrated unevenly in the northern and western Bashkiria. Sixty-three percent of such lands
were in those areas. The consolidation of dvorian lands was accompanied by the transfer of
Russian serfs into the area.
Even though Bashkirs and their pripushchenniki (Teptiars, Bobyls and others) formed
less than 40 percent of the total population of the region at the end of the eighteenth century they
were nevertheless able to use 45 percent of the lands in Orenburg region. These lease holders
after working under or for Bashkirs for a certain period of time refused to pay Iasak to Bashkirs
or ceased to work under/for Bashkirs and grabbed the lands formerly owned by Bashkirs after
the suppression of the Bashkir rebellions, or they simply claimed landownership of those lands
they tilled against which Bashkirs could do nothing but sue them.89 These peaceful attempts to
regain their grabbed lands could produce results only after years of legal struggle. Even then it
was very uncertain that they could regain their lands since the Russian courts required Bashkirs
to prove their ownership of land after presenting land grant given by the Russian officials and
authorities since the time of Ivan the Terrible. Yet this was an impossible requirement to fulfill
because most of the documents relating to the land grant had been lost during the previous
Bashkir rebellions. So land ownership in Bashkiria changed hands permanently.
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Conclusion
The Russian government’s policies developed from restraining migration to imposing it
over the decades as Muscovy developed into Imperial Russia. Authorities followed a pragmatic
policy in the region in terms of colonization and as their needs varied over time they showed a
remarkable elasticity in their relations with the natives. The Russian governments’ policy was
not to allow Bashkir lands for individual colonization for the most part of the seventeenth
century but they also did not hesitate to establish fortifications and send Russian troops to the
region to man the fortresses and for more efficient Iasak collection. When the government felt
itself weak, for the sake of preserving peace with the natives it attempted to restrict migration to
the Bashkir frontier. Under Peter the Great, however, the Russian state experienced a structural
and ideological transformation. To meet Russia’s growing needs for material and revenues, both
Peter and his successors encouraged state-sponsored colonization of Bashkir lands because by
this time thanks to the complex fortification system which suppressed and prevented nomadic
disturbances.
Bashkirs resisted the colonization of their lands fiercely but once they realized further
resistance futile, they successfully adapted themselves to the settled life which ensured their
survival as a national group. This was a long and very difficult process for the nomadic
Bashkirs. There were psychological and social hindrances that prevented many from settling
until the moment they were left no other choice. First, those Bashkirs who sedentarized had to
deal with the hardships of a new culture to which they were alien. Then they had to find a place
for themselves among the already sedentary communities as inexperienced farmers. On the other
hand as Anatoly Khazanov argues the sedentarization of an individual family would tear the
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nomad of the already existing social ties and lines of defense provided by fellow nomads. 90 It
was not an easy choice for most of the Bashkirs to sedentarize. Upon settling they had to carve
out formerly nomadic pasturelands for fields. Their nomadic fellows would turn their aggression
against them, probably considering them renegades and depriving them of pasturelands. As
noted earlier, in the traditional Bashkir society, land was communally owned and it was open to
all nomadic Bashkirs of the same clan. So the decision of some Bashkirs to settle down would
seriously weaken the nomadic economy.
Though they had lost most of their lands to the colonizers, Bashkirs were not completely
deprived of their lands. The remaining lands were large enough for an agricultural economy and
the only choice under the circumstances for the Bashkirs was to sedentarize and to adopt an
agricultural economy.
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Chapter 6
The Islamization of Bashkirs
Islam is an urban religion. It originated in Mecca, the greatest urban center in the early
600s in the Arabian Peninsula and then moved to another city, Yathrib, later called Medina,
literally “the city.” The first message was Iqra! (recite!), a genuine urban message. For the most
part of the history of Islamic civilization this religion flourished in the prominent urban centers
of Middle East like Kufa, Baghdad, Basra, Mecca, Medina and Damascus. 1 Accordingly for
most of the Islamic Golden age from roughly 700 to the 1200s the great Sunni jurists produced
fatwas (opinion) specifically for the urban or sedentary societies. The focus of the great Sunni
faqihs (Canonists) of Islam2 had always been urban or sedentary communities.
So the impracticality of leading an Islamic life for nomadic peoples caused a certain
degree of consternation among the Muslim scholars. This obstacle relating to conversion to
Islam could only be overcome with the emergence of a new type of Islam, quite distinct from
mainstream orthodox Islamic understanding. Sufism, a more lenient and more compromising
form of Islamic understanding, freed itself from the formal ways of leading an Islamic life, such
as praying five times daily, seclusion of women, fasting, or ritual ablution which are very
difficult to observe in nomadic societies. Turkic groups of Central Asia were mostly nomadic
peoples and their conversion to Islam by means of wandering Sufi dervishes was a great
transformation for these peoples in the long run. Yet the effects of Islam were not felt
immediately.
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Khanifa.
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The most widespread and most urban oriented Sunni school is Hanafiyya, which emerged
in the major urban centers of Iraq, Kufa and Baghdad and spread mainly in a northern direction
towards Central Asia. So when Turkic peoples of Central Asia converted to Islam they
predominantly chose Hanafi madhab (School of Jurisprudence). The Turks’ choice of Hanafiyya
type of Islam indicates that their conversion to Islam did not take place as a result of
comprehensive thought. Largely the Turkish leaders preferred this school for political motives
since at the time most of their Muslim neighbors were Hanafi Muslims. As Ramila Thapar
argues, their decision to convert to Islam and their dedication to create powerful states coincided
and Islam provided them a powerful and legitimate tool in western Asia where the majority of
the population was Muslim.3 So, it seems that this radical decision was not the result of a
spiritual enlightenment. However during the second or subsequent generations, it generally
became obvious that from among these new converts powerful religious figures appeared and
they determined the future Islamic course of their peoples.4

Bashkirs’ Conversion to Islam, 900s to 1300s
The conversion of Turkic peoples to this new religion started in earnest around the
beginning of the tenth century. Their conversion took place en masse when the tribal leaders
chose to convert to Islam. One factor for embracing Islamic faith might have been the rise of
intercultural, economic relations between Central Asians and the Muslims of Iran.5 Islam among
Bashkirs, a stateless Turkic group, developed in a more natural way thanks to the peaceful
preaching of the Muslim Turkic missionaries from the already Islamized Central Asia who were
3
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mostly Sufi mystics.6 Allen J. Frank argues, based on Bashkir legends that Bashkirs’ conversion
to Islam took place largely thanks to the wandering dervishes (Sufi mystics) who came from
Central Asia, Baghdad and Anatolia.7 Bashkirs were well aware of the writings of these Sufis
and used their verses in composing their national folk music. They widely relied in this context
on the poetry of Makhmud Gali al-Bulghari (13th - 14th centuries), Mukhamediar Makhmud (d.
1552), and Mukhamet Chelebi (d. 1451)8
The Bashkirs’ conversion to Islam also took place from another direction. The Golden
Horde ruler, Uzbek Khan, upon converting to Islam in 1323, very vigorously embarked upon the
conversion of the shamanist peoples of his empire and in this effort he employed the already
Muslim Bashkirs. He sent them to the river valleys of Menzele, Ik, Zai, Belaia, Ufa, Dema,
Chermasan, Ai and Ashkadar. Sometimes Bashkir Murzas like Baitura Khan led these
conversion efforts.9 These efforts were either peaceful or forceful but were largely successful to
ensure at least nominal conversion of Bashkirs. Evidence from their funerals in the late 1300s
indicated that they still had preserved some of their shamanistic ways and they still insisted to
use Shaman Turkic Sky God “Tengri” in place of its Arabic “Allah.”10
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So it is misleading to assume that Bashkirs’ conversion to Islam was the Islamization of
the community and embracing an orthodox form of Islam.11 Yet despite the superficiality of their
conversion, there was a rising invasion of Arabic vocabulary in the works of the folk poets and
some existing Bashkir written documents. In Kuzeev’s “Bashkir Genealogy” (Bashkirskie
Shezhere) one can come up with many Arabic words like Kismet (the things that will happen to
you in your life), Muqatele (mutual killing), Salahiat (warrant) or more Islamic words in Arabic
like Haq (one of the names of God, the Truth), Ulu (Divine).12
Despite all these hints of an infiltration of Islam at least in verbal ways, it is still too early
to talk about a real adoption of basic Islamic tenets, for example, relating to cleanliness or Halal
food. Ibn Fadlan reported in the 920s that Bashkirs, after he had seen many other Turkic groups
on his way to the Bulghar state, were the most wicked of all Turks, the dirtiest of them, and the
most audacious in the commission of murder. He considered them still pagan. He mentions that
his guide was a Muslim Bashkir with slightly pagan ways. At the time, his conversion to Islam
had not made him abandon his pagan past’s noisome manners like crushing lice and licking it.13
As Ernest Gellner puts correctly “In principle, the Muslim, if endowed with pious learning, is
self-sufficient or at any rate not dependent on other men, or consecrated specialists. (If not
learned, he is in a loose way dependent on those who are, which is very important.) Thus
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officially Islam has no clergy and no church organization, though it needs scholars, and church
and community are co-extensive”14
In light of the above statement it becomes clear that Islamization requires a certain degree
of learning, which is possible only with the foundation of educational institutions. It must,
however, be underlined that these institutions are not supposed to be highly complex well
established and deeply sophisticated foundations. One simple room, in times of extreme urgency
even that room could be dispensable, and one elementary level mullah are good enough to
introduce the basics of Islam to the shakirds (students). This simplicity of the instruments of
Islam was a basic reason for the resilience of Islam and its successful survival during Imperial
Russian and Soviet regimes over the centuries despite sporadic persecutions. In the face of state
repression, an ordinary Muslim could easily hide his real identity through taqiyya, a method of
self-defense by hiding real thoughts and beliefs against an insurmountable enemy. This method,
condemned by Sunni schools, is in fact used by the Shia School.
More than a century after Ibn Fadlan, another Arab traveler and geographer Yakut alHamavi (1179-1229) reports that he met a number of Bashkir madrasa students in Aleppo, a
prominent city in northern Syria, and interviewed them. These students came to Arab lands to
study Islam, specifically Hanafi School. They further related to al-Hamavi that their conversion
to Islam was accelerated by the missionaries from the Bulghar state and they wanted to learn this
new religion and spread it to the rest of the Bashkirs and occupy high positions in their own
society.15 Relying on this account it can be stated that Bashkirs at a quite early stage of their
history as Muslims started to create their own Muslim scholarly class. This evidences the
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development of an institutional Islam which would take its final form with the foundation of the
Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly under Russian tutelage.
The Bashkirs’ conversion to Islam gained momentum with the official acceptance of
Islam by the Golden Horde sultan Uzbek Khan in 1323. Surrounded by a mighty Muslim
kingdom to their north and Muslim Central Asians to the south, the Bashkirs’ massive
conversion to Islam during this period is not surprising.16 Still this intrusion of Islamic faith into
the Bashkir lands remained superficial. Beneath the Islamic make-up shamanistic ways were
mostly preserved because of the fact that their nomadic life style did not allow them to develop a
distinctive Bashkir Islam culture until long after the arrival of the Russians.
Despite all the superficiality of their conversion to Islam, they were quiet eager to
preserve such Muslim identity as they had already embraced. By insisting on the Russian Tsar’s
toleration of their religious freedom and the right to keep themselves away from the Russian
missionaries, they were in fact defending their nomadism. Concessions to their religious beliefs
could require concessions in other fields of their lives especially in their economy and life styles.
So Islam became one of the main means of expression of the Bashkir autonomy. Otherwise they
were not so much willing to lead a purely Islamic life. However this unwillingness to lead an
Islamic life was not due to their aversion to religion but rather due to their nomadism.
Muslim scholars, the founders of madhabs, great jurists of the first 250 years of Islamic
history, all responded to the needs of sedentary societies and found solutions to their problems
pertaining to leading an Islamic life. Take daily prayer. It is interpreted from the sources of
Islam (Hadith and Quran) that any person who is not a traveler has to pray on a regular basis,
considering the time of the day and cleanliness of the place and clothes of the believer. When
16
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matters come to a traveler it is determined that such a person is authorized to combine two
prayers to ease the journey. 17 So he can pray three times a day instead of usual five times.
However when the matters came to a constant wanderer who is essentially a nomad, no Islamic
jurist gave any opinion. It is almost impossible for a nomad to lead a thoroughly Islamic life. So
the Islamization of Bashkirs required their sedentarization.18

Bashkirs’ Embrace of Islam and Russia’s Muslim Question
The superficial face of Islam in Bashkir society gradually disappeared over the course of
more than hundred and fifty years from 1552 through the seventeenth century. The greatest role
in this transition to a more institutionalized form of Islam took place under the impact of the
more Islamized Volga Tatars. As discussed above, they had to abandon their homes in middle
Volga region in the wake of the fall of Kazan and subsequent Russian excesses against the local
population upon the orders of the Russian Tsar Ivan IV. By more Islamized I mean an already
developed sedentary culture among the Tatars of Kazan and accordingly a more formal and a
more institutional form of Islam in which mosques and madrasas occupied a central place.
Generally speaking these were missing among the semi-nomadic and nomadic Bashkirs. among
These institutions could be seen the Bashkirs of western Bashkiria where a sedentary culture had
already developed and the Tatar impact was the greatest.19
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Since the frontiers were the areas of liberties where the state authority was lax, an Islamic
preacher could wander in the Bashkir lands without any state supervision or regulation. They
were not subject to any centralized hierarchical control and they freely preached their own
version of Islam whose authenticity could be quite questionable.20 The distinguished Tatar
Muslim scholar Rizaeddin Fakhreddin relates the story of a Tatar mullah, Mansur bin
Abdrakhman, from a village along the Zei river who traveled widely. He went to pilgrimage to
Mecca and studied Islamic sciences in the madrasas of Bukhara. After graduation (receiving
Ijazat) he finally returned back to his native Volga-Ural region and began to educate the Muslim
youth in the region. He made his distinction in many Islamic fields and widely revered by the
Muslim peoples of the region until he died in 1720.21 Mansur’s story was by no means
exceptional. There were many other shakirds, and mudarrises who widely and internationally
traveled and received Islamic education from the madrasas beyond the lands of Russia and they
were able to disseminate their own version of Islam in the Volga Ural region and among Bashkir
peoples.
The conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan respectively in 1552 and 1556 made Muscovite
Russia a multi-confessional state. In the wake of the conquest of Kazan, the initial attitude of the
Russian tsar and his officials was quite cumbersome and devastating for the Muslims of the
Middle Volga region. Partly this was due to the nature of the Russian expedition against Kazan
20
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which took the form of a crusade and taking vengeance against the centuries-long Mongol then
Tatar yoke.22 Accordingly the male population of Kazan was slaughtered, women and children
were enslaved and mosques were destroyed upon the personal orders of Ivan IV.23 Even though
this violent policy was reversed shortly after the conquest of Kazan in 1555 and the use of force
to convert Muslims to Christianity was discouraged, the harm had been done and Russia’s
Muslim question seriously started.
Relations between Russian governments and Muslim peoples of Russia evolved through
several stages from 1552 to the fall of the Russian empire in 1917. These stages mark radical
fluctuations in the Russian state’s attitude towards the Muslim subjects and were efforts by the
government to respond. So the Muscovite and Imperial Russian political attitude towards Islam
and Muslims, despite being eternally suspicious, was an extension of Russian pragmatism rather
than dogmatic religious fanaticism. While the first three Romanov Tsars’ attitudes toward
Muslims were relatively liberal24, Peter the Great and his immediate successors applied
considerable repression, as discussed in previous chapters.25 This radical change was most
possibly because of the state’s insistence on integrating non-Russians into the Russian system. It
must be noted that the first three Romanov tsars’ reigns were one of the periods of recuperation
from the wounds of the Time of Troubles and the central government was still relatively weak.
The Russian government was often suspicious of the Muslim population because Russia
had by far the largest Muslim population of any European state and that population often
22
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challenged Moscow’s authority.26 The government at times followed a conversion policy, and
the Muslims in response developed new ways to preserve their religious identity through various
means. Mass migration to other parts of the empire was one such method.27 While the state’s
use of force to convert Muslims was more common in areas where the state’s authority was
stronger, the frontier regions were islands of religious freedom despite sporadic and ambiguous
state attempts to proselytize the peoples of Bashkir frontier.28 As noted previously, the Muslim
Tatars of the Middle Volga faced state-sponsored, church-led violence in the 1740s and 1750s
but those Muslims who lived on the right side of the Volga lived relatively freely. However this
ambiguity led the Russian authorities to consider their chances to convert Bashkirs and the
foundation of an episcopate (Eparkhiia) in Ufa was proposed but this idea was quickly
abandoned as impractical.29

Bashkir Rebellions in Defense of Islam
Russian policies toward Islam and Muslims varied from time to time and lacked a fixed,
clear-cut, well-determined political program. In fact Muslims of the Middle Volga especially
sensed the arbitrariness of the Russian monarchs and their agents in the provinces. While one
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official remained indifferent to Muslims another could embrace a quite antagonistic attitude
towards them. As a result the period from 1552 to the foundation of Orenburg Muslims Spiritual
Assembly in 1788 was a period of irregular and unpredictable persecution.
Coincidentally, the greatest Bashkir revolts took place during this period. Even though
Bashkirs thanks to their frontier location were not the main targets of the Russian state’s
religious persecution they nevertheless twice rebelled in 1681-1683 and 1755-1756 partly
because of the ambiguity of the Russian state’s posture to their religious sensitivities. The
Russian government attempted to impose Russian culture and Christianity among peoples of
Middle Volga in 1676, provoking a rebellion that spread to western parts of Bashkiria. The
rebellion started in earnest in 1681 upon the decree by the authorities which ordered the
conversion of Tatar Murzas (Nobles) and common Tatars into Christianity. Animistic Bobyls
appealed to the authorities about the excessive financial demands by the Tatars landowners and
Tatars’ insistence on Bobyls’ conversion to Islam. "Apparently Murzas and Tatars in their
pomesties (a type of land not inheritable but given in return for service) and votchinas are
imposing heavy taxes on the peasants, causing resentment and forcing the peasants to adopt
Muslim faith."30
So the war of religions in fact was working in two different directions. Tatar Muslims of
Middle Volga region apparently were not idly waiting for their ultimate forceful conversion to
Christianity. They had their own means of struggle against Russian authority. These Muslims
communities in the Tatar lands just 200 miles from Moscow were intolerable for the Russians
and they moved vigorously against Volga Tatars to convert them, a policy which reached its
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peak in the mid-1740s.31 The Tatar communities’ defiance against the proselytizing policy of the
Russian state and their active missionary activities among the pagan peoples of the Middle Volga
region probably infuriated the Russian authorities. As a response to Tatar resistance, they
increased their pressure on Volga Tatars which led to their flight into Bashkir lands.
Tatar immigration and expansion of Russian efforts to convert Bashkirs provoked
Bashkirs to rebellion in the early 1680s. A key cause of the outbreak seems to have been the
rumor about the Bashkirs’ forceful conversion to Christianity.32 But there was palpable evidence
which added credibility to this rumor, because an Orthodox bishop was appointed to Ufa. The
idea of establishing an office of episcopate was based on the Russian wish to bring the Christian
message to the “savages” of Siberia.33
As was discussed in chapter 2, this led to the outbreak of the first religious rebellion of
Bashkirs. The religious nature of the rebellion was boosted by a rebel leader, a man called Seit,
who had a religious background. A primary text used by famous Russian Tatar orientalist
Katanov states that Seit was a Sufi saint who emerged among the Bashkir khans, and whose full
name was Seiid Dzha’far. He was alleged to be a miracle worker and he invited people to join
the Islamic faith. Yet the Bashkir peoples did not recognize him as a khan, refused to obey his
orders (perestali zhit’ po ego prikazanie).34 So there was a limit of the influence of the religion
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among Bashkirs. Their refusal to recognize him as the ultimate leader of Bashkirs is evidence
that Islam was still not a fundamental part of the Bashkir communal life.
Still, Seit’s Islamic background did not represent a major breach in the already existing
nomadic culture of the Bashkirs in the seventeenth century. From the available archival data, it
is difficult to determine the influence of Islam within the Bashkir communities. Neither Imperial
Russian nor Soviet and Post-Soviet scholars tend to study the place of Islam in the nomadic life.
What we know for sure from this period about the Bashkir society is that the Bashkir people
were only nominally Muslim and there are not available data if they had their own Islamic
institutions like madrasas and mosques. Despite these institutional shortcomings they
nevertheless embraced Islam by the 1680s and considered it as an inseparable part of Bashkir
culture and were ready to defend it.
As a result, the Russian government had to ensure that it had no proselytizing policy
towards Bashkirs after the 1681-1684 rebellion.35 This was the real success of the Bashkirs
because the Tsar considered them not as rebels but as wronged subjects with whom the
government had to negotiate. The long-term results of this rebellion and the eventual
concessions by the tsar were that there would be no more serious consideration, with the
exception of an ambiguous attempt in the first decade of the eighteenth century, by the
authorities to force Bashkirs to convert to Christianity.36
The ulama of the Volga-Ural region until Batyrsha did not form an alternative leadership
to the traditional Bashkir nomadic structure but it was clear that they had managed to attach
themselves to the existing leadership structure as secondary partners. From the 1660s on for the
35
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rest of the history of the Bashkir rebellions against the Russian state they always played an active
role in mobilizing people against the state or as intermediaries to conduct relations between local
people and the state. They attempted to create conditions for negotiable peace and they were
sent by the Russian state to the insurgents to abandon fighting. They emerged as a social group
with leadership potential even though they in principle did not have to have noble blood. So any
person from a modest background with adequate religious training and popularity could emerge
as a leader of their community.37
The classical madrasa system in Central Asia where many Bashkirs and Tatars studied
and accordingly brought the same system back to their native Volga-Ural region was “based on
one’s educational background, specifically the acquisition of knowledge through a maktab
(Islamic high school) then a madrasa education…. Moral character, knowledge of authoritative
texts, ethical norms, personal development, and spiritual cultivation (all aspects of the Islamic
ideal of adab) were acquired by individuals through the shared experience of traditional Islamic
education.”38 Any scholar in Bashkiria who received a similar religious education could easily
bring the congregation under his spell. Also during this period a mullah was not only a religious
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servitor and opinion leader but also a physician. As a result they could perform many different
and vital tasks in the community.
Peter the Great made Orthodox Church subject to his will and authority and he strongly
differed from his predecessors in his policy towards the Muslims of the empire. He had radical
plans to make Russia modern and more European which included changes in the status of the
Muslim subjects.39 For example Christianity was now the precondition for joining the landowning service elite. Those who refused to convert were reduced to the status of peasants and
lost their lands.40 Accordingly the main cause of the Tatar exodus to Bashkir lands was the
state’s relentless attacks on Muslims in Kazan Gubernia who lived not far away from Moscow.
The government’s efforts to persuade them to return failed as the Tatars and Mishars of
Bashkiria and Bashkirs themselves refused to obey the order of the state. “Many inovertsy have
escaped from the towns of the Kazan Gubernia and they continue to escape to Ufa uezd and
Bashkirs of Ufa and Mishars and Tatars refuse to return those fugitives.”41 These people who
escaped from Christianization to the safety of Bashkiria in the early 1700s were the most devout
ones religiously and at the first opportunity they introduced their Islam to Bashkirs.
The Russian government’s attitude in Bashkiria in matters relating to Islam was quite
timid, due to the weakness of the tsarist authorities in the region. The rebellion in the 1680s was
a good indicator that Bashkirs were quite intolerant of violation of their religious convictions
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which they saw as part of their Votchina rights. On the other hand the Russian government
mistrusted Islamic elements within empire’s frontiers, saw them as potentially prone to create
disturbances, and the authorities attempted to have, even if minimal, gains against Islam in the
regions where Muslims are majority as the imperial decree of 1704 exemplified. The
governmental decree of 1704 is a good example of how Russians were keen on getting the
minutest concessions from the Islamic community. They also avoided radical demands so as not
to disturb already fragile balance between the state and the non-Orthodox confessional groups.
The imperial authorities were not interested in destroying Islam but to make it a docile element
within the empire. Peter the Great’s discrimination of Muslims should have been considered as a
state policy of making Christianity as the defining identity of the imperial administration, the
Russian Orthodox church as a symbol of Russian statehood.42
As was already mentioned, the Bashkir rebellion of 1704-1711 was caused by the state’s
growing financial demands. These demands, however, also had religious components, On Peter
the Great’s insistence, including the conversion to Orthodoxy of believers from other faiths
(inovertsy),43 the construction of mosques in the model of an Orthodox church, the requirement
that marriages be held in the presence of an Orthodox bishop, and new taxes such as 5 rubles for
each mosque and between 3 and 6 kopecks from each village imam and same amount of money
from each mosque attendee.44 These were seemingly trivial details that proved to be important
from the Russian point of view because of the fact that the state desired to achieve some sort of
uniformity within the empire and control those elements that stood away from the center. The
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bishop’s presence as a servant of the government is a good indicator that the state attempted to
monitor non-Orthodox elements more closely. The reaction was a direct attack against anything
Christian which was seen as an expression of the state repression. In Kazan and Ufa uezds,
rebellious Bashkirs burned down 75 churches in 1709.45
The Russian state attempted sporadically to improve the role of Orthodoxy in the public
sphere, or at least to make it more visible to the Muslims. In this context the foundation of the
Ufa episcopate in the heart of Bashkiria in 1681 can be counted.46 As the colonization of
Bashkiria gained momentum and new town centers sprang up in the eighteenth century like
Orsk, Troitsk or Orenburg, churches decorated each town center bringing the symbols of
Orthodoxy just to the center of frontier life and an Islamic society. Tsars occasionally issued
orders and decrees which forbade the forceful conversion of Muslims to Orthodoxy. These
orders, however, did not prevent all proselytizing because they did not really provide a legal
foundation for the recognition of the Muslim communities in the empire as a legal group. So the
Tsar’s protection of Muslim communities was highly inconsistent. The clearest expression of
this inconsistency was that any Muslim who was found guilty of converting a Christian to Islam
or reneging Orthodoxy could be burned at the stake.47 There were examples of such cases in
Bashkiria. One of the most enlightened officials of the Imperial Russia, Tatishchev, applied this
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rule when a Christianized Bashkir, Toigyl’dy Zhuliakov, reverted back to his original Muslim
faith in 1740.48

Bashkirs’ Islamization and the Impact of Tatars
Despite these inconsistencies, Bashkirs’ embrace of Islam gradually increased. Islamic
institutions slowly emerged within the Bashkir community. One of the main indicators of the
Islamization of a community is the establishment of madrasas and their survival based on
community support. In the classical Islamic educational system the shakirds (madrasa students)
did not pay any fee but were supported by the community of the believers who generally founded
charitable endowments (Waqfs) in support of these institutions and shakirds. The presence of
madrasas and waqfs indicated sedentarization of that community because it showed that societal
relations and efforts were united around a common goal. These institutions were run by Muslim
scholars, initially without governmental control. Later on, realizing their potential of threat to
the Russian state, the government started to take certain measures.
The Russian state first began to bring akhuns (highest religious authority in Bashkiria at
district level) and mullahs under the supervision of the local administration in the 1730s.49 This
coincided with the Orenburg expedition because one of the main concerns of the Russian
authorities in Orenburg region was to minimize the influence of Tatars over Bashkirs. Ivan
Kirilov complained about the influence of Tatars over the local population arguing that “In all
those villages (between Volga and Ural mountains) the Tatars who moved from the Kazan
48
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District live in the capacity of mullahs and abyzes (one who has memorized the entire Qur'an by
heart). All of them are learned and intelligent men. Their word is received by the population as
a word of a prophet. For that reason, Tatar mullahs and abyzes should be expelled from the Ufa
district, and their madrasas should be closed, their students should be used as interpreters, etc.”50
He also pointed out a significant detail that all 10 akhuns51 in Bashkiria were Tatars and
requested a reorganization and closer governmental control over the services of akhuns. The law
of 11 February 1736 ordered reduction of the Akhuns from 10 to 4, one for each Doroga in
Bashkiria and specified that they be appointed by the state, a sign of the end of the free frontier
world for religious activists. The same law also banned the construction of any mosque and
school (Madrasa) without permission from the authorities. The Russian authorities in Orenburg
considered this measure necessary due to the fact that religious ulama in the region took an
active role in the rebellious movements and they even led a number of Bashkir raids directed
against the Russian or “loyal” settlements.52
Yet despite the fears of Kirilov and other Russian officials about the threat from the
Tatars, the Volga Tatar refugees had the greatest impact on the foundation and survival of these
Islamic institutions and on the Bashkir society’s Islamization. The first madrasas and maktabs in
Bashkiria after its incorporation into the Russian empire in the mid-1550s appeared during the
second half of the seventeenth century. These earlier madrasas were quite simple and had a
basic curriculum i.e. reading the Quran and learning the basic rules of an Islamic life.53 One of
the first and largest madrasas in Bashkiria was established in 1720 in Isterlibash, a Tatar
50

Ravilʹ Bukharaev, The Model of Tatarstan: Under President Mintimer Shaimiev, (New York: St. Martin Press,
1999), 56-57.
51
Akhun, a Persian word, is a term denoting a member of the Ulama.
52
Faizulkhak Islaev, Vosstanie Batyrshi god 1755, (Kazan: Fen, 2004), 15.
53
T. M. Aminov, M. G. Valeeva and Iu. N. Sergeev, “Dukhovnoe Obrazovanie” in Bashkirskaia Entsiklopediia, v.2,
ed., I. G. Akmanov and Aznagul Uruskulov, (Ufa: Nauchnoe Izdatel’stvo, 2005), 530.
235

settlement, founded between 1670 and 1680.54 Isterlibash made its fame as the Islamic education
center of Bashkiria that attracted students from surrounding areas.55 At some point for several
decades, there were as many as 150 Kazakh students attending madrasas in Isterlibash and
spending at least ten years among their ethnic brethren and coreligionists.56 The brightest years
of the madrasa were in the early 1800s under the mudarris (Professor at the Madrasa)
Nigmatullah Tukaev and his sons Muhammad Kharis and Muhammad Kharras, both of whom
graduated from the madrasas in Bukhara. In the early nineteenth century Isterlibash boasted
nearly 25 madrasas with a total 200 shakirds.57
The pattern that affected the functioning of a classical Volga Ural madrasa was
determined by the factors that could be seen in other parts of the Muslim world as well. In the
classical Islamic madrasa system the shakirds choose their professors rather than the madrasa
itself. Since the Volga Ural madrasas mostly employed only one mudarris and these mudarrises
specialized most of the time in only one Islamic field and mostly they owned one textbook, the
shakirds would study with that mudarris for a certain time and after they got ijazat (literally
permit; diploma) they would search for another mudarris to study another field of the Islamic
sciences. In Islamic countries of the time state-sponsored madrasas, though few in numbers,
could provide education in many fields. In Russia, on the other hand, the Muslim population
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lacked state funding and protection and the great majority of the madrasas were poor and
mudarrises were under-qualified.58 On the positive side the shakirds’ constant wandering in
search of different mudarrises enabled them to get to know the realities of their region and to
establish closer contact with the local population and serve their religious needs in case of the
lack of a local imam.
The famous phrase that defined Imperial Russia as a “prison of nations” seems
misleading considering the fact that the “Muslim prisoners” were freely able to travel to the
religious centers of Central Asia to get an Islamic education or to establish their own religious
institutions, madrasas, and mosques, even at times sponsored by the Russian officials or rulers
themselves. There is more evidence that this phrase was an exaggeration.59 One of the best
examples of this is seen in Orenburg gubernia when the Russian authorities in the midst of
religious repressions in Middle Volga area in the 1740s allowed Tatars to establish their own
settlements, mosques and madrasas in a sloboda 15 miles from Orenburg town center.
The madrasas in Isterlibash were overshadowed only by the madrasas of the village of
Kargala, founded by Tatars in 1745, upon the invitation of the governor of Orenburg gubernia,
Nepliuev.60 It was not the only Tatar settlement founded with the special permission of the
Russian authorities. In order to populate Orenburg Gubernia post-Nepliuev Russian local
authorities continued to invite Tatars to settle in the region.61 In any case Kargala, possibly
because of its proximity to Orenburg town center was the most famous Tatar settlement founded
during this period.
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Nepliuev was convinced that Muslim Tatars could help Russia develop trade relations
with the Central Asian cities and khanates. He, in a remarkable tone reflecting Russian officials’
views of Tatars, stated “I sent charters beyond Russia, inviting Kirgizes, Khivans, Tashkentians,
Kashgarians, Turkmens and Bukharans to conduct trade…. In this capacity I relied on
Mohammedans, Tatars of Seitov sloboda; these people (Tatars) can be blinded with greed and I
generously rewarded them and promised to shower them gifts in case they succeeded in their
mission. They so zealously worked through regions that as of 1745 we started a lucrative
business in Orenburg.”62 Russian authorities rightly believed that these Tatars of Kargala could
play an active role in the growing economy of the region and interregional trade. It truly did
fulfill expectations in this context but it also achieved something the Russian authorities in the
region could not foresee: it became an intellectual and educational center for the Muslim youth
and scholars for the rest of Imperial Russian history.
From the very beginning Tatars of Kargala were allowed by the Russian authorities in the
region to construct their sobornoe (stone) mosque in 1745 and they created an educational
complex within the confines of the mosque. The first madrasa was founded next year in 1746.
By the year 1802 there were as many as 5 madrasas and four maktabs attached to the complex of
the first mosque of Kargala. It was reformed as a posad (suburb) in 1784 by a Senate decree and
declared to be a ratusha (merchants’ council),63 thus further confirming Tatars’ dominant
position in international trade between Russia and Central Asia.
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Efforts to Convert Peoples of the Volga-Ural Region
The major problem for Islam in Russia until the reign of Catherine the Great was the lack
of legal protection. The religious endowments had no security and their property could be
confiscated at the whim of a Russian official in the region. The risk of confiscation prevented, or
at least slowed down, the development of Islamic institutions in Bashkiria, although in
comparison with the Middle Volga Tatars, Bashkirs did experience a great deal of religious
freedom.64 The blossoming of Islamic institutions played a determining role in the defense of
the ethnic identity against the onslaught of the Russian authorities, as Chernavskii indicated. He
argued that Mordvins and Chuvash unlike Tatars and Bashkirs showed much less resistance to
the Russian attempts of proselytization since both of them were pagans (Iazychniki) and
therefore lacked a systematically formed catechism which would have boosted worshippers’
dedication to their pagan religion.65
Catherine’s predecessors Anna and Elizabeth carried out this last attempt to convert
Russia’s Muslims. They were ardent Orthodox Christians and were rather keen on following in
the footsteps of Peter the Great to convert non-Orthodox people even at the risk of alienating
them and wasting their potential uses for Imperial Russia.
The Office of New Converts’ Affairs (Kontora Novokreshchenykh Del’) was established
by the Holy Synod in 1731 in Sviazhsk-Bogorodits monastery with the aim of spreading
Christianity among inovertsy of Kazan Gubernia. Andreas Kappeler argues that the office was
founded not on the initiative of the Russian church, because the church had lost its political
power and become an instrument of the state, but rather on the initiative of unbendingly
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westernizing Russian rulers. Peter the Great and his immediate successors dreamed of bringing
western civilization. “Behind the change stood new goals of westernization and of leveling and
systematizing Russia’s complex socio-cultural relationships”66
A branch of the office was opened in Nagaibak fortress in Bashkiria as well.67 In this
center inovertsy of Bashkiria were accepted into Christianity and there were cases of attempts to
convert Bashkirs forcefully into Christianity.68 In this context the Ukaz of 20 February 1744 by
the Imperial Senate decreed the destruction of newly constructed mosques where Orthodox
population was settled in Bashkiria and banned their reconstruction. This law reinforced the
earlier law that required official permission for the construction of mosques and schools in
Bashkiria.69 These efforts to contain the influence of Islam in Bashkiria by the authorities were
largely unsuccessful and at every opportunity the efforts of Office of New Converts’ Affairs
were undermined, and those who converted to Christianity were harassed. During the 1735-1740
war nearly 300 households of New Converts were destroyed.70 The vice governor of Orenburg
Gubernia, P. D. Aksakov, a practical minded administrator vigorously opposed the destruction of
mosques in Bashkiria since, he feared, Bashkirs could rise again and cause so many security
problems for the Russians in the region. Ignoring Aksakov’s point of view to a degree, the
Imperial Senate decreed to halt construction of mosques in the region.71
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The Russian state had neither resources nor enough personnel to enforce a full scale
Christianization of Bashkirs because the Office of New Converts’ Affairs was operating with a
limited budget and with very few men. On the other hand the governor of Orenburg gubernia,
Nepliuev, was a pragmatic administrator who opposed the use of force in the region for fear of
inciting another Bashkir rebellion and losing commercial contacts with central Asia, a vital link
for the economic well being of the region. The Orenburg defensive line had effectively isolated
Bashkirs within the Russian empire but their warlike potential was still alive.72 Nepliuev was not
alone in his convictions. Those Russian officials, Tevkelev and Rychkov, who knew the realities
of the region, also opposed the use of force.73 Accordingly the Russian state’s assimilationist
policy in Orenburg region was half-hearted and lacked determination.

The Batyrsha Incident, 1755-1756
As was argued by A. B. Iunusova, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Islam
became an additional factor in the formation of Bashkir ethnic consciousness and heavily
influenced ethno-cultural consolidation of Bashkir identity.74 During this period Islam quite
effectively, if not totally, entrenched itself in the daily and social life of Bashkirs. Marriages,
social and individual relations were all determined by the rules of Islam. The most visible
evidence of this impact was seen in the garments of women who increasingly adopted Islamic
tesettur (veiling; the influence of Tatars was undeniable) in the rituals relating to birth, death,
burial, circumcision of boys, the Islamic festivals like the celebration of the end of the fasting on
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the first day of Shevval of Islamic calendar, Qurban (slaughter) and Mewlid75 were closely
observed. Visiting the tombs of the Muslims saints buried in Bashkiria gained popularity.76
As Islam slowly penetrated to socio-economic aspects of the Bashkir society, religious
figures came to fore. Muslim scholars’ leverage increased and their leadership potential rose. It
is not surprising that the leader and ideologue of the Bashkir rebellion of 1756 was a mudarris, a
man called Abdullah Aleev, more popularly known as Batyrsha. He was born between 1710 and
1715. His ethnic background is a matter of speculation. He became the amateurish military
leader of a purely religious Bashkir rebellion in 1755-1756. At least where he studied is well
known. He attended a madrasa in Kazan Gubernia and studied under a Tatar Mullah called Abd
ar-Rakhman in the village Taisuga and then moved to the Tatar village Tashkichu and studied
under Abduseliama Uraev. His madrasa education lasted 12 years from 1734 to 1744. Once he
completed his madrasa education he started working as mudarris (Professor of Madrasa) in
Orenburg region; first in Osin doroga then in Isetsk province, east of Orenburg Gubernia.
Finally he managed to establish his own madrasa in a Mishar village, Karyshbash in Sibir
Doroga, and educated Tatar, Bashkir and Mishar youth. Thanks to his long years as a madrasa
student he mastered Islamic law (Sharia) and Islamic literature. As his popularity rose he was
invited by the Russian officials in Ufa Provincial Chancellery to write his fatwas (judicial
opinions) in issues relating to Muslim population in the region. He failed, however, to be an
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akhun of Sibir doroga because the starshina of the doroga preferred someone else to become
akhun.77
The story of Batyrsha is quite revealing with respect to the life of a mullah and the
situation in Kazan Gubernia during the Christianization campaign of the 1740s. As is
understood from his story, the state repression of Muslims in Kazan Gubernia was not universal
and mullahs were able to work in the madrasas to educate Muslim youths. The free movement
of shakirds from one madrasa to another apparently was not closely restricted and they were able
to choose their own mudarris in the madrasas. Also there were no restrictions by the Russian
authorities over the curricula of the madrasas. The presence of madrasas evidenced the
prosperity of the Muslim community in Kazan Gubernia and its ability to support these madrasas
financially. Those mullahs persecuted by the Russian state or who failed to find employment in
the Middle Volga region could travel to the Urals, where Bashkirs were the most numerous
Muslim group, to establish their own madrasas as was the case for Batyrsha.
It is also important to note that Mullahs, though their influence was rising, were not the
dominant social group in Bashkir society because the secular starshina could influence their
appointments as the legally recognized state officials for Muslims. This authority caused
resentment among the mullahs about the powers of starshinas over mullahs. As he made clear in
his program for the rebellion against the Russian authority, Batyrsha did not spare starshinas as
well and condemned their interference into matters relating to sharia law and demanded such
matters be left to ulama.78 So the dualism in leadership over Bashkir society led to the clash of
two groups. Batyrsha’s attempt to appear as the leader of the rebellion was a challenge to the
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authority of the starshinas within the Bashkir society as well since Batyrsha was in a position to
create an ideological program for the Muslims of the region and could appeal to greater masses
than starshinas could dream of.
As Batyrsha stated in his appeal to the empress Elizabeth, the Russian rule in the region
disappointed all Muslims and created a backdrop for their alliance against the Russian state. In
his long travels through the region he came across the opinions among Tatars and Mishars to
form an alliance with the Bashkir groups in case Bashkirs decided to rise against the state.79 The
only reliable alliance of such diverse peoples could be formed by a man of religion rather than by
a man representative of exclusive tribes. There was also hope of concluding an alliance with the
Kazakhs of Middle Horde whose seasonal migrations had been severely restricted by the Russian
authorities in the areas near Ishim River of south eastern Bashkiria, and Batyrsha believed that
Bobyls and Teptiars could join a rebellion as well.80
The other advantage of a mullah over a starshina is that while starshinas represented their
own clans, tribes or ethnic groups, a mullah could appeal to all the Muslims peoples of the
region. Since they all belonged to Sunni school of Islam and they shared the same ethnicity, a
mullah’s revolutionary appeal could be more universal than a local starshina. The acceptance of
their appeal by the Bashkirs is an indicator that Bashkirs’ Islamic sentiments had already taken
root and by neglecting Batyrsha’s dubious ethnic background they vigorously embraced his call
for arms.
The direct reason for the outbreak of the rebellion was the abolition of Iasak in Bashkiria
in 1754, which the Bashkirs interpreted as a violation of their votchina rights and a loss of status,
and the imposition of salt tax on Bashkirs which they had so far freely used. In fact with this
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new tax, even though Iasak collection was terminated Bashkirs were paying more than earlier.
The fermentation of the new uprising began in southern Bashkiria. Bashkirs of Nogai doroga
appealed to those Bashkirs of Sibir doroga where Batyrsha was serving at the time. Rebellious
Bashkirs realized the fact that they had no chance against the Russians alone, so they decided to
find a respected leader who could unite other non-Russian Muslim nationalities of the region
and, perhaps, to enlist the support of neighboring Muslim peoples of Central Asia. The choice
fell on Mishar Batyrsha mullah from the village Karyshbash, Sibir doroga.
The rebellion was quickly suppressed thanks to the vigorous measures of Nepliuev, and
Batyrsha was captured by the punitive forces and duly sent to St. Petersburg to be jailed in
Schlusselburg fortress. The three basic reasons for his failure was his lack of military
experience, his inability to unite all Muslims of the region under his banner and the rivalry with
traditional Bashkir leaders, the starshinas. He was killed several years later when he attempted
to escape from the prison after killing several of his guards, which made him a hero in the eyes
of Bashkirs. His memory was kept alive in the folk songs and tales. 81

Catherine the Great’s Policy of Religious Toleration
The most positive role of the abortive Batyrsha rebellion was the impression that it
fostered among higher Russian political circles about the futility of forced conversions. The
office of New Converts was finally dissolved several years after being halted after the Batyrsha
incident in 1764. It is interesting to note that even though Bashkirs fought in defense of their
religion they never declared Jihad against Russians. This might be an indicator that they were
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still at the initial stages of their Islamization and they were unaware of the basic Islamic
terminology or this term was too much popularized much later.
The state repression of Islam was the most widely hated aspect of Russian imperialism in
many ways because Islamic norms and notions were well adapted to the Bashkir culture and it
became an integral part of the Bashkir society. So any attack on Islam, any missionary activity
even in the most peaceful form raised opposition among Bashkirs. In the legislative commission
that Catherine II convened in 1767, one of the most basic demands of Bashkirs together with the
problem of land seizures in Bashkiria was religious freedom. Bashkir delegates flatly demanded
a grant of religious liberties and they included in their demand list the right to construct mosques,
to pray five times a day freely, to have two mullahs for each mosque; one Imam (prayer leader)
and one Muadhin (caller for prayer). They stated that these worship houses (dom molitva) were
needed because they would pray for the well-being of humanity and for the good health of the
Empress.82 Indirectly they were trying to say that they were the loyal subjects of her highness. It
is clear from their demands that Islam had already been an integral part of their society and
culture.
Muslims benefited from the reign of Catherine the Great. To the surprise of the
governing elite of Russia, she first abolished the Office of New Converts in 176483 and her edict
dated 17 June 1773 granted religious freedom to all faiths but in particular it was aimed at
Muslims.84 The edict forbade the destruction of mosques and promised non intervention in
matters relating to religious life. On the other hand it was clear that because of the rising
Orthodox population in the region and the successes of the local Russian authorities in
82

N. M. Kulbakhtin, Nakazy Narodov Bashkortostona v Ulozhennuiu Komissiiu 1767-1768 gg. (Ufa: Kitap, 2005),
92-93.
83
PSZ v. 16 no; 12126; She enacted this law in April 1764. Her abolition of this office is remarkable because she
was in power for less than a year after she overthrew her husband Peter III.
84
PSZ, v. 19, No: 13996
246

suppressing disturbances, the Russian authorities did not consider the region a part of the frontier
and the Bashkirs as dangerous elements. Catherine had immersed herself in the enlightenment
debate in Europe and she unlike previous rulers of Russia had a deep interest in the inovertsy.
The Russian military was strong enough to defeat potential Muslim rebels and this growing sense
of security led Catherine to issue the edict of religious tolerance. It was a political move that
indicates the state’s pragmatism as well. Catherine’s act was not purely due to her dedication to
enlightenment ideas but to her imperial visions. By incorporating the Muslim elite into the
imperial system she dreamed of strengthening Russia’s hands in the Islamic lands beyond
Russia’s reach.85 The creation of such an institution was also the expression of her desire to run
the empire on a more institutionalized base.
Considering the Russian efforts to proselytize non-Orthodox populations in Middle Volga
region and short-lived attempt to proselytize at least a small segment of the Bashkir society, it
can be argued that the Russo-Bashkir struggle took also a religious form. From today’s
perspective, it seems that while the Russians won the struggle in the military sphere, in the
religious sphere Muslims ably defended their distinct identity as Muslims. The Russian
government was capable of employing money, privileges, rewards, if all failed, force. It must
be, however, stressed that the imperial regime also had a lot of ambivalence and it changed
policies repeatedly and made occasional concessions. Muslims on the other hand had only two
means; persuasion (sometimes use of economic incentives to force animistic peoples to convert)
and trade relations with the non-Russian peoples of the Volga-Ural region. After Peter the Great
brought a new dimension to Russian imperial policy toward Asia, a third factor played a
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dramatic role: Muslims of Russia became too valuable for the Russian to conduct their relations
with the Central Asian Muslim Khanates. Accordingly frontier war in Bashkiria in the
eighteenth century evolved into a struggle of two different cultures where Russians were
incapable of defeating their opponents. On the contrary by the end of the century it became clear
that Bashkirs were more Islamic than before partly because of the Russian repressions.
The clearest evidence of Russia’s defeat in this struggle was the decision to establish the
Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly. It was the symbol that Russians could not and would not
be able to destroy or assimilate the Bashkirs. On the other hand, it must be stressed that there
was not a continuous imperial policy to exterminate Islamic elements in Russia. It is undeniable
that some Russian rulers and a few Russian officials were enthusiastic proselytizers but theirs
were short lived attempts. The Russian imperial authorities faced the dilemma of converting
Bashkirs to Christianity or letting Bashkirs leave on their own in religious matters. Due to the
rebelliousness of Bashkirs the second method was the dominant policy. In the same context
Firouzeh Mostashari maintains that the Russian state had the same dilemma and that the Russian
administration in North Caucasus was bolder in missionary activities where the local resistance
was negligible while the rebellious Dagestan and Chechnya were beyond such considerations.86
The regime established the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly in 1788 after Catherine
the Great’s reforms of the nobility and the townspeople. This was part of her enlightened
absolutism, a kind of old-regime corporatism that brought different groups in Russia under
government oversight. Mark Raeff described it as ‘the well-ordered police state,’ a term from
the eighteenth century. Such institutions were part of a larger government policy toward most of
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the groups of the Russian empire. Muslims of the Russian empire were by no means the only
group who received a governmental religious tolerance. Even those Christian groups, Old
Believers, who had been persecuted in the past Under Peter I, Anna and Elizabeth were also
granted religious freedom, promised free use of their rituals and prayerbooks and those who had
fled Russia in the past to Poland, Moldavia and even Turkey were lured back by the
government.87
Catherine the Great’s enlightened despotism produced state toleration for the Muslim
communities within the defined boundaries. However her policy of toleration must not be
understood as universal toleration of the tsarist state to all religious confessional groups. Certain
Christian heretics or atheists were still targeted by the state and they were still subject to
prosecution. The Russian state’s attempt to bring the Muslim community under the umbrella of
the secular state was aimed at better controlling the Muslim community, creating a Muslim
ummah (any Muslim community) that would be loyal to the Russian state and employing these
loyal Muslims elements in Central Asia to promote Russian interests.88
One example of this policy was that while the government tolerated Old Believer heresy,
it felt compelled to preserve existing Islamic orthodoxy, however questionable, in the face
emerging heretical Islamic views. A certain mullah called Murat Ishapov was denounced to the
governor of Orenburg, I. A. Reinsdrop, by the akhun of Seitov sloboda Abdulnasyr
Abdusaliamov and a number of mullahs with the accusation that Ishapov had dangerous religious
beliefs and disseminated them. In their report they claimed that Ishapov wrote books in
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contravention to Islamic canonical rules and this created anger (vozmushchenie) among the
Muslim population.
The governor immediately investigated the issue and the materials which were found in
the house of Ishapov were sent to the petitioners who were scholars themselves, to search to find
anything heretical in those books. The scholars concluded that he had committed heresy because
he attempted to create a new religious law based on the Old Testament, New Testament, and
Quran. The Russian authorities clearly collaborated with the Muslim scholars in this issue to
avoid any upheaval in the region, fearing that Murat had the potential to become another
Batyrsha. Murat and a few of his followers were duly exiled. Reinsdrop was more than careful
for the tranquility of his Gubernia and sent his orders to Bashkir, Mishar, and Teptiar starshinas
forbidding the release (otpuskat’) of pilgrims to visit Biliarsk where the ruins of the Bulghar
khanate were found. (Murat had declared that that spot was a sacred place). The persecution of
Muslim religious heresy was an application of the government’s policy of collaborating with the
religious and local Muslim leadership to avoid local crises.89 It also showed the limits of
religious tolerance on the part of the authorities. As long as religious movements lacked political
and destabilizing dimensions, Russian authorities were ready to grant religious tolerance.
The case of Murat Mulla was a proof that Muslim religious life and education must have
been regularized and standardized to avoid heresy and currents distasteful to the state.
Establishment of such an institution (the Spiritual Assembly) within the state administration as
an extension of the state power to the Muslim population of the region was desirable. The
authorities believed that such an institution could also be used to extend the sway of the Russian
state beyond the borders of the Russian empire and to Islamize and pacify the “unruly” Kazakhs.
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The Russian state with the foundation of an official Muslim religious institution was passing
from the stage of repression to the stage of active cooperation and integration of a religion into
the political system of the empire.
The imperial decree that announced the foundation of the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual
Assembly is the turning point for the Muslim peoples of Russia.90 As was mentioned it was not
simply the product of Catherine’s enlightened despotism. Fortunately she always managed to
work with talented and capable officials. One of them was a certain Osip Igel’strom who was
originally a Baltic German. He served in the Russian army during the Russo-Turkish wars of
1768-1774 with distinction. He was also the first Russian governor of the newly acquired
Crimea and was very successful in integrating the peninsula to the empire by getting the
cooperation of the Crimean Tatar nobility. Igel’strom’s governing style was to get the support of
the local elite without which in his opinion it was impractical to rule and difficult to succeed to
establish an effective administration. It was necessary to cooperate with the local Muslim elite to
assimilate the Muslim masses.91
He was sent to Orenburg as governor in 1784 and one of his first acts was to employ a
Bashkir noble, Muhammadzhan Huseinov, as his agent in his relations with the Kazakhs.
Muhammadzhan Huseinov after Kutlu-Muhammad Tevkelev was the first non-Russian envoy of
the Russians to Kazakhs. Unlike Tevkelev, he remained a Muslim while Tevkelev converted to
Christianity bearing the name Aleksei Ivanovich. Igel’strom considered him as a man to be
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trusted. So not surprisingly Huseinov became the first mufti of the Spiritual Assembly when it
was opened on 4 December 178992 and remained in that post until he died in 1824. His scholarly
side, it was argued, remained weak. He was ethnically a Bashkir who was born in a village,
Sultanai, near Ufa in 1758. He studied in the madrasas of Kargala village and then in Central
Asia and Kabul. He was an adept negotiator and his first valuable service to the Russian state
was to persuade Kabardinian rebels to cease fighting against the Russian state. He was also a
good organizer and vigorously worked to bring a more formal form of Islam to Kazakhs of the
Little Horde among whom religious courts were founded and the same thing was repeated in the
Northern Caucasus as well. Muhammadzhan Husainov became the embodiment of the Islamic
clergy’s victory over the secular Bashkir starshina, none of whom could exert so wide authority
from North Caucasia to Kazakhstan.
Muhammadzhan Husainov’s efforts to make the Assembly the leading Islamic institution
earned him opponents from both starshinas and Russian officials when he attempted to elevate
his official status within the Empire. Osip Igle’strom and his successor as governor of Orenburg
A. A. Peutling, managed to limit Husainov’s ambitions. Officials repeatedly reminded him that
his powers were limited to religious matters.93 With the initial Russian connivance and support,
however, the institution grew by leaps and bound and in 1800, in Orenburg region there were
1921 Muslim religious officials under the supervision of the Assembly.94
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Bashkir Popular Islam
While at the official level the Muslims were recognized as a legal group, at a societal
level Bashkirs were drawing closer and closer to an Islamic life and making it an integral
element of their society. A significant indicator of the penetration of Islam thoroughly into the
minds of Bashkirs is evidenced in Bashkir folk songs which had themes of Islam and its role in
the daily life of Bashkirs. These songs, dating from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, are
deeply religious, extensively using Islamic concepts and rituals of death, purification of soul,
repentance and appeal for forgiveness. Much less known Islamic angels like Munkar and Nakir
are also added into the vocabulary of these songs.95
Every man leaves this world. It is final
His property cannot help him at all
So keep in mind you are mortal,
Repent and purify your heart!
Now you are alive,
The soul will leave your body.
Don’t be caught off guard,
Repent and purify your heart!
Your body falls ill,
Here comes Azrail
Inheritors try to kill
Repent and purify your heart!
----Once you are in the pit
Munkar and Nakir interrogate it
How will you answer them?
Now nobody knows how you are in the pit. 96
By the beginning of the nineteenth century Islam was a dominant factor in the life of the
Bashkirs. In education, for example, the number of religious schools under the Orenburg
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Muslim Spiritual Assembly in Menzelinsk Uezd, Ufa province, increased from 21 in 1820 to 129
by 1868.97 Unfortunately the documents of the Assembly about the exact numbers of maktabs
and madrasas were lost in fires during the first half of the nineteenth century or were seriously
harmed due to the ignorance of the Muslim officials who worked in the Assembly. Accordingly
we also do not know the exact number of Bashkir students who attended these schools. And in
fact there was no such categorization along the ethnic lines among the Muslims of the Volga
Ural region partly due to the fact that intermarriages abounded and it was difficult to determine
the ethnic identity of a student.
Another indicator of Islam among the Bashkirs in the nineteenth century was the
availability of Bashkir Spiritual leaders among the Muslims of the region. The last great
Nakshibandi sheikh of the Volga-Urals, Shaykh Zaynulla Rasulev (1735-1917), was a Bashkir
who was portrayed by the Tatar periodical Vaqit “as the spiritual King of his people.” He
received his first education in his native village’s madrasa from Damulla Muhammad Bukhari, a
Bukharan scholar.98 Since his story is beyond the scope of this dissertation I will not go into
details of his life. But what is clear from his life is that the Bashkir lands were the hub of Islamic
life which attracted Muslim scholars, mudarrises, and members of ulama from the surrounding
regions.
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Conclusion
At the beginning of the nineteenth century Islam and Bashkir ethnic identity were mixed.
All Bashkirs were recognized as Sunni Muslims while there was a large group of Tatar
Christians (Kriashens). The Russian efforts to proselytize Bashkirs were half-hearted and they
always met with strong resistance by these people. Even from among those Bashkirs who were
captured and sent to European Russia as slaves during the 1735-1740 war, there were some
Bashkirs who managed to escape from captivity and return back to their native lands. The
dynamics of Bashkir efforts to preserve their religious identity are still not widely studied. Yet
there are clues that they understood Islam and Bashkir identity as inseparable. The patterns of
their sedentarization went hand in hand with their Islamization and they mostly struggled against
the Russians. After the foundation of the Assembly99 a dominant Volga-Tatar community
emerged which patronized Islamic scholarly life, and Volga Tatars attempted late in the
nineteenth century to create a Tatar cultural empire in the region. In that period, most of the
Bashkir efforts to prevent their assimilation were directed against Tatar cultural hegemony. This
struggle has lasted to this day and taken political overtones.
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Epilogue
For the most part of the twentieth century, empires were condemned as evil, repressive,
pre-modern, arbitrary and simply ‘imperialist’. On the other hand nation states were eulogized as
something good, legitimate and representative of modern times. By the end of the last century
states based on nations proved much more catastrophic and they were identified with ethnic
cleansings, deportations and inter-ethnic violence with varying degrees of intensity. It would be
quite erroneous to assume that empires are the organisms that did not have excesses. Imperial
rule is prone to deportations, resettlements, colonial wars etc. But it must be stressed that the
subject peoples also benefited from such rule as a result of the imperial regimes’ inclusive
nature, as long as subject peoples adopted imperial rule and proved willing partners of the
imperial regimes.1
The new Russian imperial historians have stressed that the Muscovite and Imperial Tsars
were pragmatic rulers who were flexible enough to incorporate the local elite into service once
strong opposition to the Tsarist regime in the newly acquired lands disappeared. Moscow in this
respect did not hesitate to work with the Muslim elite as long as they served the purpose. Unlike
West European colonial empires, Russian empire proved to be a much less rigid organism in
managing the empire in terms of its treatment of the nationalities. The imperial administration
was open to gifted peoples of non-Russian nationalities. Although their conversion to Orthodoxy
was wished, non-Orthodoxy was not a major impediment for the promotion.
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The imperial systems in Europe showed various forms of organization and ideologies. A
recent study has argued that multi ethnic gentry dominated the administration of the Russian
empire and Russian peasants could be owned as serf by non-Russian, non-Orthodox and even
non-Chriatian nobleman.2 On the other hand a Muslim Tatar of Middle Volga region or a
Bashkir continued to lead their lives as freemen, not owned by a noble. Bashkirs in this respect
were no exception to the Russian policy of ‘pragmatic flexibility.’ Even those who had rebelled
in the past were pardoned and were given important posts in their own localities. This policy of
amnesty is also an indicator of a self-confident imperial system in which the Tsars sought
cooperation rather than revenge. Thanks to this pragmatic flexibility even though the Bashkirs’
traditional pastoral economy was devastated, they nevertheless benefited from this rule in other
ways.
Bashkiria, as Steinwedel argues, was integrated into the Russian Empire from the 1760s
to 1860s in three overlapping stages. Steinwedel analyzed integration of a region rather than
people. He mostly interpreted the region’s history from the Russian perspective and analyzed
the Russian state’s policies in the region. His book chapter mostly deals with the issue of
bringing European culture to Bashkiria but fails to evaluate the impact of that westernization on
the Bashkir people.3 My essay has focused on the previous period of Russo-Bashkir relations
and focused more on the Bashkirs themselves.
My study fits into the new imperial studies where the focus is the native peoples instead
of the Russian state or Russian people. Since it is impossible to write a Bashkir history
independent of Russian influence because of the long Russian presence, I analyzed the
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interactions between Russian state and Bashkir society. My purpose was to approach a much
neglected nationality from a general perspective to treat Russia as an empire composed of many
diverse national groups. I realized that Russian rule in the long run was beneficial for Bashkir
people because the more Russian state increased its power in the region the more Bashkirs
became sedentarized and the more they became institutionalized as a distinct ethnic group once
the Russian authorities established Bashkir cantonal system in 1798.
The Russian government’s lack of a premeditated policy regarding Bashkiria, aside from
extracting as much Iasak as possible, was the shaping feature of their relations with the Bashkirs.
Muscovite rulers had conflicting practices: while granting Bashkirs autonomy, they violated this
grant in many occasions during the seventeenth century thereby provoked Bashkir rebellions.
Therefore the Russian policy pertaining to the Bashkirs and Bashkir lands during the Muscovite
era looks like a hesitation waltz.4
These rebellions had a certain formative effect on Bashkirs’ identity. As I have argued in
my dissertation, Bashkir identity was shaped by their struggle against Russian authority in
defense of their economy, autonomy and religion. These features made them different from their
Middle Volga brothers, the Volga Tatars. Frontiers are the places where two or more distinct
cultures meet and transform each other. This was exactly what happened in Bashkiria, which for
more than two hundred years formed Russia’s southeastern frontier. The Bashkirs started under
Russians as a largely nomadic society. At the end of the period (the first quarter of the
nineteenth century) they had become a largely sedentary society. During this process they
encountered their Muslim Turkic brothers, Volga Tatars, who escaped from the Russian, initially

4

The phrase “Hesitation waltz’ belongs to Marc Raeff. Although he referred to Muscovy in general but I see it as
applicable to Bashkir- Russian relations more generally. Marc Raeff, Understanding Imperial Russia, State and
Society in the Old Regime, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 11.
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punitive, later repressive, policies and other groups. All of them, more or less, left their imprint
in the formation of Bashkir identity.
Their encounter with these economically more advanced, culturally more sophisticated,
and religiously more devout peoples who formed a role model for Bashkirs had a transforming
effect on them. Most of the time, as we have seen in the history of Bashkir rebellions, they
clashed over the economic resources of the region. While Tatars, as farmers, demanded more
fields, Bashkirs, as nomads, demanded more pasturelands. Yet the Bashkirs helped the Tatars by
providing a safe ground for Tatars to retain their cultural integrity.
Because of the Bashkirs’ rebelliousness, Russians never managed to impose harsh
proselytizing policies in the region. On the other hand, the Russians’ contribution to the region
and the Bashkirs was to bring a genuine urban culture and prepare conditions that had a
transformative effect on Bashkirs. The Russians’ effects on the lives of the people proved to be
constructive as well as destructive. The old nomadic world of the Bashkirs was effectively
crushed by the Russians to a great degree. Yet as noted earlier, nomadic elements survived
within the Bashkir society as late as the end of the Romanov dynasty. As Charles Steinwedel
argued, Russian imperial policies in Bashkiria attempted to create Bashkir loyalty to the Russian
state, to settle nomadic Bashkirs, for which in fact in the eighteenth century there was not a
predetermined and comprehensive imperial plan, and to regulate Bashkir services to the state.
All of these aspects, in Steinwedel’s view with which I concur, played a determining role in the
promotion of Bashkirs as a coherent ethnic group with a specific territory.5
Bashkirs served in the Russian armies loyally at various times. During the French
invasion of Russia, out of 29 irregular cavalry units, 20 of them were Bashkir irregulars. Even if
5

Charles Steinwedel, “Tribe, Estate, Nationality: Changing Conceptions of Bashkir Particularity within the Tsar's
Empire” Ab Imperio, 2, (2002), 252.
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they were of limited use against the French, they were nevertheless able to suppress domestic
unrest in the provinces along Napoleon’s route to and from Moscow.6 The symbolic meaning of
this Bashkir participation in the war against the French was great. Even though Bashkirs earlier
fought on the side of the Russians against the Crimean Tatars or Polish, in this patriotic war
against a foreign power which had invaded Russia, Bashkir efforts were significant signs of their
changed relationship to Russia. This loyalty was not without foundations; in 1798 Russian state
finally established a military cantonal system in Bashkiria which became the basis of Bashkir
estate system. It was an indicator that Bashkirs were not as nomadic as earlier and they could be
attached to a certain permanent location within Bashkiria.
Russian rule in the region finally managed to create a peaceful Bashkir population, which
came at a significant price for the Bashkirs. I. G. Akmanov in one his works stated that the price
of this transformation for Bashkirs was to end up the third largest ethnic group in their native
lands after Russians and Tatars. On the other hand large portions of historical Bashkiria were
alienated from the Bashkirs. For example, in 1881, historical Bashkir lands were further divided
into two provinces: Ufa and Orenburg. Ufa province at the end of the nineteenth century
demographically was dominated by a Muslim population that comprised 55 percent of the
overall population. This aspect of the region made it the most Muslim province in the whole
empire outside of Central Asia. It was a genuine imperial province with diverse cultures;
Muslim Tatars, Mishars, Teptiars, Bashkirs and Orthodox Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians,
and animist peoples. In Orenburg, however, Baskirs and Tatars were both definitely a minority,
which in theory meant Orenburg was no longer a part of Bashkir homeland demographically.

6

Dominic Lieven, Russia against Napoleon: The True Story of the Campaigns of War and Peace, (Newyork:
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The effects of demographic crisis are still felt in Bashkiria. Bashkirs are still the third
largest group in Bashkiria after Russian and Tatars. Another problem that makes the situation
even more complicated is that in Bashkiria 72 percent of the Bashkir population considers
Bashkir language as their native language. The remaining 28 percent either speaks Tatar or
Russian as main language.7 The Bashkir government’s current policies in Bashkortastan since
1991 have been a constant source of irritation for Tatars.8
The period from 1552 to 1824 was a formative period for Bashkirs, at the end of which
they were just at the middle of their way to the modernity. Aspects of modernity are represented
by literacy, secular intellectual classes, a fully sedentary life, and a growing urban culture. In
1824 none of these aspects was available in the Bashkir society to its full extent. Sedentarization
was still developing. Literate groups were slowly emerging but a secular national intellectual
class was still missing. In fact intellectual life was mainly dominated in the 1800s by the more
erudite, more international, more cosmopolitan and richer Volga Tatars. Accordingly there
emerged a Tataro-Bashkir conflict by the end of the nineteenth century, and Bashkirs took refuge
under the umbrella of the Russian autocracy to protect their distinct identity. This was an uneasy
alliance but perhaps a necessary one if Bashkirs did not want to merge with the Tatar culture.
This conflict has continued in various ways to this day. The Russian policies played a
part in this conflict. The borders of Tatars and Bashkirs were drawn in such a way that today
there are more Tatars in Bashkiria than Bashkirs. The situation is more complicated than it may
seem. The national question between these two groups never revolves around unification of
them. The psychological barrier is too strong to encourage them to think about such a
7

Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia, 2003, 3rd edition by Europa Publications Limited (London: Europa,
2003), 359.
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conclusion. This conflict which is mentioned constantly in publications is in fact a continuation
of the Bashkirs’ national formation which started in earnest in 1552 when the Russian tsar
granted them an exceptional client status.9
I was in Bashkiria between 2000 and 2002. In one of my interviews with the Bashkort
high school principal where I was working as a teacher, he stated that he was against Turkish
schools in Bashkortostan for fear, he supposed, that our goal was to Turkify Bashkort youth. He
was quite sympathetic to Russians because they were ethnically, linguistically, and culturally
different from Bashkirs and there was no likelihood for Bashkir youth’s Russification. In this
context it has appeared that the current problem of Bashkir national identity has been based on
the fear of the similar ethno-cultural elements which seem more sophisticated, though this term
can be contested, than that of Bashkirs. So the post-Soviet period in Bashkiria has witnessed a
rising Bashkir conservatism in preserving Bashkir identity which is based on near deification of
Salavat Iulaev, ironically an anti-Russian Bashkir hero.

9

To grant client status would mean that Russian Tsar recognized Bashkiria as territory beyond Russian central
control, not as part of Russia.
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